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Abstract  
 
In 1974 the Committee on Banking Regulations and Supervisory Practices 
was created and supported by the Bank for International Settlements. It 
was envisaged that a forum should be created so that regular interaction 
and co-operation could be achieved by member countries to improve 
financial stability and to enhance the quality of banking supervision. 
 
The aim of this research is to examine the risks and shortcomings posed 
by Basel III; specifically capital ratios, credit rating agencies and value-
at-risk. These are based on the author’s initial research that indicated 
these to be the most problematic. The research also aims to provide 
recommendations in order to improve Basel III. Additionally, the research 
includes Basel I and II to illustrate the developments, problems and 
milestones to create a wider appreciation of this area. 
 
The title of this research is tackled extensively in Chapters 4 and 5 where 
the risks and shortcomings are considered in the former and 
recommendations are put forward in the latter. This consists of changes 
that are taking place or have been suggested. It is argued that there is 
still much work to do, but there has been significant improvement(s). 
 
The main contribution to knowledge and understanding the field in the 
form of originality is found throughout the research in its treatment of 
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the subject matter and can also be viewed substantially in Chapter 5. The 
recommendations can be summarised below. 
 
Capital Ratios  
1. A longer implementation period for liquidity coverage ratio and high 
quality liquid assets. 
2. A longer implementation period for high quality liquid assets in a 
European context. 
3. High quality liquid assets need re-categorisation.  
4. The creation of a dedicated liquidity risk management team. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies  
1. International Organisation of Securities Commissions model and more 
enforceability through regulators and governments. 
2. Tighter regulation through the Basel regulations. 
3. The creation of a public credit rating agency. 
4. Uniformity on whether agencies offer opinions or advice and more 
accountability through the Basel regulations. 
 
Value-at-Risk  
1. Research and investment to improve credit value adjustment value-
at-risk.  
2. The use of all three conventional approaches - Analytical 
Variance/Covariance, Historical, and Monte Carlo. 
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3. Penalising those who manipulate value-at-risk to turn 
products/positions from high risk to low risk.  
 
   v 
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of the research is to examine the risks and shortcomings 
posed by Basel III and recommendations will be provided on those risks 
in order to improve Basel III. Before we begin, it would be fruitful to 
briefly illustrate the structure of the research and what will be explored 
over the coming chapters. This will allow the reader to envisage the route 
that the research has taken and guide the reader to the end. 
 
Structure of research 
 
To reiterate, it will be useful to begin with the structure of the research 
and what each chapter heading will be, alongside a small description of 
what the chapter will entail and what the main points of discussion will 
be. By doing so the reader can fully grasp and envisage the research. The 
layout of the research may change over time due to factors that could 
arise over the coming years, but the author will closely follow the 
structure explained below in order to support the research title.1 
 
Chapter 1 - Introduction  
The first chapter will provide a brief overview that will include an 
introduction to the Basel regulations, 2  the Committee on Banking 
                                               
1 It should be noted ‘the research’ refers to this thesis and ‘author’ refers to the writer of 
this thesis, unless otherwise stated. 






Regulations and Supervisory Practices (later renamed Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision3 in 1989, hereinafter Basel Committee) and the 
Bank for International Settlements4 (BIS). The aims and objectives of the 
research will be expounded followed by theory and methodology. In 
addition, a succinct overview of Basel I along with strengths and 
weaknesses will be illustrated before concluding. Chapter 1 will end with 
a conclusion.  
 
Chapter 2 - Basel II  
The second chapter will discuss Basel II and how it developed from Basel 
I. Chapter 2 will consider the problems that arose, as well as inherited, 
and how that led to Basel III. This chapter will focus heavily on the three 
pillars that Basel II is known for and by splitting them into individual parts 
the author will disseminate Basel II before assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses. A conclusion will be provided at the end so that Chapter 3 
can follow. 
 
Chapter 3 - Basel III 
The third chapter will give an in depth analysis of Basel III and how its 
structure has changed from the previous two iterations. A more 
comprehensive review will be given because it is the current version and 
most relevant to the research. Chapter 3 will also include strengths and 
                                               
3 The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is, in short, a group consisting of 
supervisory authorities. It will be explained in much more detail in due course. 
4 The Bank for International Settlements is an international financial institution. It is owned 






weaknesses which corroborates with the previous two chapters, this will 
enable Chapter 4 to begin and lead onto the poignant part of the research 
- risks and shortcomings.  
 
Chapter 4 - Basel III risks and shortcomings 
The fourth chapter will examine the areas that show obvious concern. 
This will be an important chapter that will primarily endeavour to support 
the research title. It is this chapter that will define the entire research 
and prove those areas of risk most problematic. By coherently explaining 
the problems that exist, evidence will be gathered from all sources and 
will be used to support that Basel III still has many weaknesses despite 
it being the third version of the Basel regulations. 
 
Chapter 5 - Conclusions and recommendations 
The final chapter will provide conclusions and recommendations. This will 
be in regard to the three areas of risk examined in Chapter 4 and as such 
recommendations will be put forward which will draw on current 
recommendations, expansion of current recommendations, and creating 
new recommendations for improving the Basel regulations. Reference will 
also be made to the eventuality of Basel IV and what it may look like and 
the likelihood that Basel IV may be very close to being introduced by the 





that Basel IV is already being produced.5 In recent times and since the 
research began, it can now be interpreted as Basel III additional material 
rather than Basle IV. Chapter 5 will bring together everything that has 
been written from the previous chapters in order to illustrate the findings 




The research title is - Banking regulation and the Basel III Accord: 
An examination of the risks and shortcomings posed by Basel III. 
As the title indicates the research is solely concentrated on the Basel 
regulations. 
 
The Basel regulations is a document consisting of many rules that aim to 
positively reinforce banking regulation and financial stability that the 
banking world should seek to incorporate into domestic law, whether it 
be in part or in full and to bolster domestic law and regulation. As Ahmed 
states, ’The Basel accords are merely a concordat among developed 
countries describing recommendations…‘.6 The author would stipulate 
that whilst the Basel regulations are recommendations, it will be 
ascertained over the course of the research that it is far reaching. 
                                               
5 KPMG, ‘Basel 4 - Emerging from the Mist?’ 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/pdf/2013/09/emerging-from-the-mist.pdf 
accessed 22 November 2014. 
6 J M Ahmed, ‘A Conceptual Framework for the Basel Accords Based Regulation’ (2016) 






Basel I was created with the greatest intention to improve stability and 
capital strength as highlighted by the then Financial Services Authority7 
(FSA) who said Basel I is to, ’…help strengthen the soundness and 
stability of the international banking system as a result of the higher 
capital ratios that it required‘.8 This was adopted in the United Kingdom 
by the FSA, now the Financial Conduct Authority9 (FCA), and policed by 
the Bank of England. This still emanates today and is what the Basel 
regulations continuously endeavour to achieve. 
 
The Basel regulations are devised and managed by the Basel Committee 
with the support of the BIS. A specific definition of the Basel Committee 
can be extrapolated from the BIS: 
 
 ’The Basel Committee is the primary global standard-setter for  
 the prudential regulation of banks and provides a forum for  
 cooperation on banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to  
 strengthen the regulation, supervision and practices of banks  
 worldwide with the purpose of enhancing financial stability‘10  
 
                                               
7 A quasi-judicial body that dealt with regulation of financial services. This body has now 
been replaced by the Financial Conduct Authority. 
8 Financial Services Authority, ‘The Basel Accord and Capital Requirements Directive’ 
http://www.fsa.gov.uk/about/what/international/basel accessed 7 October 2014. 
9 The Financial Conduct Authority replaced the Financial Services Authority in 2013. 
Again, it is a financial regulatory body but it is independent from the UK government. 
10 Bank for International Settlements, ‘About the Basel Committee’ 






Essentially, the Basel Committee consist of a group of banking 
supervisory authorities that began several years before the enactment of 
Basel I. 
 
The Basel Committee was created in 1974 shortly after the collapse of 
the German bank, Bankhaus Herstatt.11 It was considered that a set of 
rules were needed to ensure a future collapse of this kind never happened 
again. The purpose of such was to establish an agreement among the 
G10 central banks so that consensus could be achieved to enable a 
minimum set of capital rules which in turn could be applied to the banking 
industry;12 simply put, a forum for dialogue. 
 
Since Basel I was published in 1988 two further iterations have been 
devised; Basel II in 2004 with an implementation date of 200613 and 
Basel III in 2010 with an implementation date of 2019.14 As will be 
pointed out in Chapter 3, due to the complexity and changes made to 
Basel III there is a notably long time lapse between publication and full 
implementation. This is due to, for example, the significant changes in 
capital requirements that mean adoption of such rules will take time. 
                                               
11 Bank for International Settlements, ‘A Brief History of the Basel Committee’ 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.pdf page 1 accessed 7 October 2014. 
12 Bank for International Settlements, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards’ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs04a.htm accessed 7 October 2014. 
13 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel II: International Convergence of Capital 
Measurement and Capital Standards: A Revised Framework’ 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.htm accessed 7 October 2014. 
14 European Banking Authority, ‘Implementing Basel III Europe: CRD IV Package’ 







In very recent times there is still a strong need for regulation, especially 
when it comes to capital and liquidity. This can be seen from the recent 
collapse of VBS Bank.15 Whist a mutual bank, which does not have the 
same regulatory standards (Basel III) compared to commercial banks,16 
it does highlight the importance of regulation, capital adequacy and 
liquidity.17 It should be acknowledged that the collapse of VBS bank was 
affected by several individuals within the bank’s hierarchy, politicians, 
and changes in legislation which resulted in large sums of money being 
withdrawn from the bank causing a liquidity crisis; whilst the former 
reason is not an area of the research it does highlight the importance of 
regulation and liquidity. The author would stipulate that this very recent 
case illustrates the significance of the research in which continued efforts 
are needed when it comes to regulation, capital and liquidity, even when 
capital adequacy ratios and liquidity requirements are exceeded.18 These 




                                               
15 Renee Bonorchis, ‘South Africa’s VBS Mutual Bank Fails Amid ‘Severe Liquidity Crisis’’ 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-11/s-africa-s-vbs-mutual-bank-fails-
amid-severe-liquidity-crisis accessed 1 November 2018. 
16 Sunita Menon, ‘VBS Mutual Bank: How Did We Get Here?’ 
https://www.businesslive.co.za/fm/features/2018-03-13-vbs-mutual-bank-how-did-we-get-
here/ accessed 1 November 2018. 
17 See Siseko Njobeni, ‘VBS Bank Liquidity is ‘Far Worse’’ https://www.iol.co.za/business-
report/companies/vbs-bank-liquidity-is-far-worse-15230535 accessed 1 November 2018. 
18 Ibid, the Reserve Bank of South Africa stated that banks are in a stable place and that 
the banking sector is above the Basel III minimum liquidity requirements. Additionally, 
banks were sufficiently capitalised and above the minimum requirements needed in a 






Aim of research and key points to be discussed 
 
The aim of the research is to examine the risks and shortcomings of Basel 
III and provide recommendations to improve Basel III. Specific areas will 
be scrutinised to show Basel III’s limitations and include, but are not 
limited to, capital ratios,19 credit rating agencies20 (CRAs) and value-at-
risk 21  (VaR). These were identified during the literature review and 
reoccurred many times. By focusing on these three points the research 
will not only examine these risks and shortcomings, but also provide 
recommendations to enhance Basel III. In short these will be briefly 
explained now as they are vital to the research title due to the author 
believing them to be the most harmful. It should also be acknowledged 
that by restricting this area to the three aforesaid issues, the research 
can provide an in depth examination compared to a broad overview in 
which more issues would be considered. 
 
Firstly, capital ratios which have increased dramatically from Basel II and 
can affect many banks and financial institutions (hereinafter bank(s)) as 
vast amounts of money will need to be accumulated in order to meet the 
minimum requirements now recommended by Basel III. For example, the 
                                               
19 Capital ratios can be simply explained as a bank’s own funds (capital) against the 
bank’s risky assets.  
20 Credit Rating Agencies rate the creditworthiness of entities such as bond issuers, 
companies and countries. It will be explained in much more detail throughout the 
research. 
21 Value-at-Risk is concerned with risk management. There are many different formulas 
used in calculating the financial risk of a product. Value-at-Risk will be explained in much 






minimum total capital including the conservation capital buffer has meant 
that total capital has risen from 8 percent to 10.5 percent,22 and this may 
increase further if a countercyclical capital buffer is needed which would 
increase total capital to 13 percent.23 This will mean that a bank will have 
to put more money aside to combat potential risk. 
 
Secondly, CRAs which play a large role in determining risk. This has 
improved over time but there are still problems that exist and there is an 
argument that too much significance has been given to CRAs.24 This is 
further highlighted by the British Parliament who have commented that 
tighter supervision and policing is needed to ensure that CRAs are better 
regulated.25 
 
Thirdly, VaR which is the most complex of the three areas. It is without 
doubt one of the main failings of the Basel regulations. Some of these 
failings have been consulted on by the BIS whom state the potential faults 
of using VaR is that it does not adequately capture credit risk, or in some 
                                               
22 Bank for International Settlements, 
http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/basel3_phase_in_arrangements.pdf accessed 22 
November 2014. 
23 Bank for International Settlements, http://www.bis.org/bcbs/basel3/b3summarytable.pdf 
accessed 22 November 2014. 
24 Rebecca Marston, ‘What is a Rating Agency?’ http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/10108284 
accessed 22 November 2014. 
25 Parliament, ‘Credit Rating Agencies’, Session 2010-2012 February 2012, Point 2, 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmtreasy/writev/1866/cra16.






situations even basic risk. 26  Thus highlighting one of several issues 
identified with this mechanism. 
 
The gravity of the research is that not only will the key weaknesses of 
Basel III be identified27 with a specific focus on the aforesaid three, the 
underlying problems will also be examined. To complete the research 
recommendations will be provided and are based on what is currently in 
the field, what has been suggested, and what the author of the research 
recommends.28 As was briefly alluded to earlier in the case of VBS bank, 
further enhancements are required and the liquidity crisis highlights some 
of the issues that are discussed in the research.29 
 
To conclude, the three risks above will be scrutinised thoroughly in 
Chapter 4, although there will be other risks of Basel III that will be 
acknowledged in Chapter 3 that are also problematic, for example 
leverage ratio which plays a significant role in Basel III and contains some 
glaring faults. Needless to say, this weakness will be explored along with 
other risks and shortcomings in due course.  
 
 
                                               
26 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Fundamental Review of the Trading Book’, 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs219.pdf page 9 accessed 23 November 2014. 
27 The three main issues have also been identified to varying degrees by other authorities. 
28 This may be to develop further a recommendation already put forward but has not come 
to fruition, or an entirely new way to improve Basel III’s limitations 
29 The author believes that VBS bank and the issues discussed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5, 
illuminate the substance of the research and contribution in Chapter 5 where 








The theory that will be predominantly used is black letter law.30 This 
theory has been used for many years by legal academics, as well as 
lawyers and professionals who work directly and indirectly through legal 
channels.31 It has proven to be a solid theory that relies on various 
sources of material.  
 
Black letter law is both rigid and structured in its approach and by 
applying this theory the research will not deviate from the main objective 
of the research title. This type of theory forms an authoritarian standpoint 
in that it can provide one correct answer from the legal issue posed.32 
Whilst this can be perceived as inflexible, it can also be viewed that it can 
lead to one correct answer for any legal problem. In this instance, by 
applying a black letter law approach to illustrate the risks and 
shortcomings of Basel III, this theory will only look at the information and 
facts of the Basel regulations and relevant material that involves such. 
 
Furthermore, black letter law does not take into account outside 
influences such as a socio-legal approach. Whilst socio-legal has its merits 
such as reform, it does detract from the law itself and may become 
                                               
30 There will also be elements of soft law due to the nature of the Basel regulations as well 
as other guidelines that have been published. 
31 M Salter and J Mason, Writing Law Dissertations (Pearson Longman 2007) Chapter 4. 






convoluted from the issues at hand. On this basis, other approaches such 




The method that will be used throughout the research will be a qualitative 
data approach. This method will prove most suitable because the 
research will look at the work of others such as academics and experts in 
the field, including any applicable case law and statutory law. Due to the 
information being sourced, the descriptive elements of that information 
and commentary will be considered, whereas a quantitative approach 
would not follow suit.  
 
The key benefit of qualitative data is that it relies on the collection and 
analysis of data that is none numerical. This methodology encourages in 
depth research as opposed to breadth and is arguably more open than a 
quantitative approach. By applying a deeper research approach a better 
                                               
33 A socio-legal approach has not been chosen as it is not critical enough (ibid 179) and a 
high critique is needed in order to support the research title. Also, a lack of identity and 
direction can be associated with a socio-legal approach due to the many strands that it 
has developed over time. Arguably, the socio-legal approach provides no clear definition 
of what it really encompasses in comparison to a black letter law approach. 
34 A historical approach has not been chosen as the main theory to implement but it will 
form part of the research in that Basel I and II will be considered before assessing Basel 
III. This is to enable the reader to appreciate and understand the Basel regulations in their 
entirety. 
35 A comparative approach has not been chosen due to the immensely time consuming 
nature. So it is not surprising when it has been described as, ‘…very time-consuming and, 
in particular, difficult to timetable accurately’ (ibid 189). Whilst a comparative approach 
does have its advantages such as being highly critical and helpful in providing a 
framework to compare legal concepts, it would still be dicey to apply this theory due to the 





outcome can be achieved. It should be noted that whilst examining the 
Basel regulations some numerical data may be referred to but there will 
not be a heavy reliance in this respect, it is merely to show percentage 
increases or formulaic equations. For example, how much capital a bank 
should put to one side under Tier 1 core capital, which has changed since 
Basel I. 
 
The penultimate part of this chapter will concisely review Basel I to 
include how it came to being, why it was structured as it was, an overview 
of the structure and purpose of the first Basel Accord, and the strengths 
and weaknesses of Basel I. This overview will be shorter in comparison 
to Basel II and III due to it being the oldest set of guidelines, yet it is 
worth considering so that Basel II and III can follow. In doing so, greater 
clarity can be achieved which in turn will allow a comprehensive view of 
the Basel regulations.36 
 
                                               
36 At this early stage it would be prudent to distinguish the difference between regulation 
and supervision as both will be referred to throughout the research. Regulation can be 
described as written into law which is then enforced by regulatory authorities and bodies. 
Supervision can be described as the applicable regularity authority or body that make 
sure, by examining and monitoring, that, and in this context, banks are adhering to the 
regulation set. It should be further noted that the author refers to the Basel Accord (I, II, III) 
as the Basel regulations, it should not be misinterpreted as hard law as the Basel Accords 
are guidelines and recommendations which are to be implemented by a country. For 
further discussion see European Parliament, ‘Overview and Structure of Financial 
Supervision and Regulation in the US’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/STUD/2015/492470/IPOL_STU%282015
%29492470_EN.pdf accessed 4 April 2019, or European Central Bank, ‘Regulation and 
Supervision in Europe – Can Many Cooks Make a Good Broth?’ 
https://www.bankingsupervision.europa.eu/press/speeches/date/2017/html/ssm.sp170515










The Basel Committee can be traced back to 197437 and in 1975 the Basel 
Committee met for the first time in order to establish principles for the 
supervision of banks.38 Alexander et al. note that this was the beginning 
of modern international financial regulation.39 
 
The Basel Committee consisted of a group of ten countries referred to as 
G10,40 plus the addition of Luxembourg and Spain.41 This composed of 
representatives from central banks and regulatory authorities.42 It has 
been referred to as a central bankers’ club which is, by design, small and 
homogenous.43 In essence, this should enable quick actions to be taken 
and a degree of flexibility.  
 
Prior to the Basel 1988 Accord, otherwise known as Basel I, a series of 
meetings were conducted by the Basel Committee in relation to capital 
adequacy, a topic that moved into the international policy arena at the 
                                               
37 Bank for International Settlements, ‘History of the Basel Committee’ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/history.htm accessed 4 April 2019. 
38 B Quillin, International Financial Co-Operation: Political Economics of Compliance with 
the 1998 Basel Accord (Routledge, Abingdon 2011) 7. 
39 K Alexander, R Dhumale and J Eatwell, Global Governance of Financial Systems: The 
International Regulation of Systemic Risk (Oxford University Press 2006) 254. 
40 Consisting of industrial countries that discuss on matters ranging from economic and 
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42 R Wandhofer, Transaction Banking and the Impact of Regulatory Change: Basel III and 
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43 M S Barr and G P Miller, ‘Global Administrative Law: The View from Basel’ (2006) 17(1) 






beginning of the 1980s44 and has remained prominent ever since.45 At 
that time this was of grave concern and with international risk increasing 
it became apparent that some form of intervention was required. 46 
Goodhart explains that the force for this stemmed from international 
lending, something that was vastly growing, and that regulation at the 
time was more effective at domestic level compared to international 
levels. So it is easy to comprehend the concerns that the Basel Committee 
felt. This further added to an existing worry that was apparent at the time 
i.e. a level playing field between banks.47 As Alexander et al. state, 
’…banking regulators wanted to establish an international minimum 
standard that would create a level playing field for banks operating in the 
G10 countries…‘.48  
 
Capital adequacy can be simply explained as the ratio of a bank’s capital 
to risk based assets (or liabilities). In theory, the higher a bank’s capital, 
the higher the probability that it can withstand difficult financial events. 
In essence a bank can either raise new capital to improve financial 
stability or lower the risk of assets. 
 
                                               
44 R Cranston and others, Principles of Banking Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2017) 40. 
45 Capital adequacy being the minimum reserves of capital that a bank should have in 
place to combat adverse financial conditions in the market. 
46 C Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Cambridge University 
Press 2011) 146-181 Goodhart provides an in depth analysis of the history leading to the 
published Basel I Accord. 
47 Ibid 147. 
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Leading from this and digging further, it can be acknowledged that one 
of the main contributing factors that triggered the introduction of Basel I 
was the failure of the German bank Bankhaus Herstatt, combined with 
banks in the United Kingdom and the United States bank Franklin National 
earlier in May 1974.49 In short, Bankhaus Herstatt relied heavily on the 
speculation of foreign exchange markets. 50  It is worth noting what 
actually happened as it will display one of the main triggers that sparked 
the Basel Committee coming together.   
 
The Bankhaus Herstatt collapse caused problems for the following reason. 
Bankhaus Herstatt traded during the German market hours and the 
United States participants during theirs. The problem here was that when 
it became apparent to the German authorities that Bankhaus Herstatt 
was insolvent, the German authorities shut down Bankhaus Herstatt at 
the time of the German markets closing and, crucially, this was before 
the United States market opened. Due to the nature of insolvency which 
stopped payments from being made out but permitted payments in, the 
United States participants were left in a difficult position51 because they 
had already transferred monies to Bankhaus Herstatt. This event was a 
pivotal moment in the history of banking regulation and a new term was 
created, Herstatt risk; the risk between two legs of foreign exchange 
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deals as was the case here. Bankhaus Herstatt was a key topic discussed 
in a later meeting of the Basel Committee between member countries on 
how to counter this issue.52 
 
The collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt made it apparent that there was not 
enough equity to counter risk and on this basis capital adequacy was 
scrutinised thereafter. Regulators from Germany and the United States 
were not able to counteract the cross-border reverberations due to bank 
default in the forex market.53 Several forms of regulatory reform were 
created as a response to Bankhaus Herstatt’s failure54 and the Basel 
Committee later published a paper known as the Basel Concordat 1975. 
The paper set out supervisory responsibility and the co-operation 
between national authorities55 due to the failings of the German bank. As 
Walker states, ’The original purpose of the Committee was to begin to 
deal with the immediate problems which arose with the crisis in 
international financial markets in 1974‘.56 
 
The first document created by the Basel Committee in relation to the 
supervision of international banks can be traced to this point in time, 
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known as the 1975 Concordat. 57  This would be the first set of 
recommendations58 produced by the Basel Committee and can be viewed 
as a first block from which Basel I would eventually grow. 
 
Several years later, a second paper was published (the 1983 Revised 
Concordat) which revised the 1975 Concordat and outlined the principles 
of supervisory responsibility and capital adequacy, and the fact that by 
looking at a bank’s totality was the only way that supervisory authorities 
could assess the soundness of a bank.59 This would be the stepping stone 
for the official release of Basel I.  
 
It should be acknowledged that capital adequacy did not enter the policy 
arena until the late 1970s and early 1980s with the Basel Concordat 
1983, even though the collapse of Bankhaus Herstatt was in 1974.60 
Additionally, international lending and the growth of Japanese banks 
during this time was also of deep concern.61 The Basel Concordat 1983 
was also in response to the Latin American debt crisis62 and the failure of 
                                               
57 It outlined four principles: supervisory responsibility for host and parent authorities, 
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authorities, and foreign exchange positions in terms of co-operation.  
58 See, ibid 86-100 for a more in depth discussion of the 1975 Concordat. 
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the Italian bank, Banco Ambrosiano. 63  Whilst Basel I was gathering 
momentum, on reflection there would still be a few more years before 
Basel I would come to fruition. 
 
Moving forward there was slow progress64 in putting together a document 
that would enable banks to operate more efficiently and safely. By 1984 
it was still apparent that Basel I was not going to be realised anytime 
soon and several emerging countries were struggling to meet the 
proposed debt obligations that had been discussed several years earlier.65 
There were also other factors that affected Basel I coming to fruition, 
such as the complexity of such a document and categories of capital being 
two major sticking points. 66  A questionnaire was released to gather 
feedback from the G10 countries to help the process and encompassed 
capital and risk ratios, but this did not make the process run any 
smoother or quicker. 
 
By 1986, twelve years since the Basel Committee was created and the 
Bankhaus Herstatt collapse, there were still no signs of a document on 
banking and capital regulation. It is at this point that momentum 
gathered pace. As Goodhart explains, the United States were becoming 
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irritated by the snail like pace being made by the Basel Committee and 
decided to move forward with their own initiative.67 There was a general 
feeling that the United States were on the right track, particularly from 
the United Kingdom. The link that brought these two countries together 
was that the United States model was not too dissimilar to what had 
already been discussed in the past by the Basel Committee, and there 
were many similarities between the United States and the United 
Kingdom in what was deemed to be sound banking practices.68 
 
The United States wanted to raise capital adequacy requirements but 
many banks within the United States opposed this because of the level 
playing field issue and that banks in the United States could be 
disadvantaged in relation to their foreign rivals. Additionally, there was 
also a lack of togetherness by members of the G10 which did not help 
the situation. Evidently, a partner was needed to push this movement 
forward and assist in making Basel I real; this partner would be the United 
Kingdom. 
 
The United States and United Kingdom shared common ground in many 
respects and both were of the opinion that capital regulation needed to 
be given a more official presence to protect banks around the world. It 
should be acknowledged that the policy created between the United 
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States and United kingdom bilateral capital accord69 contained many 
similarities to Basel I that was still in progress and being developed by 
the Basel Committee.70 
 
It is this partnership that should be acknowledged and praised which 
started in 1986 and essentially helped speed the process of Basel I 
coming to realisation. Whilst the Basel Committee dedicated much time 
and effort to the creation of Basel I, it was, in the author’s opinion, the 
negotiations and partnership between the United States and United 
Kingdom that really pushed Basel I forward, otherwise many more years 
of deliberation would surely have resumed. 
 
In 1987 a consultative document was published.71 After many years and 
gruelling meetings,72 a year later in late 1988 the Basel Committee 
published Basel I. It was stated that Basel I would create a regime that 
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Federal Banking Supervisory Authorities and the Bank of England on primary capital and 




accessed 3 April 2019.  
70 C Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of the Early 
Years 1974-1997 (Cambridge University Press 2011) 170. 
71 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Proposals for international convergence of capital 
measurement and capital standards’ http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs03a.pdf accessed 21 
October 2015. 
72 Private meeting, Professor Charles Goodhart, 4 September 2015 LSE, London. In the 
grand scheme of things Goodhart was not of the opinion that there was an excessive 
amount of meetings. Considering the scale of document that was being discussed and 
that the Basel Committee was changing at the time, evolving and metamorphosing from 






recommended a minimum percentage of capital to risk weighted assets73 
(RWA) to combat financial instability. Although not legally binding, it was 
a moral obligation for those member states involved to then implement 
Basel I into their respective country.74 This was a milestone for banking 
regulation and financial stability and was a success as it became adopted 
in over forty countries75 in the immediate years that followed. 
  
It was originally stated that Basel I would apply to internationally active 
banks76 and that a minimum of 8 percent was required by those banks in 
relation to RWA. As will shortly be explained, RWA ranged from 0 to 100 
percent. A fairly straightforward approach was implemented, one which 
portrays positive and negative aspects. A positive of this simplistic model 
was that it enabled many banks to follow these guidelines without much 
difficulty. In contrast, it was not sophisticated to go beyond this basic 
formula. The banking industry is complex by nature and as will be 
discussed shortly, a more intelligent model would be needed in order to 
cope with the demand of large international banks. Overall, Basel I was 
a simple document which endeavoured to achieve soundness and 
stability, and provide a level playing field.77 
 
                                               
73 Risk weighted assets are those of a bank’s assets that are weighted against risk. 
74 L Balthazar, From Basel 1 to Basel 3: The Integration of State of the Art Risk Modelling 
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It should be addressed at this stage that the figure of 8 percent was not 
a stab in the dark but rather a premeditated decision. Upon analysis, it 
was a combination of two formulas that were present at the time; the 
Brussels formulae and Gerzensee formulae.78 After some consideration, 
it was decided by Peter Cooke the then Basel Committee Chairman, that 
8 percent was most appropriate because most countries at that time were 
in the range of 7 to 10 percent.79 It was also considered to be the highest 
figure that could be recommended that would not cause hindrance to 
member countries, and whilst no economic value was attached it was 
arbitrary in essence and based on current conditions.80 This figure still 
remains today in Basel III. 
 
The main focus of Basel I was to address the problem of credit risk81 that 
was epidemic at the time. As Foot notes, ’…there was…widespread 
recognition that there were many different reasons why a bank could fail. 
But there was a general and accurate perception that credit risk was the 
primary threat‘.82 In addition there was concern that capital levels were 
severely low amongst international banks.83 Over time Basel I evolved 
                                               
78 C Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of the Early 
Years 1974-1997 (Cambridge University Press 2011) 178. 
79 Ibid. 
80 Private meeting, Professor Charles Goodhart, 4 September 2015 LSE, London. 
81 A A Hall, ‘International Banking Regulation into the 21st century: Flirting with 
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and the Basel Committee made much needed improvements, one of them 
being market risk,84 for example. 
 
The importance of why Basel I was of great significance is that it was 
pivotal to all economies as Hall explains, ’…banking is one of the most 
highly regulated industries, largely because of the central role banking 
plays in domestic and international financial stability and policy‘,85 thus 
highlighting the scale and importance of the Basel regulations and the 
Basel Committee. Hall is right, banking plays such a huge role in domestic 
and international financial stability and is vital in securing safer 
economies. Hall further remarks, ’…banking industry does not only have 
an impact on national economies. It also affects the international financial 
system, particularly if larger, more international banks are involved‘.86 
This statement reinforces the significance of Basel I i.e. to strengthen and 
regulate the banking industry and economies worldwide and to promote 
financial stability.87 In modern times there are many large international 
banks and regulation is paramount. 
 
It should be appreciated that there have been other financial crises and 
events that have triggered the Basel Committee to respond that have not 
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been discussed at this point or in the remaining chapters (only in 
passing). For example, Black Monday 1987 which ignited the process of 
quantitative VaR; 88  the Asian Crisis 1997 that prompted the Basel 
Committee to consider lessons to learn from the 1997 crisis89 and also 
produce guidelines for a framework on internal controls due to the 
deficiencies illuminated by the 1997 crisis;90 or the twin towers terrorist 
attack in 2001, which influenced91 the Basel Committee in respect of 
operational risk.92 
 
Having considered a brief history of Basel I it is beneficial to consider the 
nature of a bank and what a bank does so that a link can be drawn 
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The nature of a bank93 
 
Essentially banks 94  require money from their clients in the form of 
deposits and this is then given out as loans to other clients. Interest is 
then paid on those loans which is, in most cases, significantly higher than 
the initial deposits and it is from this difference that profits can be made 
for a bank. There are two problems that arise for a bank when trying to 
make profit. First, if they do not achieve enough deposits to fuel their 
loan business. Second, which is arguably more important, if the client 
cannot pay back the loan. Needless to say that the consequence of this 
is circumvented as long as the bank has enough equity to withstand and 
absorb financial loss.95 
 
Bearing in mind the simplistic description of how a bank operates and in 
a traditional capacity,96 the Basel Committee wanted to achieve financial 
stability and that all banks adhere to a set of guidelines relating to equity 
in order to reach fair competition.97 The core element of Basel I was 
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the distinction should be made between commercial banking and securities markets. As 
will be described in this subsection, banks require money from clients in the form of 
deposits to which is then loaned to other clients i.e. commercial banks. Banks that deal 
with securities and trade in financial assets, are investment banks.  
94 See J R Barth, G Caprio Jr and R Levine, Rethinking Bank Regulation: Till Angels 
Govern (Cambridge University Press 2008) 102-110 for discussion of what a bank is. 
95 There are other risks that face a bank, some of which will be explored in the remainder 
of the research such as credit risk p68, operational risk p80, market risk p91 and liquidity 
risk p150.  
96 See R Cranston and others, Principles of Banking Law (3rd edn, Oxford University 
Press 2017) 23-26 for the discussion of banks post 2008 and definition and transactions in 
recent times. 
97 O Baumgartner, Basel 3 Capital Requirements - Overview and Critical Evaluation (Grin 






capital adequacy,98 as Wong states, ’…a bank has to hold sufficient capital 
(in proportion to the risk taken) for the business it is engaged in‘.99 Wong 
is not wrong, if a bank does not hold sufficient capital in relation to 
business activities, then it will be harder for a bank to withstand adverse 
conditions. An explanation provided by Wandhofer nicely puts it as, ’You 
can think of capital as your own personal savings — they will ’save’ you 
in moments of difficulty, as you have been prudent in accumulating them 
during good years‘.100 
 
It can be ascertained that the Basel committee was trying to counteract 
low capital in banks which would not be sufficient to withstand a financial 
crisis and also support a bank’s ability to guard itself from the same. What 
can be observed from this is that the nature of a bank and its natural 
desire to facilitate its loan business goes hand in hand with the Basel 
Committee’s vision of protecting those banks. The Basel Committee does 
not want to stop a bank from one of its core aims, to make money, but 
the protection of a bank from financial collapse and the effects that this 
would have on the economy that it operates in is imperative. 
 
In summary, it has been explained what the Basel Committee was trying 
to achieve, along with a basic description of how a bank operates and the 
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link between the two. With these two elements in mind, it is important to 
consider the structure of Basel I and how it tried to harmonise these two 
elements. This was one of the biggest tasks for the Basel Committee in 
that whilst creating Basel I, consideration needs to be given on how this 
can be incorporated and implemented. Equally, one needs to consider the 
way a bank operates and appreciate a bank’s ethos of making money. 
Therefore, perhaps the task is not to harmonise the Basel regulations 
alongside the nature of a bank, it is to make sure a bank has suitably 
adequate safety mechanisms that help in financial adverse conditions 
whilst still allowing a bank to make money. It is only then that both the 
bank and the Basel Committee will be content. Yet this is an arduous task 
and in reality may not be achievable due to the aims and complexity of 
the Basel regulations and of a bank. 
 
Basel I structure 
 
As Crouhy et al. point out, one of the main aims of Basel I was to create, 
’…international minimum capital guidelines for the world’s banking 
systems‘.101 On this basis a simple scheme was introduced so that capital 
adequacy could be fulfilled and a link could be made between bank’s 
capital requirements to credit exposures. Indeed, bank exposure was 
categorised into groups, or risk weights, and a specific borrower type 
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could then be correlated to the appropriate capital requirement, as Gup 
explains, ’…a simple ”one size fits all“‘.102 Gup is right, on reflection the 
risk weights were suitable for all circumstances. Unfortunately, this is 
basic and limited, and problems resulted from this which will be discussed 
shortly. 
 
By categorising risk weights, a bank obtains a percentage that would 
establish how much money should be kept in reserve. There were five 
risk weights set out in Basel I: 
 
• 0 percent which included cash, home government and central bank debt 
as well as Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development103 
(OECD) debt 
• 0, 10, 20 or 50 percent which included claims on domestic public 
entities, but excluded central government. The percentage is at a 
nation’s discretion 
• 20 percent which included public institutions and several forms of OECD 
debt 
• 50 percent which included residential mortgages 
• 100 percent which included all other claims and non OECD bank debt104 
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Seemingly there are five categories whereby assets are separated in 
terms of risk, sometimes referred to as five buckets, as Wandhofer puts 
it.105 A basic approach can be extrapolated from this position as Cranston 
et al. articulate, ’The Basel I framework established a relatively simply 
methodology for risk-weighting with only five risk weights…‘. 106  This 
opinion resembles the one made by Gup and that it was simplistic in form 
and nature. Perhaps the reason for this was that banking regulation was 
in its infancy at the time. Furthermore, there was a lack of commentary 
in this area combined with limited financial expertise and academic 
debate. In the end Goodhart asserts that the approach taken was more 
on what the major banks were doing at the time.107 It seems that the 
main aim at this time was to create a general consensus. The 
consequence of this can be seen in the simple risk weight categories. 
Over time this simplicity would fail.  
 
To complement the risk weights there were two minimum standards that 
a bank should adhere to in terms of capital adequacy requirements, they 
were assets to capital multiple and risk based capital ratio. The first 
standard was an overall measure of a bank’s capital adequacy, whilst the 
latter standard was the credit risk for on and off balance sheet asset 
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categories. A description of these two measures will be explained to 
provide clarity. 
 
Assets to capital multiple is a simple equation of dividing a bank’s total 
assets by its total capital. The maximum multiple allowed was .20 and 
whilst only large off balance sheet activities would really engage this 
multiple, it was not the first standard that constrained a bank the most. 
It was the second standard that could be the most constricting. 
 
Risk based capital ratio, also known as the Cooke Ratio,108 was the real 
driving force of Basel I and one that really showed signs of inadequacy 
as well as constraint for a bank. This equation was the ratio of capital to 
risk weighted on balance sheet assets and off balance sheet risk. It was 
a requirement that a bank should calculate their RWA according to the 
different types of risk weighting. Once complete, a bank should then set 
aside a flat fixed percentage to combat credit risk which was 8 percent. 
An example of risk based capital ratio is explained by Balthazar, ’…a bank 
buys a 200 EUR corporate bond on the capital market, the required capital 
to cover the risk associated with the operation would be: 200 EUR x 100% 
(the weight for a claim on a corporate) x 8% = 16 EUR‘.109 The example 
explained by Balthazar illustrates the basic formula of how a bank would 
calculate risk in relation to assets. It is a simple process whereby the 
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asset is multiplied by the risk weighting of that asset, it is then multiplied 
again by the minimum 8 percent stipulated by the Basel Committee. It 
will be highlighted in the weaknesses section of this chapter that whilst 
this formula is simple to follow and implement, there are consequences, 
one of them being OECD categorisation. 
 
It can be ascertained from what has been discussed that Basel I was 
centered on capital adequacy and credit risk. To further bolster Basel I, 
the Basel Committee created and defined Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital. Tier 1 
and Tier 2 capital110 are two-forms of equity that are held by a bank in 
relation to RWA and how much a bank should put in reserve to combat 
credit risk. Additional enhancements were made to Basel I several years 
later, most notably market risk which allowed for potential losses, 
particularly from trading businesses.111 A third tier was added to aid this 
development and consisted of short term subordinate debt. Before 
looking at the strengths and weaknesses of Basel I, it is necessary to 
articulate the three tiers that Basel I endorsed so that a deeper 
understanding can be obtained and context given. 
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Tier 1 capital otherwise known as core capital, includes equity capital and 
published reserves.112 Tier 2 capital, or supplementary capital, contained 
all other elements that ranged from undisclosed reserves to subordinate 
term debt.113 It was stipulated in Basel I that Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 
should constitute at least 8 percent of RWA. It was stated further that at 
least 4 percent of this should be in the form of Tier 1 capital.114 In practice 
the capital levels of those banks that are regulated normally exceed the 
aforesaid requirements115  and this is due to several factors such as 
competitors, CRAs and adherence to the Basel regulations. It should be 
noted that this does not mean that Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital are 
insignificant, quite the contrary, it would suggest that Basel I focused too 
narrow on credit risk. 
 
During the early 1990s there were complaints that the risk weighted 
categories were too narrow and did not take into account of other aspects 
of risk, such as market or liquidity risk.116 The consequence of this, for 
instance, was that trading books of banks increased greatly. The Basel 
Committee realised that there was a gaping hole in Basel I in the form of 
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market risk; 117  market risk was still prevalent when Basel I was 
published, however it was not included at first publication. Market risk 
was aided by Tier 3 capital and created through the Market Risk 
Amendment in 1996.118 This was implemented in 1998 and it can be 
ascertained that this natural progression began several years prior to this 
date following a G30 report that was published in 1993.119 On this basis 
the main point to capture was that market risk was added to Basel I and 
extended the risk weighted capital requirement. As such, Tier 3 capital 
was born in order to support market risk. For the first time this allowed 
banks to utilise internal models rather than the previously created 
framework.120 In the author’s opinion this was the starting point for 
internal based model utilisation and the encouragement to use such 
measures in the future. As will be explained in later chapters there are 
now several internal based models when it comes to credit, operational 
and market risk.   
 
In light of the discussion around market risk, Tier 3 sub-supplementary 
capital was included to help cover market risk. Market risk was defined 
by the Basel Committee as, ’…the risk of losses in on and off-balance-
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sheet positions arising from movements in market prices‘.121 It can be 
argued that this type of risk should have been included when Basel I was 
originally published. It should be appreciated that market risk 
encapsulates a bank’s trading book and most of these assets are liquid 
and can be sold very quickly in order to alleviate any risk, therefore, it is 
a lesser risk compared to credit risk. This could be construed as to why it 
was not incorporated from the outset but included ten years later. The 
positive from this is that the Basel Committee identified a weakness of 
Basel I and rectified with the Market Risk Amendment. It should be 
acknowledged that Tier 3 capital became defunct in Basel III, but market 
risk has continued to be included in Basel III and falls under VaR. This 
will be discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 of the research. 
 
Strengths and weaknesses 
 
A brief description of the positive and negative aspects of Basel I will now 
be highlighted. It will explain why Basel I was superseded and provides 
an overview of the by-products that came from Basel I. It should be 
appreciated that whilst many criticised Basel I for being too simplistic, 
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First and foremost, it is indisputable that Basel I created a benchmark for 
banking regulation, as Barr and Miller purport, ’…Basel I is one of the 
most successful international regulatory initiatives ever attempted‘.122 
Whilst it was originally envisaged to be implemented by the G10 states 
and internationally active banks within that category, it reached a wider 
audience in that it encouraged more than one hundred countries to adopt 
and implement.123 Many adopters being non-G10 countries which is a 
true testament to Basel I.124 By creating one uniformed document to 
govern the banking industry, it enabled the G10 and associated banks to 
come together and share a general consensus on financial stability. Under 
the umbrella of a forum for dialogue, financial stability could be enhanced 
and supervisory expertise shared, after all this is what the Basel 
Committee thrive to achieve.125 
 
Secondly, the minimum capital ratios that a bank held rose from 9.3 
percent in 1988 to 11.2 percent in 1996126 because of Basel I, and this 
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can only be viewed as positive considering some of the percentages that 
banks were holding prior to this point. As Zaher points out, perhaps this 
was partly due to the fact that previously there was not one single 
definition of bank capital127 and by doing so all those involved would be 
on the same page. To put it in a monetary context, Alexander et al. state 
that, ’…the Capital Accord resulted in U.S. banks adding $20 to $50 billion 
to their capital reserves in the 1990s, while Japanese banks added an 
estimated $40-$45 billion and French banks added $15 billion over the 
same period‘.128 
 
Considering that one of the main aims was to set a minimum capital ratio 
for every bank under its remit, then the rise in minimum capital 
percentages can only be viewed as positive. 
 
Thirdly, the creation of a compact and simple risk weighting table that 
gave different asset categories helped define and improve previous 
systems that were in place around the world such as equity to asset ratios 
(total shareholders equity over total assets), for example. Indeed, there 
was no differentiation between categories or types of loan with the equity 
to asset ratio system. Basel I is often criticised for its simplicity,129 
however the basic structure not only provided guidelines for banks, it also 
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provided a straightforward system to allocate each type of asset. In 
return a percentage was established so that a bank could allocate funds 
appropriately. 
 
In many scenarios it is far easier to see weakness than strength. It should 
not be forgotten that Basel I was the first building block in creating a 
stable banking environment. As Wandhofer notes, ’…a key building block 
of the current Basel III accord‘.130 It was a crucial development and the 
best strength of all was that it created a foundation for financial stability. 
Equally, Walker notes:  
  
 ’…it constituted the first significant agreement in the regulatory  
 area while it fundamental simplicity promoted easy adoption and 
 widespread compliance…a remarkable achievement especially for 
 a document without any formal legal status and one issued by a  
 Committee that itself has no formal authority or standing in  
 international law‘131 
 
It does, therefore, play an important role. As Barr and Miller correctly 
state, ’…the Basel Committee play an important role in harmonizing 
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capital standards, in improving and coordinating prudential supervision 




Criticisms can be drawn from Basel I and it would be naive and unfair to 
conclude that it would never need improving. In fact, the Basel 
Committee stated, ’The Accord was always intended to evolve over 
time‘.133 Drawing conclusion that the Basel regulations will always need 
constant improvement and amendments. After all, it is a document that 
needs to remain up to date and relevant as time passes. Basel I in today’s 
financial environment is very different to that of the late 1980s through 
to early 2000s which it operated in.  
 
Some of the main weaknesses that surfaced will now be discussed leading 
to the conclusion that Basel I would eventually become outdated.134 The 
problem was that Basel I lagged behind new risk management and 
mitigation techniques, and arbitrage was not tackled appropriately.  
 
Firstly, Basel I assumed that all corporate borrowers regardless of size or 
characteristic, posed the same credit risk. Crouhy et al. are of the opinion 
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that what this meant in practice was that a loan to an AA rated company 
would require the same amount of capital set aside for a B rated 
company.135 Giving the impression that both, although rated differently, 
shared the same risk. Obviously, this was an inappropriate tool that 
lacked sophistication, a belief reinforced by many, Fawcett stated, ’The 
Accord now appears inadequate for its task. In particular, its methodology 
for measuring risk is rigid and based on assumptions that do not 
accurately reflect economic realities…‘.136 What can be deduced from this 
is that economies changed since the creation of Basel I and over time the 
banking industry metamorphosed into something much larger than it 
once was. Furthermore, if one company is rated by CRAs as AA and 
another company as B, then both should not be comparable in terms of 
risk. In addition and due to the aforesaid, Ojo is of the opinion that Basel 
I effectively rewarded risky lending by allowing banks to put the same 
amount of monies aside whether the borrower was questionable or 
sound.137 Ojo is right, additionally this could mean that consequences 
would follow such as putting banks into deep waters when it came to the 
quality of clients and the money being put aside for those transactions 
i.e. not a true reflection of the risk, in turn this could result in substantial 
financial losses. 
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Secondly, Basel I did not allow for complex issues within a portfolio.138 
This meant a bank could put aside capital for a one £1 million loan and 
also set aside the same capital for a hundred different corporate loans 
totalling the same. Yet whilst the one £1 million loan might cause 
problems, it is highly improbable that the hundred different corporate 
loans totalling the same would cause an issue all at once. This shows that 
there was no ability within Basel I to differentiate between the two 
scenarios and corroborates the statement made by Fawcett earlier. 
Again, this weakness highlights the rigidness and inability of Basel I to 
differentiate different scenarios. In the end this would contribute to the 
demise of Basel I. 
 
Thirdly and the most nonsensical of all, is the poor definition given to risk 
weighted factors. Barth et al. suggest that a consequence of this is that 
claims to different OECD countries received the same weighting, 139 
irrespective of the country rating. Barth et al. rightly point out that not 
all governments pay equal and on time, which causes further problems. 
In addition to this, Baumgartner postures that the result of this is that a 
bank may not have sufficient equity in times of crisis.140 Wong agrees 
with this point and also adds that preferential treatment was given to 
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OECD claims.141 Arguably, another serious loophole within Basel I and 
one which baffles a logical approach. The author would state that the risk 
weighting of the United States, a well established economic power, is 
different to India, a rising economic power but still establishing. 
Therefore, OECD is flawed and the weighting of OECD claims are not 
accurate. 
 
Fourthly and following on from the third weakness, is the simplistic 
banding of risk weighting.142 This meant that many banks were engaging 
in arbitrage143 and in effect this contributed to Basel I being overhauled. 
This links to the earlier example given of OECD countries being given the 
same rating regardless of the countries’ qualities and inequalities. Adding 
to the simplistic banding issue, Walker notes that the 100 percent 
classification banding was baffling and that the credit assessment rating 
system in place was effectively undermined as a consequence.144  
 
Fifthly, the ability by banks to manipulate Basel I protocol in respect of 
maturity factors.145 For example, the capital required for a bank to put 
aside for a term less than one year was zero, if the facility was over one 
year then this created large capital charges. Therefore, many banks 
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decided to create short term facilities that were under one year to avoid 
large capital charges. In this instance the bank would not need to put 
capital aside and could roll over the facility into the following year as a 
revolving credit facility, thus avoiding the cost of putting capital aside as 
well as still being able to offer lending facilities to clients. Needless to say, 
this type of behaviour was substantially problematic and risk prone. In 
essence, a bank could avoid regulatory rules and banks would not be 
reprimanded i.e. Basel I did not cover this blatant misbehaviour, which 
meant that a bank would be able to manipulate in order to safeguard 
them self.146 
 
The final weakness to consider is lack of enforceability. It has been 
mentioned in this chapter that Basel I created a set of supervisory 
guidelines and would be implemented at domestic level. It has been 
argued that Basel I had a weakness of enforceability and this is due to 
the Basel regulations being, what is coined as, soft law.147 As Quillin 
affirms, ’The Basel Committee does not possess any legal enforcement 
authority and states comply with the Accord at their own discretion‘.148 
Whilst Basel I created a set of clear and simplistic set of guidelines for 
banks to follow, it was and is non-enforceable by law and is only a set of 
key recommendations for stronger financial stability. It is a harsh 
criticism because the Basel Committee never intended the Basel 
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regulations to be a legal document, far from it, the Basel Committee 
entrusted countries to incorporate the Basel regulations into national law 
and not abuse those recommendations. After all, it is a forum for 
dialogue.149 
 
It should be appreciated that it is not feasible for the Basel regulations to 
be a legal document considering the scale in which it operates, although 
in terms of Europe and the European Union150 (EU), the Basel regulations 
are stronger in that the regulations have been incorporated into EU 
law.151 Due to the very nature in which the EU operates, those countries 
that have signed and been ratified must abide by those laws; to varying 
degrees. On this basis, the Basel regulations within the EU can be 
interpreted as being a much stronger tool for implementation in the sense 
that within the EU there are currently (as of early 2019, the United 
Kingdom is scheduled to exit in March 2019) 28 member countries that 
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will apply the CRD.152  Whilst the Basel regulations are designed for 
internationally active banks, within the EU this applies to all banks.153 
 
It can be argued that due to some countries implementing Basel I earlier 
than others, there was an un-level playing field154 and that this goes 
against the idea of equality. The BIS explained:  
 
 ’There was strong recognition within the Committee of the   
 overriding need for a multinational accord to strengthen the  
 stability of the international banking system and to remove  
 a source of competitive inequality arising from differences in  
 national capital requirements‘155  
 
However, it should be highlighted that Basel I did achieve one of its main 
aims which was to create a minimum 8 percent capital ratio. As Gup 
suggests, this in itself created a level playing field156 and its international 
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presence created the same.157 This is true, furthermore the author would 
agree with Gup and Cranston and that by creating a minimum 8 percent 
capital ratio, all banks incorporating the Basel I measures will be better 
aligned and fears of an un-level playing field will be appeased.  
 
It should be noted at this stage that the argument of enforceability will 
not be pursued further as over time, and in practice, the Basel regulations 
do become enforceable once a national bank regulator endorses them. In 
addition, Haynes argues that member states’ governments adopt the 
Basel regulations further and seem to take little persuading in this 
regard. 158  So, whilst there may be some argument that the Basel 
regulations lack enforceability, in reality it is not really an issue and in 
time becomes law. Thus, the issue of enforceability is moot.159 
 
Out of the six weaknesses only the last does not allude to a reoccurring 
problem for Basel I, and that was calculating risk due to it being rigid and 
based on inaccurate data that failed to mirror current economic 
conditions.160 Furthermore, distorting those risks were highly prevalent 
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and this was partly due to the basic model of Basel I, but also the bank’s 
behaviour in assessing those risks.  
 
There are three elements that lead to this conclusion. One, there was a 
poor definition of risk capital. Two, a bank’s understanding of risk capital 
is somewhat different from bank to bank. Three, the combination of the 
aforesaid two results in misalignment. As such, some banks may attempt 
regulatory arbitrage in which manipulation occurs so that smaller capital 
charges are achieved. As Gup explains, ’…the simple structure 
encouraged transactions whose principal benefit was to arbitrage bank 
capital‘.161 This can be easily solved if the first two elements are more 
closely aligned162 and then regulatory capital will compliment economic 
capital. Simply put, a bank’s capital put aside will reflect that of the risks 
associated more accurately.  
 
Due to arbitrage a further issue resulted, banks argued that if risk is to 
be measured more accurately then banks should be given permission to 
create their own internal mechanisms to determine VaR. This in itself is 
problematic and will be scrutinised in Chapter 4 as it is one of the main 
risks and shortcomings of Basel III purported by the author. In short, a 
problem that could occur from banks being given the freedom to create 
their own internal mechanisms to determine risk is that the complexity 
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with which a bank calculates their internal values is hard for many people, 
even bankers to understand. Gup concurs by adding, ’…resulting capital 
amounts will be difficult to evaluate for adequacy and compliance…‘.163 
So if it is difficult for those within banks to comprehend, then the chance 
of success is severely limited. 
 
As can be seen from the six listed weaknesses, Basel I eventually came 
to a demise and there was an acceptance in the late 1990s that Basel I 
had become outdated and left behind due to developments in risk 
management and other key protocols.164 It should be stressed that Basel 
I is still used in many developing economies as a basis for financial 
stability and Basel I should not be underestimated nor should it be 
undervalued as it enabled Basel II to come to fruition and provided a 
foundation for a stronger financial system. It also guided those countries 
that were trying to develop a more stable economy. 
  
Perhaps the best outcome from Basel I was that it encouraged many 
banks to operate more sensibly. As Ojo states, ’…the Basel Capital 
Accord…established minimum capital requirements for internationally 
active banks and was able to increase capital levels during this 
period…‘.165 Ojo is correct, by creating a minimum level for banks to 
adhere to resulted in banks operating with similar standards and it thus 
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promotes a more sensible and stable environment. Furthermore, as 
Walker notes, ’Until the establishment of the Basel (originally the Basle) 
Committee there had been no formal mechanism for the development of 
cross-border supervisory co-operation in connection with the activities of 
international banks‘.166 
 
On reflection, Basel I did achieve the two objectives set; raising capital 
and creating a more level playing field. 167  Unfortunately, a more 
sophisticated financial market developed, and Basel I essentially 
promoted risk based arbitrage through internal structures. It was, as 
Varma puts it, ’…crude and fragile…crude in that it did not distinguish 
between safe loans and risky loans…fragile because these deficiencies 
could be easily gamed…‘.168 Nevertheless, Basel I should be seen as 
making a positive contribution and it provided a foundational block on 
which Basel II and future Basel regulations could develop.  
 
Basel I conclusion 
 
Basel I consisted of three tiers which included: 
 
• Tier 1 core capital 
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• Tier 2 supplementary capital 
• Tier 3 sub-supplementary capital that included market risk 
 
Under Basel I it was stipulated that Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital must 
represent a minimum 8 percent of RWA of which 4 percent must come 
from Tier 1 core capital. Tier 3 was introduced several years later in 1998 
to combat market risk. 
 
The main focus of Basel I was capital adequacy and this took the form of 
credit risk and RWA and linked to the three Tiers. RWA was categorised 
as the following: 
 
• 0 percent for cash and home and central bank debt as well as OECD 
• 0, 10, 20 or 50 percent for claims on domestic public entities but 
excluding central government 
• 20 percent for public institutions and forms of OECD debt 
• 50 percent for residential mortgages 
• 100 percent for all other claims 
 
There were two main approaches given to enable a bank to meet the 
capital adequacy requirements set by Basel I so that risk could be 
calculated in conjunction with RWA. These were assets to capital multiple 
and risk based capital ratio otherwise known as the Cooke ratio. Assets 





its total capital. Risk based capital ratio used the equation of capital to 
risk weighted on and off balance sheet exposure and assigned to credit 
risk. Once the risk had been assigned to the risk weighting, a bank could 
then multiply by the percentage of the risk weighting category and then 
multiply once more by 8 percent.169 
 
In hindsight, Basel I was not sufficiently subtle and accommodating to 
the ever-changing banking world. However, Basel II was not published 
until 2004 and as such Basel I was the leading authority for almost two 
decades and should not be discredited. Furthermore, many developing 
countries continue to use Basel I. 
 
Basel I was not only revolutionary but provided a platform for Basel II for 
banking regulation to develop, grow and improve. As Davis states, ’The 
1988 capital framework was not intended to be a static document, but to 
evolve over time‘.170 This is evident with Basel III as the current leading 
authority and there is no doubt that there will be many more versions. In 
the end, for the Basel regulations to remain the pinnacle of banking 
regulation it needs to develop and evolve, importantly it needs to adapt 
in order to remain relevant and effective.  
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The author would summarise Basel I as the first building block to financial 
stability and that Basel I was never going to be complete at the first 
attempt. Basel I provided a basis for international financial stability and 
a general consensus in one document across all nations to respect and 
adhere too. It would be wrong to assume that Basel I was envisaged to 
be the complete version and this was purported by the Basel Committee; 
it is also a logical conclusion. The banking world is changing all the time 
and it is inevitable that the Basel regulations must also change to stay 
effective and appropriate. Equally, regulation will develop and change as 
participants are progressively able to agree. 
 
Whilst the general reaction to Basel I was positive, it did take the coalition 
of the United States and the United Kingdom to push it forward. This was 
needed due to the slow progress being made and mainly due to the 
characteristics of the Basel Committee i.e. unanimity between like-
minded persons needing to prevail to proceed.171 Goodhart was right, a 
general consensus was required in order for Basel I to come to fruition. 
The difficulty came from risk weights and the inability to agree between 
member states to come to an agreed meeting of the minds. 
 
It was necessary to discuss Basel I in this chapter because it paved the 
way for Basel II which was published just before the financial crisis and 
has been superseded in recent times by Basel III. The remainder of the 
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research will discuss Basel II and III with appropriate Basel Committee 
regulatory work. It should be appreciated that while not mentioned in the 
research, the Basel Committee have produced other important work in 
relation to financial conglomerates,172 electronic banking,173 and in more 
recent times financial technology (FinTech).174 However, the research 
does not intend to explore these avenues as they are out of scope of the 
research. 
 
Chapter 2 will move on to discuss Basel II and how it moved forward from 
Basel I, along with its structure, strengths and weaknesses. By doing so 
a logical timeline can be illustrated from Basel I to III with the intention 
that the reader will appreciate how the Basel regulations progressed over 
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CHAPTER 2 - BASEL II 
 
Chapter 1 explained what the research will entail and the aims that will 
be striven for. It was established what sources of material will be used to 
make the research successful and what parts in particular would 
contribute to supporting the research title. A succinct overview was given 
of Basel I so that the reader could obtain an understanding and 
foundational appreciation in order for Basel II and III to follow. By delving 
into part of the history leading to Basel I, a fuller picture was portrayed. 
 
Many years of deliberation occurred before the enactment of Basel I, and 
several events took place which encouraged and prompted the Basel 
Committee to take action and publish a document on banking 
supervision.175  Whilst Basel I was revolutionary and contained many 
strengths, it was not free from criticism and had many weaknesses, some 
of which were discussed in Chapter 1. To lead from this, Chapter 2 will 
deliver an in depth analysis of Basel II and will split into three areas: Pillar 
1, Pillar 2 and Pillar 3.176 Once these areas have been explored, the 
strengths and weaknesses of Basel II (and Basel II.5) will be assessed 
before concluding and moving forward to Chapter 3 Basel III. 
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BASEL II - THE BEGINNING OF A NEW ERA 
 
It is fitting to start with a quote from Barr and Miller who state, ’Over 
time, banks, commentators, and regulators became increasingly 
dissatisfied with the 1988 Accord as overly rigid, not well-aligned with 
risk, subject to regulatory arbitrage, politicised, and subject to 
distortion‘.177 Keeping this in mind, a new era of banking regulation was 
about to begin. 
 
The New Basel Capital Accord, otherwise known as Basel II, consisted of 
several consultative documents. The first in 1999, 178  the second in 
2001 179  and the final document in 2003. 180  The final proposal was 
published in 2004181 with a full comprehensive guide released in 2006182 
and expected implementation date the same year. It was commented at 
the time that any delay between the arrival of Basel II would be to the 
detriment of the banking world183 (from a European perspective). This is 
because if the rules within Europe were not aligned to internationally 
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based rules then it could weaken the financial system in that regulators 
and supervisors would not be aligned to up-to-date regulation. Equally, 
European regulated banks would be at a disadvantage compared to their 
international competitors. Essentially, arbitrage would be more likely. 
Gleeson noted that outside the EU, Basel II was implemented much faster 
than within the EU and this could create problems such as arbitrage and 
a temporary capital boom. In hindsight this was true but had little effect 
on the financial crisis, the financial crisis was not extinguished by Basel 
II and the fact that Basel III came shortly after is recognition that Basel 
II was not fit for purpose.184 Alexander et al. suggest that, ’…Basel 
II…disproportionately focuses on the particular economic risks that banks 
create for themselves and not on the aggregate risk that banks create for 
the entire financial system‘. 185  A criticism put forward prior to the 
financial crisis. This will be evident over the coming chapter. 
 
Despite these criticisms and in hindsight, Sabalot notes, ’Basel II 
represents a major revision of the international standard on bank capital 
adequacy…‘.186  
 
It was explained that Basel I had many weaknesses that contributed to 
its overhaul, some of which were explained in Chapter 1. One of the main 
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problems of Basel I was that it did not allow for varying degrees of risk, 
and it was also regimented in its structure 187  which prohibited 
adaptability. It was evident that change needed to occur and swift action 
was required, additionally, Basel I required a complete re-evaluation. It 
was stated that:  
 
 ’…the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision published a  
 consultative paper proposing substantial changes to the   
 existing global consensus on bank capital regulation…This   
 development represents an acceptance by the major bank   
 supervisors that the structure put in place by the 1988   
 Accord had become dangerously outdated…‘188  
 
One of those changes was RWA, which under Basel I was simple and 
constructed in an unsophisticated manner. It was dangerous because it 
allowed unacceptable incentives for banks when it came to true economic 
risk during arbitrage and how risk was measured.189 This could then lead 
to operational risk problems without reducing other risks and 
consequently expose the banking system.  
 
The motive for Basel II was to not only improve Basel I but to counter 
banks’ capital regulation and focus on internal controls so that greater 
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flexibility could be achieved and to enable capital requirements to reflect 
underlying risk more accurately.190 It also provided a more sophisticated 
set of guidelines to combat capital and credit risk. One of the main 
alterations allowed banks to create their own internal rating models to 
determine risk,191 the benefits of such was that lower capital charges 
could be achieved. Alexander et al. articulate, ’The aim of Basel II is to 
make the regulatory capital held by banks more sensitive to the economic 
risks that banks face‘.192 
 
Basel II maintained the same 8 percent standard of capital to RWA and 
definition of capital as stated in Basel I.193 It is interesting to consider 
whether the definition of capital was still relevant i.e. should the definition 
have been altered considering that substantial changes were being made 
to large parts of Basel II? This point was discussed by the Basel 
Committee, but no change applied,194 and this will be discussed later in 
the strengths and weaknesses section.  
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At this point it is important to illustrate the three aims stated by the Basel 
Committee (and by Balthazar)195 on what Basel II aimed to achieve. 
These were: the quality and stability of the international banking system 
was to be improved, to create and maintain a level playing field, and 
promote and encourage the adoption of stringent practices in risk 
management. The first two aims existed in Basel I, the third was new. 
Essentially, Basel II was trying to improve risk management and 
resilience of the banking industry.196 By creating a three (pillars) pronged 
strategy, the objectives were clear. In order to improve the financial 
system the Basel Committee designed Basel II to focus on internal control 
and management and an emphasis was placed on a bank’s internal 
models. This was further supported by a supervisory review process and 
market discipline. It can now be appreciated that Basel II would become 
more structured than its predecessor. 
 
It can be appreciated that a huge transition was taking place from a ratio 
based approach (Basel I) to one that focused on the alignment to internal 
management, models and practices. The end result being a more risk 
sensitive approach,197 in line with the statement made by Alexander et 
al. above. 
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One of the main differences and improvements was that Basel II became 
more flexible and risk sensitive.198 Gup was partly right, it was different 
to Basel I in that it became more flexible and the approach taken was 
geared toward being more risk sensitive. In theory it would be effective, 
in practice not so much. Furthermore, Basel II developed the over 
simplistic category of classes in which risks were attributed (0-100 
percent),199 adding more depth and clarity. The development of risk 
weighting can be viewed positively for the simple reason being that the 
risk weight categories and processes were basic and lacking depth to 
calculate risk correctly. 
 
Like Basel I, Basel II continued to be a set of guidelines which applied to 
G10 countries and internationally active banks. The intention being to 
reach more than one hundred countries, in line with its predecessor, so 
that greater stability and parity could be attained.200 That being said, it 
will be discussed shortly that parity and a level playing field may not have 
been achievable due to the EU applying the Basel regulations to both 
investment firms and banks, and the United States not doing so.201 If 
countries in Europe were incorporating most of Basel II and the United 
States the opposite, then this could affect many elements of banking from 
lending to RWA. 
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It is unequivocal that Basel I focused heavily on the idea of a minimum 
capital requirement model that lacked flexibility and the ability to 
differentiate between different risk scenarios. To limit this problem it 
appears that the Basel Committee tried to construct Basel II in a more 
flexible and robust way and, as Sabalot notes, ’…it aligned the capital 
measurement framework with sound contemporary practices in 
banking‘.202 To complement and enforce this approach Basel II was split 
into three areas or three pillars203 as it was famously known for,204 they 
were: 
 
• Pillar 1 Minimum Capital Requirements. Improvements to Basel I to 
include credit risk, operational risk, and market risk 
• Pillar 2 Supervisory Review. Bank capital adequacy and internal 
processes 
• Pillar 3 Market Discipline. To strengthen market discipline and promote 
solid banking practices 
 
It will be apparent over the coming chapter that all three pillars are 
dependent on each other. As Docherty and Viort state, ’…any one of the 
three pillars doesn’t work without the other two…‘.205 
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In order to fully comprehend Basel II, the three pillars will be discussed 
individually. By dissecting Basel II in this manner a complete picture can 
be given so that critical evaluation can follow. Once dissected, strengths 
and weaknesses will be examined. 
 
An interesting point to ponder whilst exploring Basel II over the 
remainder of this chapter is to consider the viewpoint of Gup who 
explained why banks fail (from his experience) within the banking world. 
First, that banks in general have made too many bad loans. Second, these 
have been accumulated over several years. Third, there has been poor 
maintenance of these loans. Fourth, that there is a common trait of those 
bad loans with banks that fail.206 Some of these points will be alluded to 
throughout the remainder of this chapter. It will become apparent that 
some of these points are intertwined and that Basel II had very little 
effect on limiting these problems. 
 
PILLAR 1 - MINIMUM CAPITAL REQUIREMENTS 
 
Background of minimum capital requirements that began with Basel I 
 
Pillar 1 overlaps with the discussion that has already taken place in 
Chapter 1 where it was explained how Basel I was constructed. In order 
to reinforce this point and to explain the enhancements made by Basel 
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II, the background of minimum capital requirements will be briefly 
expounded before detailing the structure and alterations that were made. 
 
It was noted earlier that the Basel Committee predated the enactment of 
Basel I and was born in 1974 to include the G10. This was primarily due 
to the failure of the German bank Bankhaus Herstatt, amongst other 
issues and events. The Basel Committee focused on information sharing 
and there was an overall desire to achieve a forum for dialogue. As time 
passed it became increasingly apparent to the Basel Committee that 
there was a need to create a set of guidelines to prevent bank failures 
which developed due to a fear of insufficient capital to counteract large 
losses which could arise from financial downturn or poor banking 
methods. This concern heavily shifted towards Japan during the 1980s as 
Japanese banks were expanding around the world at a phenomenal rate. 
The rapid expansion alarmed the Basel Committee because the valuations 
of many Japanese banks consisted solely on valuations of capital.207 As 
Gup explains, ’…valuations of capital that included large amounts of 
unrealized capital gains from rapid increases in the values of Japanese 
stocks that they owned‘,208  thus increasing the possibility of several 
banks collapsing. In addition, the Latin American debt crisis added to the 
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concerns surrounding capital ratios and the decline in large international 
banks.209 
 
Due to concerns surrounding Japan and banks within Latin America, the 
Basel Committee began to look at international regulation and what could 
be done to regulate the banking industry. The capital standards idea 
developed herein and eventually evolved into Basel I; the first iteration 
was also (to a large extent) a response to the declining capital levels in 
international banks which was equally a huge concern for the Basel 
Committee.210  
 
The most important outcome that came from Basel I in relation to 
minimum capital requirements was that it put in place a formula that 
enabled banks to allocate capital to risk in a simplistic way and whilst 
many criticisms can be drawn from this it was revolutionary for its time, 
especially in comparison to previous mechanisms such as leverage 
ratios211 that mainly looked at total assets.212 Basel I included on and off 
balance sheet assets and used the results to then allocate a risk factor. 
In Chapter 1 it was explained that there were five risk categories that 
ranged from 0-100 percent and those assets would be placed into one of 
these categories depending on the type of risk. Basel I further stipulated 
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that a bank should hold a minimum 8 percent to RWA and this was known 
as risk based capital. 
 
Criticism unravelled over the coming years with many commentators 
stating that risk based capital was too rigid, inflexible and that it was not 
realistic.213 One of the consequences that came from this was that a bank 
could manipulate parts of Basel I. 214  Nevertheless, Basel I was 
implemented by many leading countries around the world and many 
countries still implement Basel I in recent times.215 One assumes that the 
adoption was partly due to political pressure,216 but also because there 
was no leading document at the time that brought banking regulation 
together under one document, and for this reason Basel I should be 
commended. That being said there were improvements to be made and 
as the years passed and criticisms mounted, the Basel Committee 
deliberated on how Basel I could be strengthened. Credit risk weights 
were to be modified and three alternative methods were given that would 
provide better results for calculating minimum capital requirements. The 
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same was done for operational risk, a new measure created. These as 
well as other key changes will now be discussed. 
 
Basel II and the key changes to Pillar 1 minimum capital requirements 
 
Balthazar explains that Pillar 1 and minimum capital requirements was 
deemed the most crucial part of Basel I due to it being the principle buffer 
to protect a bank against financial losses.217 This is logical considering 
that having sufficient capital to counter large capital losses is the primary 
way to defend against a financial crisis. Needless to say, it also needs to 
be liquid.218 The sole focus of the Basel Committee and capital remained 
in Basel II in relation to which Pillar 1 is analysed.219 The 8 percent 
requirement continued but under Basel II the RWA were refined. Pillar 1 
further stipulated different reserve recommendations for different banks 
because it was deemed that each bank will vary in terms of their asset 
portfolio,220 because large international banks will be very different to 
small to medium sized banks. Additionally, a third risk category was 
introduced to coincide with credit and market risk, this would be coined 
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operational risk.221 As Lopez highlights, this addition would enable Pillar 
1 to become more risk sensitive.222 After all, this was a weak point for 
Basel I. 
 
Whilst devising Basel II, the Basel Committee created methods to 
determine and calculate credit risk more effectively. On this basis Basel 
II made two notable changes relating to minimum capital requirements. 
Firstly, the Basel Committee introduced and extended enhancements to 
calculate risk. This included market risk which incorporated the Market 
Risk Amendment 1996 from Basel I, and operational risk which was a 
new measure. 223  Secondly, key changes were made to credit risk 
whereby Basel II improved the previous Standardised Approach and 
created two new approaches in respect of the internal ratings model.224 
 
In order to explain Pillar 1 and highlight the key changes made, it is 
necessary to separate Pillar 1 into three areas that minimum capital 
requirements apply to: credit risk, operational risk and market risk. It 
should be acknowledged that the different approaches used were 
deliberate so that lower capital requirements could be achieved when 
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moving from the basic approach in all three to the most complex in all 
respective three. It can be viewed as an incentive by the Basel Committee 
to encourage banks to increase their risk management standard 
procedures225 in the hope that all banks will strive to reach the more 
complex models. 
 
Pillar 1 - Credit risk 
 
Credit risk is the largest component of Pillar 1 and arguably the most 
significant of the three pillars in trying to accomplish stability as well as 
prevent financial collapse. Gleeson states, ’Of all the risks that banks are 
exposed to, credit risk is the most important and the most intuitively 
obvious‘.226  
 
Credit risk can be defined as, ’…the potential that a bank borrower or 
counterparty will fail to meet its obligations in accordance with agreed 
terms‘. 227  Therefore, banks must allocate funds to both on and off 
balance sheet items that in turn produce a RWA value.228 
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It is important to remember that credit is not limited to loans, it covers 
many other facets ranging from lending money in the future to buying 
debt securities.229 Accordingly, credit exposure and credit risk are an 
essential part of everyday transactions for banks. This is because the two 
bear significance on effective risk management and are essential for long 
term stability.230 In modern day banking the old maxim, ’…lend on the 
credit, not the security…‘231 is regularly broken. One of the reasons for 
this is that not all financial transactions are credit transactions. Credit 
expands beyond the concept of loan exposures, as explained above it 
covers other aspects such as buying debt securities and in fact many 
financial transactions will involve some form of credit risk. Perhaps this is 
the main problem with banks in the modern era and that banks have 
moved away from the general practices that were originally founded 
upon.232 Although it is unfair to suggest as banking, like many other fields 
changes over time, and naturally morphs into new realms. Adapting to 
the environment is essential, the byproduct is that the type of 
transactions and ways of translating do as well. 
 
In this area there is high usage of internal and external rating agencies 
that try to reduce the probabilities of default. This is a significant change 
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from Basel I but does not pass without fault, this will be highlighted in 
the weaknesses section. Needless to say, the Basel Committee believed 
and encouraged the use of CRAs as a form of objectivity and accuracy, 
which in turn would reflect the market in true form when it came to bank 
loans.233 Credit risk was heavily criticised under Basel I because of the 
simplistic structure that was used to determine this type of risk i.e. 
allocation to a risk category, and considering that credit risk forms a large 
part of RWA, 234  this posed a great problem due to credit risk 
encompassing more than just loans. Due to this, the Basel Committee 
improved credit risk with three approaches. Before the aforesaid is 
analysed, more detail is required to clarify this change. 
 
In terms of credit risk exposure the main problems were losses from 
default. 235  Potential losses are divided into two parts, probability of 
default236 (PD) and loss given default237 (LGD). The values of PD and LGD 
are stipulated by a bank’s respective regulator if that bank is a small 
entity. Control and freedom will gradually move towards the bank when 
they are a much larger entity; producing more flexibility for the bank and 
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models to calculate risk. This explanation can now be applied to the three 
approaches. 
 
As previously stated, under Basel I there was only one formula that 
applied to credit exposure. Basel II created three approaches when 
determining credit exposure.238 These were: 
 
• Standardised Approach 
• Foundation Internal Ratings Based Approach (F-IRB) 
• Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach (A-IRB) 
 
A smaller bank will generally be allowed to use the Standardised 
Approach to determine RWA, which employs a list of weightings that are 
based not only on asset type but external credit rating sources. In 
comparison, a larger bank will be permitted to use the F-IRB approach 
and in some instances the A-IRB approach if approved. Most large banks 
will use the third approach as it offers detailed adjustment of capital 
requirements.239 
 
Under the Standardised Approach different risks are assigned to different 
categories and the approach relied on external rating agencies to 
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determine those risks. This was considered during Chapter 1 in relation 
to the five categories ranging from 0-100 percent. The approach is almost 
identical to the one found in Basel I which did not need any input from 
the bank.240 The other two approaches, F-IRB and A-IRB, differ in that 
internal mechanisms are used to measure risk as opposed to external 
mechanisms. It would seem that Basel II enhanced Pillar 1 credit risk 
with the F-IRB and A-IRB approaches and this does coincide with the 
Basel Committee placing more emphasis on internal risk management 
and models.  
 
These approaches were strengthened further, for instance F-IRB banks 
could use their own internal models to calculate risk in terms of default 
risk but regulatory authorities would determine parameters for loss. A-
IRB gave even more freedom to a bank in that not only default risk could 
be calculated but parameter for loss using a bank’s own internal models 
and databases could be utilised. A bank must consider which of the three 
approaches it is going to use, although the A-IRB approach needs 
approval by the appropriate regulator.241 It can be ascertained at this 
early stage why the A-IRB approach required approval because of the 
complexity and scope it would give to large investment banks. 
 
Once confirmed a bank may choose to use a basic approach for different 
types of asset but cannot choose a more complex one. For example, if 
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Bank A used the F-IRB approach then it could use the Standardised 
Approach for some of its exposures but could not use the A-IRB approach 
for any of its exposures. The general philosophy is that a bank will 
progress to the A-IRB approach, however it is accepted that the most 
complex method may not always be cost effective and appropriate for 
all.242 This is logical considering the qualities of the third approach and 
that the cost to produce calculations and time to invest as well as proceed 
calculations would be taxing even on the most large of banks. The three 
approaches explained will now be detailed further. 
 
Pillar 1 - Credit risk and the Standardised Approach 
 
In theory, regulators will assign risk weights to individual assets with  
guidance from CRAs to determine allocation, and this is in relation to a 
banks current outstanding market debt which will reflect both PD and 
LGD.243 What this means is that smaller banks will be reliant on this data 
from regulators and whilst it is similar to Basel I, there are some 
differences, the main one being that risk weightings were more aligned 
to market evidence. Otherwise the process was identical to Basel I. 
 
The Standardised Approach includes both expected and unexpected 
losses; Basel I only dealt with the latter under the market risk 
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amendment protocol and can be viewed as more complex with five 
groupings of assets.244 Apart from this and stated above, the approach is 
essentially the same as it was in Basel I, whereas in contrast Basel II 
endeavoured to make this area more risk sensitive. For example, the 
bank allocates the risk weight to each of its assets, as well as off balance 
sheet assets, and the end result is the risk weighted asset values for that 
bank. As Crouhy et al. put it, ’…a risk weight of 50 percent means that 
an exposure is included in the calculation of risk-weighted assets at 50 
percent of its full value, which then translates into a capital charge equal 
to 8 percent of that value or, equivalently, to 4% (=8% x 50%) of the 
exposure‘.245 
 
Compared to Basel I, the risk weightings were more aligned to market 
evidence which positively cover a far wider range than Basel I 
encompassed. Arguably this was an important improvement for banking 
regulation because by aligning those risks more closely to the bank a 
more accurate picture can be derived. This would, in theory, reflect the 
credit risk of a bank in a more precise manner and that would further 
mean that the bank would be able to allocate an appropriate figure 
against their risks. There are similarities that can be drawn with Basel I 
in this respect, however, these categories are more in line with market 
and economic information gathered from wider sources in contrast to 
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Basel I.246 An enhancement that highlights how Basel II improved this 
part of banking regulation and strengthened the area of credit risk. 
 
Whilst criticisms can be applied to the Standardised Approach, many of 
which share the same problems as Basel I, 247  the simplicity of this 
mechanism and that it only applied to small banks was very much a 
strength. 
 
Pillar 1 - Credit risk and the Foundation Internal Ratings Based Approach 
(F-IRB) 
 
F-IRB was intended for larger banks. Most banks can determine their own 
risk but may require assistance for other risks which are calculated by 
the regulator. Since Basel I, capital requirements and F-IRB are no longer 
classified as global risk weights aligned with external ratings.248 This 
approach changed to formulas computed by credit risk models which are 
then calculated by the bank. The risk parameters that are now used by 
banks are split into several areas249 and allows for more diversity. 
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Under F-IRB a bank categorises banking book exposures into five areas: 
corporate, sovereign, bank, retail and equity.250 This approach is widely 
accepted and consistent with solid banking practices.251 Furthermore, the 
F-IRB approach has the ability to differentiate between many types of 
loan, whether it be corporate or retail. F-IRB will base this information on 
internally created models whereby PD and LGD are obvious. As alluded 
to by Gup, most banks will use PD for individual loans but use LGD 
calculations provided by the regulator.252 To put this into context, a 
formula will be explained to best illustrate this process which will include 
a further two abbreviations, exposure at default253 (EAD) and maturity of 
facility254 (M). So, in the F-IRB approach banks will be able to calculate 
(roughly) the PD associated with each borrower and the remaining 
calculation will be concluded by the regulator. Here are the stages: 
 
 ’LGD = 45 percent for senior unsecured facilities and 75 percent  
 for subordinate claims; the existence of collateral will lower the  
 estimated LGD 
 EAD = 75 percent for irrevocable undrawn commitments 
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 M = 2.5 years, except for repo-style transactions where the  
 effective maturity will be six months‘255 
 
It should be kept in mind that the second stage is assuming a conversion 
factor of 0 percent and is applicable for immediately cancellable 
commitments or unconditionally cancellable commitments. What can be 
extracted from this example is that a bank will do part of the calculation 
for expected future loss and the regulator will input the remaining 
calculation(s) i.e. everything else after PD. That is why approval is still 
required for this approach.256 What this means for a bank is that, in 
essence, the bank will perform part of the calculation and the regulator 
will conduct the other half thus providing an end result. By doing so, the 
partnership between the bank and regulator and that the regulator is 
approving the process, provides a form of clarity and almost guaranteed 
nature that the end calculation will be accurate, or at least more accurate 
compared to the Standardised Approach.  
 
There is still a key emphasis and contribution from regulators in order to 
safeguard a bank, otherwise it could be argued that a bank would be open 
to varying degrees of risk, either through carelessness or inexperience. 
In a broad context, ’…supervisors and regulators have a key role to play 
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in stabilizing the regulatory framework…‘.257 If a bank is allowed to go 
even further with their internal ratings model then the regulator will 
assess whether the bank can adopt the A-IRB approach. 
 
Pillar 1 - Credit risk and the Advanced Internal Ratings Based Approach 
(A-IRB) 
 
The A-IRB approach can only be used for the largest of banks where a 
more sophisticated model is required to determine risk. Similar to F-IRB, 
the models created would need to be approved by the appropriate 
regulator.258 In contrast to F-IRB, banks need to pass intensive standards 
in relation to their internal rating systems and is judged by the regulator. 
This has been asserted to be rather discriminatory because gone is the 
objectivity of a level playing field.259 If assessed successfully, a bank will 
be able to determine their own models for both PD and LGD, unlike the 
F-IRB approach which only allowed the former. It can be accepted that 
the A-IRB approach goes even further, developing on the F-IRB approach 
and very distinguishable between the basic Standardised Approach. The 
idea behind giving bank’s a more advanced model to calculate credit risk 
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is understandable as it gives more control to the bank, but more 
importantly it allows more accurate results to be derived.   
 
In summary a bank which is approved to use this approach will be able 
to calculate PD, LGD, EAD and M parameters to loss. Needless to say, 
these measures should be pre-approved due to the magnitude of 
responsibility and freedom given to the bank. On this basis, regulators 
must ensure that a bank's internal processes are robust260 in order to 
competently calculate. After all, if the bank does not have the 
infrastructure and resources in place to conduct such calculations then 
this could negatively impact the results. This should be picked up by the 
regulator beforehand whereby the regulator will investigate whether a 
bank has the right historical data (in-depth) and reliable risk models to 
use the A-IRB approach.261 In supporting this goal, Basel II set out 
minimum operational requirements that should be followed and will 
compliment an effective implementation of this task. 
 
Similar to F-IRB, a big incentive for a bank to create their own models in 
calculating risk is that it can lower capital charges.262 Due to this, it is 
clear to see why banks would want to create their own risk models as the 
benefit of lowering capital charges means that funds can be used 
                                               
260 B E Gup, ‘The New Basel Capital Accord and Questions for Research’ in M 
Saidenberg and T Schuermann, The New Basel Capital Accord (Thomson 2004) 105. 
261 A Docherty and F Viort, Better Banking (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2014) 124. 
262 I A Moosa, Good Regulation, Bad Regulation: The Anatomy of Financial Regulation 






elsewhere. In the end and to reiterate, banks using this model (compared 
to the F-IRB approach) can see lower capital charges due to the formula 
used in calculating RWA,263 thus complimenting the incentive created by 
the Basel Committee to reach this level. 
 
The policy by regulators is to encourage and promote the benefits for 
banks reaching this level and progression toward the A-IRB approach is 
highly rewarding, though it is accepted that it may not be economically 
sound for some banks.264 Therefore, it seems a thorough evaluation 
would be required to fully investigate as to whether the A-IRB approach 
should be sought for the reasons explained above. 
 
The end result is that the A-IRB approach, and by de facto the F-IRB 
approach, is very different from the mindset of Basel I. Capital 
requirements would now be based on a bank’s experiences and 
judgement. 
 
Pillar 1 - Operational risk 
 
The second component of Pillar 1 relates to operational risk. Operational 
risk refers to failed internal processes by people and systems, or from 
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events externally that lead to losses. Whilst a new addition to Basel II, 
this risk was coined many years beforehand.265 
 
Operational risk is defined in Basel II as, ’…the risk of loss resulting from 
inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or from 
external events‘.266 Arguably one of the reasons why this risk was created 
was due to the large wrongdoings of both Enron in 2001 and WorldCom 
in 2002 as concurred with by Wong267 who stated the following, ’The 
Basel II reform (2004) established operational risk as a major risk, 
following the fall of Enron and WorldCom, two of the largest corporate 
bankruptcies caused by unauthorized trading and accounting scandal‘.268 
Additionally, the Barings Bank collapse further highlighted to the Basel 
Committee that operational risk was an imperative factor that needed 
more attention.269 
 
The case of Enron portrayed a classic example of greed by people and it 
illustrated that whilst an entity may be large it is still susceptible to 
collapse. Although not directly linked to the Basel regulations and 
operational risk, Enron displayed how several people within an 
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organisation can damage and implode an organisation from within. It is 
this part of the Enron scandal that relates to operational risk and one 
would assume that this was included in Basel II to stop events like this 
from happening.270  
 
Another example was WorldCom, a similar case to Enron only larger in 
terms of loss. Again illustrating a clear abuse of internal management 
and the falsification of accounts; this finally led to WorldComs’ demise.271 
It has been suggested that, ’…most of the major losses of the last twenty 
years have been driven by operational risk losses. Enron, WorldCom…all 
experienced catastrophic losses because of operational risk 
misjudgments‘.272 Thus emphasising the significance of operational risk.  
 
Continuing on this note and more applicable to the research due to the 
entity being a bank was the failure of Barings Bank; albeit primarily due 
to fraud.273 It is arguable that fraud can be a main factor of operational 
risk and Barings Bank is one of several examples that portray this.274 In 
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short, a rogue trader brought down Barings Bank275 and the capital based 
regulation at the time was not enough to save Barings Bank. This was a 
combination of large operational losses and that Basel I was not geared 
toward risk management.276  
 
It can be ascertained from the three aforementioned examples of internal 
abuse that people were the real driving force behind the catastrophes 
within those entities, although they were not directly linked to operational 
risk and more to do with accountancy laws in the first two cases. 
However, it is proposed that this must have heavily influenced the Basel 
Committee and the need to limit this kind of abuse. The major effects of 
Enron, 277  WorldCom 278  and Barings Bank 279  are evident. Hence the 
importance and inclusion of operational risk. 
 
                                               
275 See Jason Rodrigues, ‘Barings Collapse at 20: How Rogue Trader Nick Leeson Broke 
the Bank’ The Guardian (London, 24 February 
2015)https://www.theguardian.com/business/from-the-archive-blog/2015/feb/24/nick-
leeson-barings-bank-1995-20-archive accessed 20 September 2018. 
276 I A Moosa, Good Regulation, Bad Regulation: The Anatomy of Financial Regulation 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2015) 104. 
277 Richard A Oppel Jr and Andrew R Sorkin, ‘Enron’s Collapse: The Overview; Enron 
Collapses as Suitor Cancels Plans for Merger’ New York Times (New York, 29 November 
2001) http://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/29/business/enron-s-collapse-the-overview-enron-
collapses-as-suitor-cancels-plans-for-merger.html accessed 25 June 2015. 
278 Simon Romero and Riva D Atlas, ‘Worldcom’s Collapse: The Overview; Worldcom 
Files for Bankruptcy; Largest U.S. Case’ New York Times (New York, 22 July 2002) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/22/us/worldcom-s-collapse-the-overview-worldcom-files-
for-bankruptcy-largest-us-case.html accessed 25 June 2015. 
279 James Titcomb, ‘Barings: The Collapse that Erased 232 years of History’ The 
Telegraph (London, 23 February 2015) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/11427501/Barings-






As mentioned earlier operational risk was a new addition under Basel II. 
Unlike credit risk, operational risk requires no capital to cover this 
exposure and this is due to the fact that it is not a quantitative risk like 
credit risk; it is concerned with control systems and expert opinions280 
and cannot be quantified. Similar to credit risk, operational risk also 
contained three approaches: 
 
• Basic Indicator Approach 
• Standardised Approach 
• Advanced Measurement Approach 
 
To contemplate what this meant for a bank, these approaches will be 
analysed. 
 
Pillar 1 - Operational risk and the Basic Indicator Approach 
 
Gup describes the Basic Indicator Approach as, ’…one indicator to 
represent the operational risk for the entire bank, and it ties capital to a 
single measure of business activity…‘.281 The first approach to calculating 
operational risk can be viewed as a simplistic way to calculate capital 
requirements which is based on a gross income percentage.282 The Basel 
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Committee identified that there were many risks associated with 
operational risk from fraud and system failures to external events. It even 
includes legal risk.283 Hence the inclusion in Basel II. 
 
The first approach gives a capital charge equal to 15 percent of a banks 
gross income and a bank must hold capital equivalent to the last three 
years (on average) of a fixed percentage in relation to positive annual 
income (gross).284 It is the simplest of the three approaches and only 
considers the risk in proportion to a bank’s activities. Under Basel II there 
are no requirements that need to be fulfilled to use this approach as it is 
the default option for operational risk. Although, due care and accordance 
to the guide stipulated by the Basel Committee should be practised; this 
may be due to a difficulty in applying a capital charge to operational risk 
as a result of methodology and historical data issues.285 The guidelines 
have been updated in recent years.286 
 
Gross income includes items such as interest receivable, interest payable 
and income from shares.287 Gross income should exclude items such as 
any loss or profit from the sale of securities or income derived from 
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insurance. 288  Therefore, it is apparent that gross income should be 
applied before the deduction of operating outgoings. 
 
It is a simple gauge for operational risk and this is why it is the default 
approach. There are no requirements set by Basel II that need to be 
satisfied before this model can be used,289 but Basel II does purport that 
operational risk and the Basic Indicator Approach should fall in line with 
guidance given for sound banking practices. 
 
As will be highlighted shortly and because the Basic Indicator Approach 
does not offer any incentive for applying this calculation method, there 
are incentives for reaching the more complex approaches. However, 
some banks will not be able to apply the Advanced Measurement 
Approach due to the complexities of such. 
 
Pillar 1 - Operational risk and the Standardised Approach 
 
The Standardised Approach is more complex in comparison and by using 
this method the risk is more closely aligned to the purpose of the loan. 
These loans are placed into eight categories and range from corporate 
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finance to retail brokerage. 290  It is more advanced than the Basic 
Indicator Approach whereby percentages are based on the business lines.  
 
Like the Basic Indicator Approach, the average gross income over the last 
three years must be given. In contrast, the Standardised Approach goes 
further in allowing a bank to offset negative income from one area of the 
business to another, provided that over the last year the sum of capital 
requirements are positive.291 The end sum yields the total operational 
risk charge for a bank. The multipliers used for calculating the total 
operational risk can be found in Basel II.292 As illustrated there are eight 
business lines relating the level of capital needed to the gross income and 
these range from 12 percent retail brokerage to 18 percent corporate 
finance. 
 
A bank must have clear responsibilities in what they should be doing and 
assign these to a risk management function.293 What this means is that 
if correctly done then operational risk will be properly assessed and 
monitored, additionally the design and implementation of future models 
can be put into practice.  
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If a bank is using this approach then regular reporting must occur and 
include risk exposures and material losses to management aspects of the 
bank, as well as the board of directors.294 The outcome(s) of such means 
that mechanisms must be in place to take action if needed. What this 
means is that policies must be in place for non-compliance.  
 
For banks using this model, the processes and assessment system in 
place for risk management not only requires validation, but also regular 
independent review.295 In addition to this, the bank’s risk assessment 
system will be reviewed regularly by external sources and it would appear 
that this is in order to make sure that it is compliant and functional. In 
comparison to the Basic Indicator Approach it can be ascertained that the 
second approach in place to calculate operational risk is more detailed 
and thorough.296 Validation is required and so only the largest of banks 
will go toward this approach. 
 
Pillar 1 - Operational risk and the Advanced Measurement Approach 
 
Evidently the third and final approach is even more accurate than the 
second. There are similarities with the Standardised Approach such as 
regular reporting of risk exposures, internal and external reviews, and 
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validation of key processes.297 Although, the scale and detail in which this 
is done will be much greater. 
 
It was envisaged that through this model flexibility would be afforded to 
banks for them to use their own approaches, subject to qualitative and 
quantitative standards.298 There are threshold conditions which must be 
met before a bank can use the Advanced Measurement Approach. To 
surmise these include: all operational risks are captured, all bank 
operations meet qualitative criteria and any simpler model approaches 
used meet criteria, on implementation a significant part of the banks 
operational risk is captured by this model, and this approach must be 
rolled out to all legal entities and business lines.299 It is by its very nature, 
the third and final approach to calculating operational risk, the most 
complex and only the largest of banks will attempt to gain approval.  
 
A bank may apply this approach (assuming approval has been granted 
and conditions are met above) to parts of its operational risk. The rest of 
the operational risk can be calculated either by the Basic Indicator 
Approach or the Standardised Approach.300 Although there is no set 
model to follow there are some key points to adhere to whilst performing 
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this approach. For example, a bank using this model can use both internal 
and external data (five years plus) when assessing risks, and the bank 
must have procedures in place to collate operational historical data and 
retain this information so that it can be used by the appropriate business 
department.301 
 
As highlighted recently, in order for a bank to use this approach certain 
conditions must be met. The full threshold of conditions are listed in Basel 
II302 and the demanding nature is evident; in reality only larger banks 
will be able to satisfy this criteria.303 If larger banks are able to utilise this 
model, which in turn should improve measures of operational risk, then 
the incentives gained (lower capital charges) are highly beneficial. What 
can be construed from the information discussed is that Basel II became 
more robust and aligned to its new measure, operational risk.304 
 
Whilst there seem to be many hurdles for a bank using this model, and 
an assumption could be made that once approved a bank will be in a 
strong place to implement this approach; the worrying part is that after 
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approval a bank is left to their own devices.305 Surely there still needs to 
be some form of assistance and guidance. Even though it is the most 
advanced of all three approaches, this element does raise some concern. 
Not only from a supporting function but also regulation and monitoring. 
The Basel Committee did not indicate the structure of calculations, 
although there are minimum requirements stipulated in respect of risks 
prescribed.306 It may also be the case that it is the most advanced and 
therefore once approved there is no need to provide much guidance 
thereafter.  
 
Pillar 1 - Market risk 
 
The third component of Pillar 1 is market risk, which is widely known for 
the VaR method. This will be discussed in greater detail during Chapter 4 
when looking at Basel III as this is arguably one of the major flaws of 
Basel III.307 
 
Market risk is unchanged from its definition in Basel I, and primarily 
relates to risk associated with on and off balance sheet criteria as a 
consequence of change in market prices. It also relates to interest rate 
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instruments and equities in a bank’s trading book, as well as foreign 
exchange and commodities risk.308 
 
It should be noted that unlike credit risk and operational risk, market risk 
has two approaches and the reason why the former has three approaches 
is because for most banks the Standardised Approach (credit risk) and 
Basic Indicator Approach (operational risk) are sufficient, but for some 
larger banks the other approaches are needed to accommodate the 
complexity and manner in which the bank operates. To be clear, the 
definition of market risk is, ’…the risk of losses in on and off-balance sheet 
positions arising from adverse movements in market prices‘. 309  The 
positions included come from the trading book of a bank, commodity and 
foreign exchange risks for the entire balance sheet of a bank, and in more 
recent times it now includes credit risk and illiquid positions within trading 
book portfolios.310 
 
There are two approaches that are used to measure market risk, they 
are: 
 
• Standardised Approach 
• Value-at-Risk Approach (VaR) 
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Pillar 1 - Market risk and the Standardised Approach 
 
Market risk did not change greatly in terms of regulatory requirements 
from the introduction of the Market Risk Amendment 1996 seen in the 
later stages of Basel I. It does, therefore, continue with a basic risk 
weighting approach.  
 
The Standardised Approach applies a regimented set of criteria which is 
only permitted when the risk can be offset with another risk and when 
that risk is either linear, equal or opposite.311 This approach relies on the 
risk weights being fixed along with aggregation techniques. On this basis 
the Standardised Approach will either disregard correlations or apply a 
very simple approach. If a bank requires a more sophisticated way to 
calculate market risk then the second method discussed shortly will need 
to be sought.  
 
The Standardised Approach is used for different areas of risk from interest 
rates to commodities. With interest rate positions, for example, the risk 
is guided by the maturity or duration of a position.312 With commodity 
positions, for example, the risk is determined by spot price risk, basis risk 
and interest rate risk which are then combined with long and short term 
positions and regulatory capital charges.313 
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Even though this approach is the basic of the two stipulated for market 
risk, it is fairly prohibitive in that is requires a bank to store large sums 
of capital for trading book activities. In theory a bank is given two options, 
apply this approach as long as the trading book is basic or small, or 
develop calculations for using VaR.314 For many banks this could mean 
that the path to calculate market risk is already determined because their 
trading book will be large. Consequently, the only route to take in 
calculating market risk is the VaR method. In addition, incentives to use 
internal models (VaR) are prevalent and with the possibility of producing 
lower capital charges315 the temptation to go down this route was very 
alluring.  
 
In reality the Standardised Approach can only be used when a bank has 
no complex products in their portfolio, or they are not a large bank. 
Therefore, most banks will be guided toward the second approach to 
calculate market risk. 
 
Pillar 1 - Market Risk and the Value-at-Risk Approach (VaR) 
 
In comparison the second approach is more complicated and uses both 
qualitative and quantitative standards. As highlighted above a bank may 
have to go down this route due to the prohibitions of the Standardised 
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Approach. VaR will be discussed in more detail during Chapters 4 and 5 
due to the risk posed but will be briefly explained here due to the 
discussion of Market Risk.  
 
The focus of this approach is to assess general risk exposure.316 For more 
specific risks other internal models are used, e.g. debt securities or 
equities which will have a specific charge attached due to VaR not 
capturing the risk. This approach can be described as, ’For market risk, 
the VaR measures the magnitude of an adverse market shock on a 
position, or on a portfolio of positions, over a given horizon‘.317 Whilst it 
is good at deterring general risk exposure, specific risk exposure may 
prove tricky. 
 
A bank must not only produce VaR on a daily basis but also conduct back 
testing. Back testing is the comparison of the estimations made by using 
VaR and to measure those to the actual profit and loss results.318 In other 
terms it is, ’…for checking that the number of losses in excess of VaR is, 
or is not, in line with the quantile of the VaR model‘.319 The way in which 
VaR is estimated is simply described as, ’…a 99 per cent confidence level 
over a 10-day holding period‘.320 
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There are several criticisms of VaR which will be highlighted in the 
weaknesses section of this chapter, but VaR will be examined and 
scrutinised at greater length during Chapter 4, as the improvements 
made by Basel III still portray some obvious problems and it is one of the 
three weaknesses of Basel III that the author believes to be of huge 
concern. 
 
Pillar 1 - Summary 
 
Pillar 1 has added value to Basel II with the enhancements made to credit 
risk as well as the inclusion of operational risk and further enhancements 
made to market risk. By allowing banks to use several approaches 
depending on bank size and being permitted to do so, Pillar 1 improved 
greatly. Overall, a more robust system surfaced.321 
 
In summary, credit risk was overhauled to include two new approaches 
(F-IRB and A-IRB), operational risk was a new addition which included 
three approaches (Basic Indicator Approach, Standardised Approach and 
Advanced Measurement Approach), and market risk was enhanced and 
VaR improved. It will be discussed in the strengths and weaknesses 
section the implications that occurred due to the amendments and 
enhancements made by the Basel Committee. 
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PILLAR 2 - SUPERVISORY REVIEW 
 
The new pillar supervisory review was to stimulate banks to develop 
better risk management protocols. Supervisory review can be described 
as, ’…not only to ensure that banks have adequate capital to support all 
the risks in their business, but also to encourage banks to develop and 
use better risk management techniques in monitoring and managing their 
risks‘.322 Arguably Pillar 2 acts as a net, catching elements of risk not 
caught in Pillar 1. This was a good inclusion and it is believed to be the 
real innovation behind Basel II.323  
 
Pillar 2 was created to determine those risks that may not be captured 
and addressed under Pillar 1324 and to evaluate those risks. Basel II 
further stipulates:  
 
’Supervisors are expected to evaluate how well banks are 
 assessing their capital needs relative to their risks and to 
 intervene, where appropriate. This interaction is intended to foster 
 an active dialogue between banks and supervisors such that when 
                                               
322 Bank for International Settlements, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards A Revised Framework Comprehensive Version 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf page 204 accessed 2 April 2015. 
323 A Resti, ‘Pillar II in the New Basel Accord and in the New European Directives’ in M 
Bignami and A Pilati, Pillar II in the New Basel Accord: The Challenge of Economic 
Capital (Risk Books 2008) 3. 






 deficiencies are identified, prompt and decisive action can be  
 taken…‘325 
 
In addition to catching risk that may have slipped through the net in Pillar 
1, the second pillar endeavoured to create better communication links 
between banks and supervisors. That way if an issue is identified it can 
be swiftly rectified.326 
 
It can be succinctly summed up as, ’Evaluate all your risks, cover them 
with capital, and we will check what you have done‘.327 It is a tool to 
make sure that banks are not only putting capital aside to cover their risk 
but that it is also being completed in the correct way; a policing 
mechanism essentially. It is plausible to assume that this was an 
important part of Basel II regardless of its small inclusion in the Basel 
document.328 Yet it did, and continues to be, an integral part of the Basel 
regulations. It is not wrong to conclude that for such an important 
mechanism, and it is, after all one of three pillars, that more emphasis 
and explanation would have been allocated to supervisory review. 
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Furthermore, Pillar 2 requires internal systems to be put in place by banks 
to evaluate capital requirements in relation to the regulatory framework, 
and this will enable the bank to monitor their own risk profile. Banks 
should also consider other areas that may affect their risk such as 
reputation risk or interest rate risk;329 i.e. banking book. It can already 
be ascertained from the material so far that the baton was given to banks 
and supervisors in the effective implementation of Pillar 2. This delegation 
was not, in hindsight the optimal move to take from the Basel 
Committee.330 
 
Although Pillar 2 was covered briefly in comparison to Pillar 1 and Pillar 3 
of Basel II, it was still of paramount importance in that it required a bank 
to evaluate all other risks that were not covered under Pillar 1 and to then 
set aside capital to counter the risk of those areas. An extremely tough 
task without doubt.  
 
The idea behind Pillar 2 is valid but the execution flawed. The Basel 
Committee’s lack of exactness was deliberate, so all risks not identified 
under Pillar 1 would be found in Pillar 2.331 Whilst the ambiguity of such 
questions the effectiveness of Pillar 2, the flexibility of having no 
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regimented list is undoubtedly beneficial in that it should allow banks to 
assess all risks and not just those stated on a list; a tick box exercise. 
Unfortunately, a repercussion of this flexibility poses the query of whether 
those banks and persons conducting such evaluations, are suitably 
qualified. This will be discussed in the weaknesses section because if they 
cannot, then the intended purpose of Pillar 2 becomes impeded.  
 
It has been described that the innovation of Pillar 2 is that it extended 
the range of risks in terms of capital adequacy.332 With this in mind, there 
are three points contained in Basel II that establish what Pillar 2 will 
tackle: identify risk that is not fully captured by Pillar 1, identify risk not 
captured at all under Pillar 1, and identify risk that are external to banks 
such as business cycle effects.333 With this in mind, supervisors must 
ensure that for banks using the Internal Ratings Based Approach and/or 
Advanced Measurement Approach should satisfy their required qualitative 
and quantitative measures.334 To reinforce these aims and cement the 
key ethos of Pillar 2, there are four principles335 to enable Pillar 2 to be 
effective. 
 
                                               
332 A Resti, ‘Pillar II in the New Basel Accord and in the New European Directives’ in M 
Bignami and A Pilati, Pillar II in the New Basel Accord: The Challenge of Economic 
Capital (Risk Books 2008) 3. 
333 Bank for International Settlements, ‘International Convergence of Capital Measurement 
and Capital Standards A Revised Framework Comprehensive Version 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs128.pdf page 204 accessed 22 April 2015. 
334 L Balthazar, From Basel 1 to Basel 3: The Integration of State of the Art Risk Modelling 
in Banking Regulation (Palgrave Macmillan 2006) 90. 
335 R Wandhofer, Transaction Banking and the Impact of Regulatory Change: Basel III and 






Firstly, banks should be able to assess their overall capital adequacy with 
the processes they use.336 This means that a bank should consistently 
demonstrate capital targets in relation to their risk profile. Additionally, a 
bank should have a plan in place in terms of how they will sustain their 
capital levels.337 Some of the items that will be considered is whether 
there are clear policies and procedures in place and that regular 
independent reviews occur. This is a positive mechanism which enhances 
good practices that in theory should promote and strengthen financial 
stability. 
 
Secondly, supervisors should review the bank in relation to ability to 
assess capital adequacy and strategies.338 However, it is imperative that 
a bank does not become permissive as supervisors are in place to 
evaluate and not to take the role of a banks internal risk management 
system. Although, it should be acknowledged that supervisors are 
required to take action if they are not happy with a bank and the 
processes involved.339 Areas to be covered include internal targets and 
processes and whether these have fully incorporated the risks associated 
to the bank and the assessment of capital quality composition. Similar to 
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the first point, this should enhance financial stability and promotes good 
banking practices.  
 
Thirdly, supervisors expect that all banks operate above the minimum 
capital ratios set340 and also hold capital over the required minimum.341 
This is due to Pillar 1 not being able to cover all risks. The reason for the 
expectation that banks should hold more than the minimum capital 
requirement (8 percent) is attributed to the notion that this provides 
better protection for banks and future unexpected changes such as 
business cycle. The author would comment that the more a bank has in 
terms of capital, the better chance of surviving a financial crisis. However, 
it will be examined in Chapters 4 and 5 that capital is not the only 
mechanism that should be relied on.  
 
Fourthly, supervisors should intervene at the earliest opportunity to 
prevent a bank from falling below the minimum levels required.342 Under 
the fourth principle the magnitude of actions available to regulators is 
sizeable and increases the monitoring of a bank; this is a positive 
attribute as it allows a regulator to use discretion and apply tools best 
suited to each individual bank. 343  Regulators will also ensure that 
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operational risk and interest rate risk is correctly managed, amongst 
other particulars.  
 
There are many actions that regulators can impose on a bank if it is 
deemed to be non-compliant with Pillar 2. This could be a capital 
adequacy restoration plan or a restriction to pay dividends is put in place 
until Pillar 2 is better applied. There is an assertion that the latitude given 
to regulators is a weakness of Basel II and that it fails to create a level 
playing field because some regulators will be stricter than others. This 
will be discussed later in this chapter and whether (from a European 
perspective) the eleven principles created by the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors to combat this criticism actually worked.344 
 
It is tenable that all four principles together create a strong shield against 
adverse financial conditions and if implemented correctly then this will 
increase the chances of bank survival. Matten explains, ’…Pillar 2, if done 
properly, acts as a very powerful tool to mitigate the impact of financial 
crises and provide greater resilience to the system‘.345 Matten also raises 
an interesting point in that countries such as Australia and Canada, both 
of which were unscathed by the financial crisis, applied and incorporated 
Pillar 2 into their respective financial eco-systems.346 Matten highlights 
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not only why Pillar 2 was introduced, but also the effectiveness of what 
could be achieved if endorsed and applied. 
 
Pillar 2 – Summary 
 
Supervisory review was a great improvement and one which demanded 
a huge amount of time and work from banks. Essentially, banks are 
required to evaluate their risks, make sure adequate capital is put to one 
side for those risks, and then the regulator will check to see what has 
been done to prevent such risks. As Matten alluded to, in theory Pillar 2 
is thorough and complimentary towards Pillar 1,347 therefore, if applied 
appropriately and correctly then this should strengthen a bank and limit 
problems when they arise. 
 
One of the main positives of Pillar 2 is evident from an earlier point 
mentioned with countries such as Australia and Canada being unscathed 
from the financial crisis. This is a true testament to the positive 
capabilities of Pillar 2 and adoption of Basel II in general.348 After all, the 
purpose of Pillar 2 is to complement Pillar 1 and account for any risks not 
found or fully captured in the first pillar, including external risk. However, 
what has been created is a non-level playing field. This part of Pillar 2 will 
be discussed in the weaknesses section shortly. As Balthazar explains, 
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most banks have adhered to the minimum 8 percent capital requirements 
but this is purely to do with better credit ratings amongst other items (it 
could be due to domestic banking regulations, rather than a better credit 
ratings), therefore, capital put aside is not being allocated 
appropriately.349 This contradicts Matten’s earlier statement in that it has 
been shown by the likes of Australia and Canada that if done properly 
then the rewards are evident. There appear to be positive elements in 
both approaches. Matten makes the point that if implemented correctly 
and fully, Pillar 2 can be a useful tool for financial stability. Equally, and 
as Balthazar comments, a non-level playing field may be created due to 
the varying degree in which Pillar 2 is being implemented. Therefore, both 
standpoints are valid. For equality purposes, implementation should have 
been the same across the board. 
 
The true nature of Pillar 2 will be exposed when discussed later in this 
chapter, specifically when considering the weaknesses of Pillar 2. 
 
PILLAR 3 - MARKET DISCIPLINE 
 
Market discipline is the third and final pillar which established a disclosure 
system for regulated banks.350 It can be described as the responsibility 
of a bank (or sovereign nation) to be mindful of the risks that may affect 
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stakeholders, although the approach in Basel II is limited to a description. 
Pillar 3 has been described as, ’…a set of requirements regarding 
appropriate disclosures that will allow market participants to assess key 
information on the scope of application, capital, risk exposures, and risk 
assessment processes, and so the capital adequacy of the institution‘.351 
The idea and basis of Pillar 3 is that those involved with a bank, be it a 
client, investor, or other party will be in a better position to assess the 
risk of a bank and whether they should remain, invest, or leave etc.  
 
Based on the material discussed above, banks are required to make their 
own reports relating to internal risk management systems and once 
complete this must be publicly disclosed. This must be completed at least 
two times per year,352 normally bi-annually. Therefore, it is imperative 
that banks are timely and accurate when publishing such reports.353 It 
will be pointed out later in this chapter that there are some weaknesses 
that arise from this requirement, such as the material of information and 
how the information is distributed. 
 
The Basel Committee created Pillar 3 to compliment both Pillar 1 and 2 
and aimed to encourage banks to publish such information. For further 
clarity, it has been described by the Basel Committee as,  
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’…a set of disclosure requirements which will allow market 
 participants to assess key pieces of information on the 
 scope of application, capital, risk exposures, risk assessment 
 processes, and hence the capital adequacy of the institution‘354  
 
This is very similar to Balthazar’s view. 
 
Pillar 3 relies on market participants and a commitment from the bank to 
publish a risk report on a frequent basis. These participants i.e. investors 
or debt holders, will then be able to act if the bank is struggling. This in 
effect should encourage banks to manage themselves more efficiently 
and sensibly. If successful, a bank should be well equipped to withstand 
financial crises as banks should be creating an environment in which they 
are more efficient and sensible because this would create 
transparency.355 
 
Market discipline includes both insiders, those of whom are responsible 
for examining a bank who generally have access to a vast amount of 
information, and outsiders such as CRAs to equity investors. To gain 
clarity two examples can be given, one from an insider perspective and 
one from an outsider perspective.  
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An insider, for example a bank regulator, will assess the qualities within 
the bank. A major factor of this role is to detect problems so that changes 
can be made. Gup explains, ’Part of the examination process is the early 
detection of problem banks and banks that are going to fail‘. 356  An 
outsider, for example CRAs, will assess the bank from an external 
perspective based on the information that is provided to them amongst 
other items. However, CRAs are not completely independent because 
agencies are paid by the bank to rate the bank. There are several 
problems associated with this measure and one questions the 
effectiveness of CRAs and their ability to establish risks within a bank 
before it is too late.357 This will be discussed in the weaknesses section 
as it can be argued that CRAs have their own agenda, so much so that 
the use of CRAs in recent times is a hot topic for discussion.358 
 
A final note to highlight is that similar to Pillar 2, Pillar 3 would appear to 
be an integral part of Basel II, yet there was only a small amount 
dedicated to this area in relation to the entire document.359 Whilst the 
amount of pages do not reflect the quality of material, it does put forward 
a degree of less importance and in some ways the author would argue a 
half-hearted approach. Surely such an integral part of Basel II like Pillar 
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3, it would be appropriate to allocate more time and effort in order for 
this piece of regulation to stand a better chance of success. Pillar 3 can 
be viewed as a list of information requirements,360 and perhaps in reality 
this justifies a smaller part within the Basel II regulations. However, the 
author would propose that more could have been done at this stage to 
allow a stronger chance of being successful. It has been a challenge for 
those compiling the information required and those who use it. 
 
Pillar 3 – Summary 
 
Pillar 3 was crucial to Basel II because it allowed market participants to 
effectively assess the true risk of a bank. On this basis, the client, investor 
or other participant can make an informed decision as to whether they 
wish to remain with that bank or invest.361 In theory, this is plausible 
because it encourages banks to maintain high standards.  
 
Pillar 3 states that disclosures should be objective and details policy 
related on risk management for each risk, this includes items such as 
strategies, processes, and processes for monitoring.362 What Pillar 3 does 
or in theory should do, is support market participants in assessing key 
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information. The information gained will be highly important material 
from risk exposures to capital adequacy. 
 
There is a degree of significance in deciding which disclosure(s) are most 
applicable and purposeful. A bank should be aware that what constitutes 
material is the material that if omitted or exaggerated, could influence 
the participant whose reliance on this material would affect their 
decision.363 Thus reinforcing the idea of transparency and providing a 
better foundation for assessing a bank’s profile. 
 
In essence Pillar 3 requires a bank to be transparent with the information 
it provides and this must be to the utmost accuracy and submitted in a 
timely manner.364 It seems that whilst the information must be accurate, 
the byproduct is that it can also be burdensome and is a balancing act 
between the two. 
 
One of the main challenges for Pillar 3 is the information gathered by a 
bank. For example, the material to be included is decided by the bank 
producing the disclosure (guidelines are used for this).365 However, Gup 
suggests that the disguising of information may prove a problem.366 The 
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consequence of such disguising is that the picture presented can be 
misleading to both participants, markets, and regulators. The financial 
profile being illustrated may be very different to the actual finances of 
the bank concerned. 
 
In conclusion, the nature of Pillar 3 promotes and encourages banks to 
partake in market discipline and contributes to a more stable banking 
system whilst improving the effectiveness of solid banking practices. 
Before discussing the strengths and weaknesses of Basel II it is important 
to discuss the revisions that were made shortly after the onset of the 




Before the financial crisis, it was acknowledged that improvements were 
needed to bolster Basel II.367 Many banks during the financial crisis 
experienced extreme financial loss and several banks collapsed.368 This 
is because the trading book of those banks were extensively damaged 
and several factors contributed to this such as the subprime mortgage 
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market,369 collateralised debt obligations370 (CDOs), and what can only 
be described as a lack of common sense. Basel II.5371 imposed higher 
capital charges in relation to market risk for banks trading book activities, 
especially credit and credit related products. There was a realisation that 
Basel II did not possess the qualities to deal efficiently with a global 
financial crisis, as will be explained shortly, the criticism of Basel II can 
be extended to Basel II.5, a point concurred with by Moosa.372 
 
The process of improving the market risk framework commenced before 
the financial crisis, but evidently increased in speed and complexity once 
markets began to crash.373 There were four key enhancements made: 
 
• Stressed VaR  
• Incremental Capital/Risk Charge  
• A new standardised charge for both securitisation and re-securitisation  
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• A Comprehensive Risk Measure, which looks at trading position and the 
assessment of default and migration risk374 
 
With this mind an analysis of the financial crisis points to several 
problems, in particular VaR which falls under Pillar 1 minimum capital 
requirements. The main two enhancements from the four listed included 
Stressed VaR and Incremental Capital/Risk Charge,375 and both of these 
were adopted in response to the criticisms of VaR. This issue would 
develop further in Basel III and remains a problematic mechanism for 
gauging risk376 because over reliance on such models underestimates 
risk. 
 
All four enhancements will now be discussed, bearing in mind that Basel 
II.5 was supposed to improve the market risk framework. However, the 
complexity of these improvements were difficult to interpret. This will be 
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Basel II.5 and Stressed VaR 
 
Stressed VaR377 (SVaR) was one of the key changes incorporated into 
Basel II.5 and was aimed at decreasing the impact that pro-cyclicality 
could have on a bank, although not all pro-cyclicality is bad.378 The 
previous model under Basel II was that a bank would calculate VaR based 
on a 99 percent one day model. This could be scaled up to ten days if 
needed using a one year fixed period of high level stress. 
 
New capital charges were introduced which meant that those banks using 
internal models would now have to include a SVaR calculation based on 
a one year stress period. The purpose of such is that in the previous 
model only normal market conditions were engaged, whereas SVaR in 
addition to this would combat periods of stress outside of normal market 
conditions. In essence, SVaR is a static model which does not rely on 
market movements, like past VaR in Basel II. It may vary with positional 
changes and, therefore, SVaR can be interpreted as more of a stress test 
result for a bank.  
 
Basel II.5 stipulated that when using SVaR the estimate must be 
conducted on a weekly basis and should be conducted by using the 
formula of historical data, which includes high stress levels for a banks’ 
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portfolio. In turn, regulators will expect capital to be held for these new 
stressed periods. Essentially it is the same as VaR but used under 
extreme volatile market conditions.379 
 
The underlying idea behind SVaR was that it would be a first line of 
defence mechanism which would protect a bank against pro-cyclicality.380 
As the Financial Stability Board (FSB)381 state, the consequences of pro-
cyclicality can result in many forms such as market volatility to 
illiquidity.382 In theory this is good, in reality and has been mentioned 
earlier, not all pro-cyclicality is bad. Nevertheless, it would appear a step 
in the right direction and an improvement on VaR. 
 
Basel II.5 and Incremental Capital/Risk Charge 
 
As a result of the many banks that became submerged during the 
financial crisis due to loss of liquidity, credit migration and credit spreads 
as opposed to default, 383  the addition of Incremental Capital/Risk 
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Charge384 (IRC) enabled banks to estimate default as well as migration 
risk(s) over the course of a one year period for un-securitised credit 
products. This takes into account both sets of positions and individual 
positions.  
 
Several large banks experienced substantial losses during the financial 
crisis and these losses were narrowed to a bank’s trading book.385 These 
were not covered in the aforementioned SVaR model because the losses 
had come from credit movements and not defaults as well as sheer loss 
of liquidity.386 
 
In essence, IRC was incorporated in recognition that illiquid credit 
products were not accounted for under VaR, or at least not to a high 
standard.387 This can be associated with the developments that took 
place in a bank’s portfolio which eventually led to changes in credit risk 
and illiquid positions.388 Therefore, VaR was somewhat lacking. It should 
be appreciated that there was no particular model recommended for the 
use of IRC but rather a set of guidelines that should be observed and 
                                               
384 An estimate of default including migration risk in relation to credit products that are 
unsecuritised in a bank’s trading book.  
385 M C Y Wong, Bubble Value at Risk: A Countercyclical Risk Management Approach 
(Revised Edition, John Wiley & Sons Singapore Pte. Ltd 2013) 206-207. 
386 R Barfield, ‘Trading Book and Securitisation’ in I Vry, A Practitioners Guide to Basel III 
and Beyond (Thomson Reuters 2011) 108. 
387 M C Y Wong, Bubble Value at Risk: A Countercyclical Risk Management Approach 
(Revised Edition, John Wiley & Sons Singapore Pte. Ltd 2013) 206-207. 
388 European Banking Authority, ‘Market Risk’ https://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-






implemented.389 Whilst this can be viewed as being well structured and 
specific, the author would state that these guidelines do exude a task of 
strenuous dedication and one which may be too much for most banks. As 
Wong commented at the time, ’IRC is a turning point that may open up 
an exciting but arduous path of development‘.390 
 
All positions are accounted for under IRC and are subject to capital 
charges in regard to interest rate risk, with a few minor exceptions. The 
new charge under Basel II.5 should capture rebalancing positions, in this 
context it refers to end of liquidity horizons. In turn, this will mean that 
a constant level will be maintained over a one year period for a bank. 
 
IRC will also include the impact of clusters of default as well as migration 
events, specifically throughout stressed periods of time in the market 
place. This means that the variation between these two events (including 
others) will not be assessed and the end result is that the IRC is added 
to VaR for market risk. Taking into account this new charge, it meant that 
those banks using an internal based model should have set procedures 
in place to competently and carefully conduct required stress tests.391 
These should include all types of scenarios and as a result may impact on 
a bank with extreme financial losses.  
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Securitisation positions are excluded and covered under a separate 
heading of the securitisation framework which now follows.392 
 
Basel II.5 and new standardised charges for securitisation positions 
 
For those positions that are not in a correlation trading book which are 
covered by the Comprehensive Risk Measure approach (discussed next) 
and are linked to securitisation and re-securitisation products, then a 
standard charge will be applied.  
Securitisation now receives the equivalent to a banking book charge393 
and resecuritisation carries with it higher risk weights due to its nature. 
A resecuritisation is, ’…a securitization where the risk associated with an 
underlying pool of exposures and at least one of the underlying exposures 
is a securitisation position‘.394 
 
Securitised products in a bank’s trading book will be subject to capital 
charges of the banking book unless it is a resecuritisation which receives 
a much higher charge.395 Now, as a consequence of Basel II.5, it will be 
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calculated according to more stringent rules which will be either banking 
book rules or those quoted by the Basel Committee.396 That being said, 
these have been described as rather punitive rules and charges applied 
will be in accordance to the banking book and IRB approaches. 
 
Basel II.5 and Comprehensive Risk Measure 
 
The final key enhancement is in respect of correlation trading positions. 
The Comprehensive Risk Measure397 (CRM) approach covers default and 
migration risks for underlying exposures and allows a bank to combine 
the measurement of both specific and incremental risk.398 In a nutshell it 
is an estimate of risk in relation to a bank’s credit correlation position 
within their trading book. 
 
The model to use CRM is both difficult and challenging, and a bank must 
ensure that when using the CRM model that the information gathered 
adheres to the list. Some of those requirements include recovery rate 
volatility as well as volatility of correlations.399 
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CRM also includes basis risk which is best described as a situation 
whereby, ’…the risk that a hedge becomes less effective—and the 
potential costs of resetting a hedge following a change in the underlying 
position, such as an amendment to the composition of an index‘.400 The 
floor of at least 8 percent is deemed necessary of the capital charge to 
the specific risk and is, in most cases, binding on a bank. 
 
A bank will also be required to create and implement stress scenarios that 
examine the repercussions of those hypothetical scenarios in relation to 
recovery rates and default rates.401 These tests ought to be carried out 
on a weekly basis with those results submitted to the relevant regulator 
who will apply capital charges if necessity dictates. This improves 
financial stability by having regular tests carried out on a weekly basis. 
 
Basel II.5 - Summary 
 
Basel II.5 became the sole focus of the Basel Committee once the 
financial crisis unravelled and certainly prompted the Basel Committee to 
take action.402 On reflection it was only a temporary measure considering 
that Basel III was published in 2010. As Moosa states, ’…Basel II.5 came 
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as a quick and ad hoc response to the global financial crisis‘.403 This was 
not good and in reality a quick fix to a much larger problem. 
 
Before Basel II.5 the trading book of a bank would be primarily based on 
a VaR approach, however, with the enhancements made by Basel II.5 
this changed to also include the four key enhancements previously 
stated. Perhaps the Basel Committee should have waited until 2010 when 
Basel III was published and set implementation dates sooner for the 
matters of concern, whilst allowing for later adoption with some of the 
other stipulations that were introduced by Basel III. After all, it can now 
be viewed as a quick response. 
 
Due to the nature in which Basel II.5 came to being, there are very 
noticeable weaknesses as a result. The main problem is complexity, this 
has been commented on by many reputable authors404 and it is on the 
verge of making Basel II.5 incomprehensible. It was overlapping, 
inconsistent and a fast attempt at resolving a big issue with rules that 
baffle most.405 Unfortunately, Basel II.5 was a quick attempt at fixing a 
large problem when it came to repairing the risk management and 
securitisation issues beforehand, to changing risk models and regulatory 
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capture.406 This was no easy task and one which should have been given 
a lot more time. 
 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES OF BASEL II AND II.5 
 
Perhaps it is fitting to start with a quote from Davis who stated that:  
 
 ’Clearly Basel II is an attempt by regulators to not only close 
 ”loopholes“ originating from product and technological innovation 
 since the implementation of Basel I, but also a strategy for  
 managing loopholes that cannot yet be anticipated due to future 
 shifts in economic and technological conditions‘407  
 
It has been described how Basel II tried to improve upon its predecessor 
by implementing a range of enhancements in order to improve financial 
stability, even more so with Basel II.5. In the light of this, and before 
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Firstly, there are many advocates for Basel II who state that it was very 
attentive and detailed and that many countries would be able to 
implement Basel II over a long period of time which would protect the 
foundation created by Basel I and promote the improvements made by 
Basel II. 408  Furthermore, Basel II was adopted by most signatory 
countries between 2007-8409 which should be viewed as a positive step 
in the right direction.   
 
The second iteration would also extensively encourage banks to act more 
prudently, an area which Basel I struggled to achieve. The detailed nature 
of Basel II was defended very strongly by Jaime Caruana, who at the time 
of Basel II being published was the Governor of Bank of Spain and also 
the Chairman of the Basel Committee.410 He expressed that complexity 
was a by-product and was inevitable whilst creating a three pillared 
framework that offered many options to assist banking regulation.411 A 
valid point, although considering the position held then any feelings of 
negativity would not have been projected in order to allay any fears and 
give a positive outlook. In a separate interview, Jaime Caruana also 
highlighted the benefits of Basel II and the requirement for banks to be 
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well capitalised and more risk sensitive;412 one of the aims that Basel II 
wanted to achieve and thus further complimenting. 
 
Secondly, Basel II made Pillar 1 minimum capital requirements more 
robust with the improvements made to credit risk and the creation of 
operational risk. Credit risk under Basel I contained the Standardised 
Approach for measuring risk. This simplistic mechanism drew wide 
criticism and was subsequently changed to include the F-IRB and A-IRB 
models; both encouraged banks to manage risk more effectively and 
accurately. The latter of the two gave greater power and responsibility to 
a bank and if implemented correctly it meant that prudent banks could 
manage their finances and risk more effectively. In essence, banks could 
differentiate between loans and could also create their own risk models 
as long as approval was given by the regulator.413 Operational risk was a 
new measure created under Basel II which allowed for a new type of risk 
to be calculated and accounted for. This new measure was to combat 
failed internal processes as a result from people and systems, or external 
events which could affect a bank. Like credit risk, there were three 
approaches (Basic Indicator Approach, Standardised Approach and 
Advanced Measurement Approach). An extra form of security that further 
added to the mechanisms put in place to prevent a bank’s financial 
collapse and to promote more scrutiny and vigilance. 
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Thirdly, Pillar 2 and supervisory review. Arguably a huge breakthrough 
that required banks to account for risk not fully captured in Pillar 1 or not 
captured at all, including the observation of external events. Pillar 2 was 
a significant improvement from Basel I which allowed, or more 
importantly encouraged and required, a bank to identify any risks that 
had not been recorded in Pillar 1. In some countries Pillar 2 was clear and 
detailed, and added RWA or capital requirements to this,414 which in the 
author’s opinion was the right move to implement. 
 
As the title suggests, supervisors play a pivotal role and assess whether 
a bank is operating above the minimum capital guidelines, and it should 
also detect problems that may arise in the future. As stated earlier in this 
chapter, Matten explained that Pillar 2 is a very powerful tool if 
implemented correctly.415 The main purpose of Pillar 2 it seems is one of 
prevention rather than reaction. Foreseeing a risk will help reduce or stop 
that risk from impacting on a bank, if not implemented or incorrectly 
implemented a bank will be more likely to encounter financial 
repercussions. This can be argued from the examples given earlier in this 
chapter with Australia and Canada being positive instances of deploying 
Pillar 2. Surely Pillar 2 is one of the outstanding strengths devised and 
whilst it is a demanding requirement, it is a logical one that makes sense. 
In a document of over three hundred pages, simplicity was refreshing. 
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Fourthly, is Pillar 3 market discipline. Pillar 3 was greatly developed under 
Basel II and promoted a bank to be more conscious of image and 
reliability toward clients and potential clients. Pillar 3 enables clients and 
potential clients to assess the riskiness of a bank and allows an informed 
decision to be made i.e. whether to invest or not. It also compliments 
Pillar 1 and Pillar 2. Linking to the ethos of all pillars depending on each 
other. 
 
Pillar 3 also allows for market transparency416 and as such it ensures that 
the price that banks pay in order to raise capital truly reflect the current 
market; importantly the level of risk. 
 
There are some negatives of Pillar 3 such as there being no requirement 
to publish disclosure forms when it comes to financial accounts and that 
it can be made in any way that is available.417 However, in theory market 
discipline is a good measure. Perhaps the positive to take from this is that 
it was recognised by the Basel Committee418 and that it would be a 
stepping stone for future amendments. 
 
Finally, Basel II.5 should be noted for one of its key strengths and these 
were the enhancements made to the market risk framework. Due to the 
financial crisis it was apparent that Basel II was not fit for purpose in 
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many ways, one of them being market risk. Basel II.5 developed four key 
enhancements (SVaR, IRC, standardised charges for securitisation and 
re-securitisation, and CRM) to make Basel II stronger and less prone to 
financial instability.419 The main strength that came from this was that 
Pillar 1 became more robust to include higher capital requirements, 
equally the improvements made to VaR was very much needed with the 
main enhancement being SVaR, which unlike VaR in Basel I, considers 
stressed scenarios outside of normal market conditions. Thus, SVaR was 
able to adapt to the ever changing market. A quality Basel I did not have. 
 
Whilst there are noticeable strengths of Basel II and ones which clearly 
portray the developments brought forward by the Basel Committee, there 
are obvious flaws. After all, if Basel II was sufficiently robust to withstand 
the financial crisis then there would not have been Basel II.5, or this 
version may have been published several years later and Basel III may 
have been published years later too. It has already been established that 
Basel II.5 was a quick response to a much larger problem. 
 
It is now appropriate to analyse some of the main weaknesses that came 
from Basel II and what this actually meant for the second iteration. 
Similar to strengths, the points that follow are non-exhaustive and are 
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purely some of the main criticisms420 that the author of the research 




Firstly, is the issue of complexity.421 This point was also mentioned as a 
strength, but it is comprehendible to be viewed as a weakness and that 
with Basel II it is difficult to understand and interpret compared with 
Basel I. The importance to note from this weakness is that not only will 
banks become confused by Basel II, but that it lacks any real 
substance.422 This is due to the nature of Basel II being procedurally 
complex and in scope of what it is trying to achieve, too overreaching. 
Furthermore, it is too complex and really should be taken back to 
basics.423 It should deploy effective liquidity and leverage ratios. Due to 
these complexities, the costs of implementing are also detrimental424 and 
has limited the amount of countries that have adopted Basel II. This is 
evident even now with Basel III in full motion.425 It was inevitable that 
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when creating Basel II a high level of complexity would result. To 
incorporate new measures that were not included in Basel I as well as 
enhancing and improving existing measures, is no simple task that allows 
simplicity. The consequence of this is that Basel II became long and 
convoluted, and this is visible when considering the number of pages 
between the two Basel iterations. When taking into account Basel I was 
thirty pages compared to Basel II at over three hundred pages, it is easy 
to deduce that there would be a sharp increase in complexity and scale. 
More is not always better and when it is argued that, ’the whole system 
should be swept away‘,426 serious consideration needs to be given to the 
complexity of the Basel regulations. 
 
Secondly, criticisms can be drawn from the extreme tightening of Pillar 1 
minimum capital requirements and that in actual fact the strict 
mechanisms in place will affect business cycles for those banks. Meaning 
that credit within a bank will become strangled during times of recession 
and in periods of prosperity credit will be loosened.427 The weakness is 
most apparent having recently experienced a financial crisis in which 
Basel II was in place but did not stop such an event. The criticism of Pillar 
1 being tightened which impacted on the business cycles for many banks 
has been proven in that many economies around the world were in sheer 
jubilation during the financial and housing market boom, yet it was not 
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foreseen that danger loomed just around the corner even though, for 
example, mortgages of up to 125 percent loan to value428 were being 
offered. It is because of this loosening that created many downfalls for 
banks around the world. Equally, it should be appreciated that some 
loosening of credit should be permitted, which in turn will boost 
economies. In the author’s opinion there needs to be a clear separation 
between boosting economies in the form of housing and business lending, 
and then plain recklessness of lending for the sake of lending and 
greed.429 There is no implied suggestion here in that it should be reversed 
i.e. loosened in times of recession and tightened in times of prosperity, 
far from it, what this weakness means and what is being suggested is 
that there should be a balance between the two.430 Instead of being 
driven to make more money, perhaps a department could be created 
within a bank to internally monitor and set an allocated maximum amount 
of funds per year. Then credibility and sensibility can be achieved; a 
barrier from excessiveness. Once the level of lending has been reached 
then a bank would have to wait until the next financial year, or if there 
are still several months of the year remaining then the department could 
review the situation. It should be noted that there are (already) risk 
management and compliance departments within banks, which the Basel 
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Committee refer to and comment on what they should be doing.431 
However, the effectiveness of these departments should be assessed as 
to whether they are doing a sound job.  
 
Thirdly, and continuing with Pillar 1 is the calculation of credit risk and 
CRAs.432 With so much reliance and credibility proportioned to CRAs it 
was inevitable that this would cause a problem for Basel II, and the Basel 
Committee did not allow for the fact that there were, and continue to be, 
a small minority of CRAs that have international reputation to offer such 
assistance.433 A key example showing the inadequacy of this problem was 
that prior to and during the financial crisis, many banks were involved 
with products known as asset backed securities. These were financial 
products created so that several loans could be packaged together and 
then sold to another bank,434 otherwise known as collateralised debt 
obligations (CDOs). There were two main negatives from continuing with 
an over reliance of CRAs reports. One, that banks could effectively move 
risk and decrease their RWA. Two, CRAs being unable to calculate such 
risks due to the complexity and regular movement of those risks.435 
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Needless to say, the ability to move risk away from a bank (this could be 
in the form of a special purpose entity)436 cannot only bypass Basel II but 
can also give the impression of a better credit risk rating. The 
consequence is that an untrue and false picture was created and whilst 
many will not see beyond this mask of deception, eventually those risks 
will come to surface. As Baily et al. note, ’…a CDO could turn lead into 
gold…‘.437 This caused a massive problem for CRAs and contributed to the 
weakness of CRAs calculating credit risk under Pillar 1.  
 
Fourthly, and continuing with CRAs were the bad estimations taking place 
prior to and during the financial crash of several banks. The main problem 
with CRAs and their relationship with Basel II is that all CRAs are 
businesses at heart. All businesses have a clear desire and need to make 
money. One of the biggest ways to make money is to compete and secure 
the services of a bank so that an assessment and rating can be given, in 
return money will be paid to CRAs.438 It is this unhealthy relationship that 
assisted to the demise of Basel II and contributed to the mismanagement 
of banks. 439  This was envisaged just as Basel II was about to be 
implemented and before the financial crisis, Alexander et al. note: 
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 ’…the use of outside agencies raises a serious problem, namely  
 the need to provide these agencies with appropriate incentives to 
 consider the full implications of their ratings on over systemic  
 risk…there exists the possibility that these private agents may act 
 either in their own interests or in that of the borrower in hopes of 
 maximising their own gains by issuing favourable ratings‘440 
 
The author of the research is of the opinion that there is a three stage 
vicious cycle and this begins with Basel II and the importance placed on 
CRAs, followed by banks who feel impelled to obtain high ratings from 
CRAs, followed by the necessity to make money as a business for CRAs. 
As Lowry and Reisberg comment, ’…the built-in conflict of interest created 
by the business model, whereby the agencies compete for the business 
of, and are compensated by, the issuers of such securities, creates 
undesirable incentives for the CRA’s to bend to their clients’ wishes‘.441 
An example of such can be viewed in the United States442 and it happens 
elsewhere too.443 It can be argued that leading up to the financial crisis 
credit ratings were becoming more of a number crunching exercise and 
may not have been effectively wrong, but that clients were not applying 
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common sense to assets. CRAs will be explored in more detail during 
Chapter 4 as it is one of the pivotal areas that portrays clear pitfalls.  
 
Fifthly, and continuing with Pillar 1 is market risk and VaR. VaR is not an 
easy segment of Basel II and is described as complex.444 It did not 
become clear until the financial crisis how bad the VaR methodology was 
in calculating market risk. This was due to fault and basic assumption 
that VaR predicted a constant liquidity level of ten days. Due to this, many 
banks did not have sufficient liquidity and were not able to reduce this 
problem within a ten day period.445 The VaR model was further weakened 
because it looked at historical data and assessed how the market had 
performed during the past five years. The problem with this is obvious, 
the five years leading to the financial crisis portrayed a positive and 
strong outlook, economies were booming and banks were lending at an 
unprecedented rate with mortgage approvals rising by the year.446 It 
appears that many people in banking (and those who were not) became 
disillusioned and trapped with the mindset that the prosperity would 
never end. VaR looked at volatility within various markets and because 
there were none at the time, no problems were forecast; unless those 
people within the banking world were hiding the true nature of banking 
practices, however this is a separate issue entirely. When problems did 
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start to arise, the model used by many banks could not predict the 
amount of liquidity needed to withstand such volatility.447  It will be 
explained in Chapters 4 and 5 that liquidity is an important factor and 
one that needs more emphasis.  
 
Sixthly, relates to Pillar 2 supervisory review which contains two serious 
issues, latitude given to regulators and the potential un-level playing field 
that it exhibits. The latitude given to regulators has been argued to be 
very detrimental for the effectiveness of Basel II and due to the informed 
nature of Pillar 2 regulators would benefit from this greatly.448 What this 
means is that because of the informed supervision within a bank, this 
would enable the supervisor to evaluate the internal risks of that 
organisation. It could be said that supervisors were not performing these 
tasks correctly. More importantly, the latitude given to regulators meant 
that in some countries regulators would be very strict compared to other 
countries where a more relaxed approach was taken. This could be due 
to benefits that a regulator could reap from informed supervision.449 This 
leads to the next issue within Pillar 2; an un-level playing field.450 It has 
been argued that many smaller banks would be at a disadvantage under 
Basel II compared with larger banks, and that the latitude given to 
regulators will also impact on how banks operate depending on their size. 
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The problem here is that many smaller banks will be disadvantaged by 
the rules of Pillar 2. Unlike their larger rivals, smaller banks will not have 
the financial resources to implement costly measures recommended by 
their respective regulator, compared to a larger bank if that regulator is 
strict. Also, even larger banks can be disadvantaged by Pillar 2 against 
other large banks in another country. This is due to how the regulator 
operates and how strict or lenient they are, and this is a common fear 
amongst many.451 As a consequence, a un-level playing field is created. 
Alexander et al. add that those banks based in countries with strong 
supervision will also be disadvantaged, 452  further aggravating the 
situation. As discussed earlier in this chapter, the Committee of European 
Banking Supervisors tried to circumvent this problem by introducing 
eleven principles (in a European context). 453  In theory the eleven 
principles compliment Pillar 2 and promote supervisory review for 
internationally active banks. However, even though these principles had 
been published several years beforehand, there still seems to be an 
unclear process in which banks co-operate on the same basis. As 
highlighted by Sommer and Spielberg, ’More discussions between 
regulators and banks are required to establish a level playing field…‘.454 
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Clearly, to limit the level playing field conundrum Pillar 2 should have also 
applied to non banking institutions not just large international banks. 
 
Seventhly, Pillar 3 market discipline and the material to be gathered and 
distributed by a bank, and the challenges that are faced.455 The real 
problem here is the true effectiveness to assess an organisation. It has 
been previously mentioned that under Pillar 3 there are insiders and 
outsiders. The resounding problem is assessing an organisation 
effectively 456  and honestly. Some examples include withholding and 
concealing of information. Another issue is complicity between 
employees.457 These two examples were heavily evident in the case of 
Enron (whilst not a bank it was linked with large investment banks such 
as Citigroup458 and Merrill Lynch459), therefore criticism can be directed 
towards Pillar 3 and market discipline on the basis that whilst market 
discipline is good in theory, in practice it can be disguised. Concealment 
in relation to market discipline has been commented on for many years 
now.460 To surmise, these issues can have very harmful side effects. 
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Market discipline is an integral part of Basel II and one which is, as 
Wandhofer asserts it is, ’…fundamental to an efficient and thriving 
banking industry‘.461 
 
Eighthly, Basel II.5 is problematic due to the lack of coherent and 
consistent regulations. Basel II.5 contains overlapping features of capital 
charges which lead to illogical reasoning and at times repetitiveness. The 
problem with the overlapping issues is that capital charges for a bank can 
be higher than the actual greatest loss,462 meaning for some trades the 
capital required may exceed the positions value. In addition, it appears 
that due to the financial crisis the Basel Committee were very keen to 
limit the occurrence of such a disaster happening again and to the same 
magnitude - which is understandable. Arguably one way to prevent or 
limit this was to make sure that banks allocate vast amounts of money 
to limit any financial losses in the future. By doing so would mean that 
no matter how big the financial crisis, a bank would be able to withstand 
it. However, due to this overcautious approach, many banks will have to 
(by the very nature of Basel II.5) put aside extraordinary amounts of 
money that far exceed the potential maximum losses. Whilst this could 
be perceived positively, the biggest weakness is that a bank may be less 
likely to lend money, complete as many financial transactions as they 
would have before this measure came into force or reduce the areas in 
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which the bank operates. This would not only be detrimental to the bank, 
but also the economy that it resides in; a domino effect from bank to 
economy to around the world. 
 
Before concluding, it is worth considering one more issue: should the 
definition of capital have been re-evaluated and changed under Basel II? 
Capital should be straightforward in its definition and approach, the 
general consensus is that regulatory capital requirements should be 
sufficient capital for both expected and unexpected losses. As Gleeson 
states:  
 
 ’…any losses actually suffered would affect only the contributors of 
 the capital of the institution; leaving depositors, bondholders and 
 other senior creditors paid in full. This would ensure the smooth  
 operation of the market, remove most of the credit risk exposure 
 inherent in dealing with banks, and ensure that the function of  
 operating the payment  system would proceed unaffected by  
 credit losses by individual institutions‘463 
 
The then FSA stipulated and combined two parts of what capital meant 
and stated: 
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 ’…first, the role of capital while a firm is solvent, including in times 
 of stress, and second, the role of capital if a firm is wound up. We 
 can summarise this distinction between the two main purposes of 
 capital as follows: to absorb losses while the firm is going   
 concern…to absorb losses in a gone concern scenario…‘464  
 
The definition of capital stated by Gleeson and the combination of two 
functions which it entails as per the statement by the then FSA, best 
describe what capital is. With the aforesaid in mind, the definition of 
capital described in the Basel regulations did not change a great deal from 
Basel I465 and still incorporated the three tiers. The key weakness from 
this was that Basel II continued with the same problem that hindered 
Basel I and that capital was only interpreted from a solvency point of 
view. The decision to not change the definition of capital has been 
undermined extensively since the financial crisis, although it should be 
noted that the definition was changed to incorporate this in Basel III and 
this will be discussed in Chapter 3.  
 
Whilst the definition of capital remained the same and Basel II was fairly 
effective at protecting a bank against its liabilities and in turn the banks’ 
depositors from an insolvency level, it did not account for the order in 
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which a financial crisis affects banks. The order in which this sequence 
starts is from current year’s profits right through to any other debt.466 
The next problem that occurs is that a bank will have severe difficulties 
before it reaches the end of the aforementioned sequence. In essence, a 
bank may still be solvent at the point of its Tier 1 core capital being mostly 
depleted, and at this stage questions will be asked, and authorities may 
need to intervene. This is otherwise known as a tipping point, or in 
accountancy terms regulatory insolvency. It has been recognised by the 
Basel Committee that whilst there is no term used for tipping point under 
the Basel regulations, it is agreed that capital can be sliced into two parts, 
going concern and gone concern, resembling the definition from the then 
FSA. The former relates to a bank’s ability to absorb losses whilst still 
trading, the latter relates to the protection of depositors when a bank has 
been judged to have failed and that no way back is envisaged.467 
 
The financial crisis highlighted the gaping flaw in capital and how it was 
implemented under Basel II. Whilst it can be viewed that secondary 
capital would help protect senior creditors in a gone concern situation, it 
did not have any real effect in helping a bank stay solvent. As Gleeson 
states, ’…capital is useless to a firm if any loss impacting on that capital 
item immediately results in failure of the firm‘.468 The point being made 
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is that capital should be capable of not only protecting creditors but 
should also support a bank without any consequences that would lead it 
to cease trading or require more capital from investors.469 In short, the 
problem with capital and that Basel II continued to use an almost identical 
model to that of Basel I (which should have been changed in the author’s 
opinion), is that it only focused on solvency and the protection of ordinary 
creditors. This is admirable, but there is no point in protecting ordinary 
creditors if it means that the bank will collapse. It would be better for a 
bank to stay solvent, operational and contribute to the economy in which 
it functions. With this in mind, the solution can be split into two options, 
either change the definition of capital or introduce new mechanisms. The 
problems that developed from the financial crisis illuminated these flaws. 
This substantiates that the definition of capital should have been re-
evaluated (like it has been in Basel III)470 when the Basel Committee 
were constructing Basel II, as it did not fully reflect or assist when a bank 
approaches financial instability.  
 
Furthermore, the Basel Committee stated that the Basel regulations 
should, ’…keep pace with the rapid evolution in the marketplace…‘,471 
however this cannot happen if the minimum amount a bank should hold 
against risk has not increased from Basel I to Basel II. Gup explains that 
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the minimum capital requirement of 8 percent is not adequate. The point 
being made is that if the definition of capital was re-evaluated and had 
changed, like the author suggested when the Basel Committee were 
devising Basel II, then maybe the 8 percent figure would have risen too. 
Thus, more capital was required by banks. 
 
It has been illustrated throughout the Strengths and Weaknesses section 
that Basel II (including II.5) contained positive and negative attributes. 
What can be deduced is that Basel II was an improvement from Basel I, 
but it still maintained some previous issues as well as creating new issues. 
A conclusion will now follow to bring together what has been detailed 




The New Basel Capital Accord, Basel II, was published in 2004 with a 
revised and full comprehensive guide issued in 2006. Unlike its 
predecessor Basel II was more thorough and detailed. A three pillared 
approach was created which focused on making banking regulation more 
stable, creating a level playing field and promoted stringent practices 
which banks around the world should incorporate. The three Pillars were: 
 
• Pillar 1 - Minimum capital requirements 
• Pillar 2 - Supervisory review 





There was a key shift between Basel I and II from an inflexible to flexible 
model. Basel II expanded on the different types and varying degrees of 
risk, it also enhanced existing, and created new, measures to combat 
these issues. However, Basel II was not able to shake off parts of its 
predecessors’ shackles that evidently led to its demise in 2010 when 
Basel III was published.  
 
Perhaps what Basel II will be remembered for is its inability to limit the 
financial crisis. Many commentators from academic to professional 
backgrounds will remember Basel II in this light with comments such as, 
’The Basel II regulations proved to be wholly inadequate in preventing 
the failure of banks and no mechanism was in place for a bank deemed 
too large to fail‘.472 This is because at the time of the financial crisis and 
years leading to it, Basel II was the leading document on banking 
regulation and most banks had complied with it by 2008.473 Yet it could 
not stop or did very little to suppress the financial crisis that engulfed 
many countries and economies around the world.  
 
In reality, if Basel I was the leading document during the financial crisis 
it would also have done very little it seems, although Basel I was created 
in a different era in which many factors were dissimilar. On this point, 
perhaps what the Basel regulations need, whether it be an amended 
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version of Basel or even in the future and Basel IV, is for it to be more 
versatile and be able to manage many aspects of financial complication. 
Alternatively, it should be amended/reviewed/changed every x amount 
of years to keep it aligned with the fast paced world which the Basel 
regulations try to regulate.  
 
It is accepted that amendments are made throughout the lifespan of a 
given Basel iteration, for example the Market Risk Amendment 1996 
which improved Basel I; although, that was a reactive measure by the 
Basel Committee rather than proactive. Perhaps what should be 
considered is thinking outside the box, when the Basel Committee meet 
and discuss their agenda it would be beneficial to foresee or even predict 
what may be needed over the next few years. This idea may seem 
farfetched and could be open to criticism, but most of the leading figures 
involved with the Basel Committee and esteemed colleagues, are highly 
regarded individuals in their respective fields, whether it be finance, 
regulation or banking. Therefore, it would not be out of their remit. 
 
Basel II.5 had a short time span of about one year before Basel III was 
published and one questions why this was done considering that Basel III 
was published shortly thereafter. There was a clear need for improvement 
and the financial crisis showed the frailties of Basel II. Ideally it would 
have been more sensible to incorporate this into Basel III a year later 






To surmise, Basel II failed to prevent the financial crisis and this can be 
attributed to several factors.474 Some of those factors were discussed in 
the weaknesses section ranging from a reliance on CRAs and bad 
estimations of credit risk, to market discipline and the material gathered 
and distributed by banks. Additionally, Basel II encouraged the 
accumulation of CDOs and sovereign debt, was focused on capital 
adequacy, permitted banks to overstate capital and understate risk, and 
incentivised off balance sheet utilization which enabled banks to move 
credit risk.475 
 
While there are faults, what Basel II has done is reveal that there is still 
much more work to do in establishing solid banking regulations, rules and 
practices to govern banks around the world. Some of the lessons to take 
from the financial crisis was that market discipline was ineffective, an 
underestimation of systemic importance in relation to non-banking 
institutions occurred, and regulators and supervisors failed when 
accounting for systemic risk(s) between regulated and unregulated 
entities.476 
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In the next chapter the research will move to Basel III and how it 
developed from Basel II, with an aim to progress, strengthen and instill 
a greater sense of community, solidarity and parity between countries 


























CHAPTER 3 - BASEL III 
 
In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated how and what led to the Basel 
Committee publishing Basel II and the processes that took place in order 
for this to happen. What is evident from the timeline between Basel I and 
II is that the second iteration became more complex, detailed and 
lengthy, these characteristics were also some of the factors which did not 
bode well for Basel II. A structure and overview were discussed so that a 
full picture of how the second iteration was intended to operate could be 
ascertained, as well as the strengths and weaknesses that naturally 
surfaced.  
 
Chapter 3 will aim to follow a very similar pattern that was utilised in 
Chapter 1 whilst discussing Basel I and Chapter 2 Basel II. This pattern 
will show how and why Basel III was created, the structure, strengths 
and weaknesses, and a conclusion to bring it altogether. It should be 
noted that capital ratios, CRAs and VaR will not be mentioned at this 
stage due to these three areas being scrutinised at greater length in 
Chapter 4. This is purely to do with the fact that the author believes these 
three areas to be the most problematic for Basel III and vital in 
supporting the research title. It would be prudent to state that the three 
risks stated above and the risks which will be evidenced in the weakness 
subsection later in this chapter, do not fully cover other issues present 
such as market risk and counterparty risk, or over the counter 





shortcomings of Basel III.477 These issues have not been included for 
similar reasons to Basel I and II in that only a select few were highlighted. 
Additionally, these are more mathematically involved and the research 
never intended to take this approach.478 
  
With this in mind, Chapter 3 will now begin by looking at the origins of 




It would be poignant to start with the following quote, ’Regulatory reform 
must in particular address the socially unacceptable mechanism that lets 
banks privatize their profits when the sky is blue and socialize their risks 
when the hurricane is unstoppable‘. 479  However, the support shown 
during the financial crisis endorsed the biggest moral hazard and 
obduracy of such.480 
 
It will be appreciated over the coming chapter that Basel I and II 
contained elements to extend a micro prudential approach to banking 
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regulation.481 On reflection, leverage was not restrained and levels of 
liquidity were low, this was particularly noticeable in Basel II and one of 
the main contributing factors of the financial crisis. In terms of liquidity 
this does seem rather strange in the author’s opinion, considering that 
liquidity was recommended as a measure to focus on during the 
beginning of Basel II’s tenure.482  
 
Despite the flaws that will be evident in Basel III through the remainder 
of the research, it should be said that the Basel Committee have come a 
long way since Basel I. Openness and transparency have improved 
greatly.483 As Sabalot rightly states, ’Basel III is part of the Committee’s 
continuing efforts to enhance the banking regulatory framework…‘.484 
 
In late 2009 the Basel Committee issued two consultative documents, 
one on liquidity risk measurements, standards and monitoring,485 and the 
other on strengthening the resilience of the banking sector.486 This would 
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be the starting point for Basel III which was published the following year 
and replicated the first487 and second488 aforementioned documents.  
 
Similar to Basel I and II, the third iteration aimed to improve and 
strengthen financial stability for banks around the world489 and in the 
author’s view this objective will always remain pertinent. Furthermore, 
the G20 wanted to minimise regulatory arbitrage and improve 
transparency.490 Due to this complex task, the implementation date has 
changed several times since Basel III was first proposed and is currently 
set at 2019.491 
 
On contemplation there are several key events that took place leading to 
the undoing of Basel II and enactment of Basel III. It will be evident 
shortly that capital standards were far too weak and could not withstand 
the many forms of risk that assembled during the rise and peak of the 
financial crisis. There was a combination of events that contributed to 
this, from market liquidity risk being improperly managed to regulators 
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ignoring the spread of systemic risk concentrations.492 In addition, there 
was an excessive amount of leverage created for both on and off balance 
sheet assets.493 In order to illustrate the pattern of events that unfolded 
during this time an analogy will be provided of a jigsaw puzzle that will 
explain several errors that once pieced together, form a picture of the 
financial crisis. 
 
The first part of the puzzle relates to the years leading up to the financial 
crisis which saw an excessive amount of liquidity surging into the asset 
markets. Becker describes this as, ’…money supply that is surplus to the 
needs of real economic activity, and therefore free to be invested in 
financial assets‘. 494  It is because of this that many banks found it 
increasingly difficult to recognise liquidity risk when it occurred.495  
 
The second part of the puzzle was that as the financial crisis began to 
take shape, liquidity started to erode due to the evaporation of wholesale 
funding.496 This meant that many banks had little reserve stock to protect 
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themselves adequately from pre-existing obligations. 497  Rixtel and 
Gasperini comment that this deterioration which occurred rapidly 
particularly affected high leveraged banks and as such caused problems 
across the world due to interconnectedness.498 
 
The third part of the puzzle is one which combined the inability of a bank 
to recognise liquidity risk alongside poor quality capital, 499  the 
repercussions of such were clear to be seen. In hindsight this is easy to 
state now but at the time would have been unclear to most. Whether 
knowingly or unknowingly by banks and regulators is a different issue 
entirely. Acharya and Mora suggest that due to banks being unable to 
recognise liquidity risk, investors began to lose confidence in the ability 
of banks to identify even low risk, leading many to withdraw from deposit 
accounts.500 
 
With these two elements in play i.e. an inability to recognise liquidity risk 
and poor quality capital, and that during this economic time there was 
low inflation resulting in low capital returns, the fourth part of the puzzle 
refers to how banks took to riskier means, this could be in the form of 
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irresponsible mortgage lending in the United States501 for example, this 
as well as other instances aided better returns as markets shrank.502 A 
result of such was that riskier financial products were being sought so 
that higher returns could be achieved. The problem that faced banks at 
this point was that there was no way back to safer ground because of the 
risky financial products tactic being deployed and low levels of liquidity. 
Popper postulates that these risky amalgams of mortgages and loans 
contributed to what went wrong during the financial crisis503 (and banks 
are busily reviving these investments since 2013, which is a worrying 
factor).  
 
It was getting to a stage where nothing else could be done to hide or 
rectify the reckless behaviour shown by banks, buyers vanished and 
prices and valuations dropped significantly.504 This being the fifth part of 
the puzzle. Fox comments that during the summer of 2007 buyers and 
sellers could not simply agree on price, thus affecting and contributing to 
the financial crisis.505 It was around this time in August 2007 that the 
beginning of the financial crisis began with the key indicator coming from 
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an announcement by BNP Paribas in which certain valuations were going 
to be frozen.506 
 
The penultimate part of the financial crisis jigsaw was that Basel II did 
not sufficiently protect banks that incorporated the Basel regulations. 
Meaning that risk concentrations were underestimated and, through no 
fault of Basel II, the financial system was deeply intertwined.507 The 
consequence of such is that financial shock could be felt far and wide, 
and Basel II did not have the mechanisms in place for banks to implement 
measures that would absorb the magnitude of losses that resulted. For 
example, the Royal Bank of Scotland, Citigroup and Wells Fargo had a 
combined total of $160 billion in losses during 2008.508 
 
The final part of the jigsaw puzzle was the nature of Basel II and its pro-
cyclical tendencies when calculating credit risk. This meant that the 
chances of a bank defaulting would be extremely heightened, the only 
way for a bank to circumvent this issue would be to increase capital 
reserves to counter losses as well as absorb potential losses. This was 
not achieved by many banks during the financial crisis with several United 
Kingdom banks amongst other international banks,509 having to ask their 
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respective central bank or government for liquidity support.510 There are 
still many banks who are reliant on state support and the tax payer has 
predominantly funded those banks. In the United Kingdom for instance, 
this is most prevalent with Royal Bank of Scotland and Lloyds Bank.511 
Only recently has Lloyds Bank group returned from partial government 
ownership (2017), 512  Royal Bank of Scotland group remains partly 
government owned. 
 
What can be divulged from the jigsaw puzzle analogy is that a series of 
events took place which led to the demise of Basel II and the 
reverberations that rippled through the financial world were felt far and 
wide. It was not caused by one single factor but rather a catalogue of 
issues that mounted over time. In response, the Basel Committee created 
Basel III to strengthen not only the resilience of banks but to combat 
issues such as excess leverage and low quality capital.513 To surmise, the 
events unfolded as follows:  
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http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-08-04/where-the-u-k-s-bank-bailout-went-
wrong accessed 13 October 2015. 
511 UK Financial Investments Ltd, ‘Market Investments’ http://www.ukfi.co.uk/about-
us/market-investments/ accessed 30 October 2015. 
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Remaining Shares’ The Telegraph (London, 17 May 2017)  
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1. Excess liquidity coming into the asset market made it invisible for 
banks and supervisors to recognise liquidity risk and this produced 
many problems ranging from asset price inflation to financial bubbles 
as Campbell states.514 
2. Financial markets began to crash and banks had little by way of capital 
reserves to combat loss. It has been stated that banks were betting 
on themselves with borrowed money and whilst this worked in good 
times it did not in bad times, thus producing catastrophic events.515 
3. A bank’s inability to recognise liquidity risk combined with poor quality 
of capital. A view of which was supported to be adequate at the time 
as Buehler et al. state.516 
4. Banks began to conduct riskier financial deals and products to gain 
better returns. Ashby states that many banks found it difficult to stay 
out of these risky activities.517 
5. The number of buyers in the market reduces in the early parts of 
2007, prices drop and no going back for banks.518  
                                               
514 Ian Campbell, ‘Excess Liquidity Thesis Gains Tractions as Financial Markets Soar’ The 
Telegraph (London, 6 August 2009) 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/breakingviewscom/5982796/Excess-liquidity-thesis-
gains-traction-as-financial-markets-soar.html accessed 19 April 2018. 
515 The Economist, ‘The Origins of the Financial Crisis Crash Course’ 
https://www.economist.com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-
being-felt-five-years-article accessed 19 April 2018. 
516 Kevin Buehler, Hamid Samandari and Christopher Mazingo, ‘Capital Ratios and 
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6. Basel II was unable to protect banks with poor and underestimated 
mechanisms in place.519 
7. Basel II’s pro-cyclical nature520 when calculating credit risk meaning 
a higher probability of a bank defaulting and higher capital reserves 
were needed, that many banks did not have. 
 
In addition to the material and sequence of events detailed, there have 
been a number of reports and responses to the financial crisis that link to 
the reasons explained above as well as highlighting other issues that 
contributed to the financial crisis. Particularly, the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission521  which issued a succinct press release522  detailing the 
reasons behind the financial crisis523 as well as a substantial report524 
intensively exploring the causes behind the financial crisis.525  
                                               
Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic Future (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2010) 98 for 
other problems that began to spread during this time. 
519 See J de Larosiere, ‘Structural Bank Reforms: An Illusory Solution’ (2015) 10 JIBFL 
636, 637. 
520 R Cranston and others, Principles of Banking Law (3rd edn, Oxford University Press 
2017) 44. 
521 Created to examine the underlying issues of the financial crisis that affected the United 
States. 
522 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, ‘The Crisis was Avoidable – A Result of Human 
Actions, Inactions and Misjudgements; Warning Signs Were Ignored’ 
https://cybercemetery.unt.edu/archive/fcic/20110310171107/http://c0186234.cdn1.cloudfil
es.rackspacecloud.com/2011-0127-fcic-releases-report.pdf accessed 10 April 2019. 
523 Causes such as: failures in financial regulation, too much risk taking, systemic 
breaches in accountability. 
524 Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, ‘The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report’ 
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf accessed 10 April 
2019. 
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financial crisis. The Commission conclude that the financial crisis was avoidable, there 






The Basel Committee also reported with initiatives in response to the 
financial crisis526 summarising recommendations for going forward527 and 
a comprehensive report528 detailing further the response to the financial 
crisis.529 Furthermore, the Basel Committee released a paper detailing 
the Basel Committee’s response530 which considered reform measures 
and future work.531 Evidently, there has been commentary on lessons 
learned from the financial crisis.532 
 
In light of the sequence of events that unraveled and the reports and 
papers published, the Basel Committee devised and created Basel III to 
strengthen the banking sector and promoted three aims, ’…improve the 
                                               
and risk taking, systemic failure of accountability and ethics, mortgage lending standards 
dropped, and there was a failure of CRAs. Ibid xvii to xxviii. 
526 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Initiatives in Response to the Crisis by the Basel 
Committee’ https://www.bis.org/press/p090330.htm accessed 10 April 2019. 
527 Such as more and higher quality capital, higher liquidity buffers, and greater 
transparency.  
528 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Comprehensive Response to the Global Banking 
Crisis’ https://www.bis.org/press/p090907.htm accessed 10 April 2019. 
529 Concluding the agreements achieved by Central Bank Governors and Heads of 
Supervision stemming from the ‘Initiatives in Response…’ report. 
530 Bank for International Settlements, ‘The Basel Committee’s Response to the Financial 
Crisis: Report to the G20’ https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs179.pdf accessed 10 April 2019. 
531 Ibid Section IV. 
532 See Eugene A Ludwig, ‘Lessons Learned from the Financial Crisis 2008’ 
https://group30.org/images/uploads/publications/G30_LessonsLearned2008FinancialCrisi
s.pdf accessed 10 April 2019 which illustrates 7 lessons ranging from reliance on rating 
agencies to compensation and more alignment with compliant behaviours and making 
sure that products being sold are suitable. IMF, ‘Lessons from the Recent Financial Crisis 
and the Role of the Fund’ 
https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sp062608 
Accessed 10 April 2019 which splits the lessons into two sections, private and public 
ranging from governance structure requiring improvement and investors needing to 
undertake their own due diligence in the former, and improvement of the regulatory 
framework and incentives to explore the problems in risks management systems in the 
latter. Also see, Martin Wolf, ‘Lessons to be Learnt from the Financial Crisis’ Financial 
Times (London, 1 July 2018) https://www.ft.com/content/ddea2c54-478b-11dd-93ca-







banking sector’s ability to absorb shocks arising from financial and 
economic stress, whatever the source…improve risk management and 
governance…strengthen banks’ transparency and disclosures‘.533 These 
aims endeavour to enforce the primary statement purported by the Basel 
Committee which is stipulated as, ’”Basel III“ is a comprehensive set of 
reform measures, developed by the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision, to strengthen the regulations, supervision and risk 
management of the banking sector‘.534 Basel III indicates and represents 
reform for banking regulation that will see it substantially enhance the 
capital requirements that preceded it.535 
 
It will be apparent in the next section of this chapter that a different 
approach has been taken in contrast to Basel I and II. Where the former 
two iterations primarily focused on bank loss reserves and how much a 
bank should put to one side, Basel III considers loss reserves from other 
aspects of borrowing and bank deposits. It forms both macro and micro 
prudential approaches which should be more coherent and, in theory, 
provide greater durability.536 In essence, this expands on the previous 
two iterations and has taken into account the criticisms and events from 
the financial crisis.537 Therefore, perhaps it is best to view Basel III in 
                                               
533 Bank for International Settlements, ‘International Regulatory Framework for Banks 
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light of not truly superseding Basel II but rather enhancing, working 
alongside and continuing the work of Basel II.538 This would coincide with 
Schwerter’s view who noted that Basel III is a sound advancement, 
however there are still improvements to be made539 such as risk weighted 
leverage ratios.540 This will be discussed later in this chapter. 
 
It should be noted at this point and before Basel III is inspected, that 
there are two areas which affect the banking scenery: ring-fencing 
(implementation 2019) and non-performing loans541 (NPLs) which are 
currently being discussed by the Basel Committee and other peer groups 
such as the European Central Bank542 (ECB) and FSB. 
 
Ring fencing543 a term whereby risky elements of a bank’s business are 
separated from the non-risky retail elements i.e. the separation of retail 
banking from investment banking. It is to safeguard the ordinary citizen 
against the otherwise riskier dealing of a bank.544 For instance, in the 
                                               
538 E Lee, ‘Basel III: Post-Financial Crisis International Financial Regulatory Reform’  
(2013) 28(11) JIBLR 433, 434. 
539 S Schwerter, ‘Basel III’s Ability to Mitigate Systemic Risk’ (2011) 19(4) JFR & C 337, 
348-350. 
540 Ibid 349. 
541 A loan that is close to being in default or is in default.  
542 The central bank for 19 EU countries. 
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Services Law (4th edn, Oxford University Press 2018) 724-727. 
544 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Ring-fencing’ https://www.fca.org.uk/consumers/ring-






United Kingdom this should come into full force 2019545 and it has been 
argued that ring-fencing will help in the next banking crisis.546  
 
In the United Kingdom, for example, ring fencing can be traced to the 
Independent Commission on Banking where it was a key 
recommendation 547  and introduced through the Financial Services 
(Banking Reform) Act 2013. 548  This has been included in other 
legislation.549 
 
By separating core retail banking from investment banking, it is 
envisaged this will provide support for banks. For example, if part of a 
bank fails (ring fenced or non ring fenced) it should be possible to manage 
the failed part without government intervention. Equally, tax payers 
should not be called on. The optimistic standpoint is that ring fencing will 
curtail financial crises or allow for a reduction in the impact of a financial 
crisis.550 
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The second area, NPLs can be described as: 
 
 ’…the sum of borrowed money upon which the debtor has not  
 made his scheduled payments for at least 90 days. A   
 nonperforming loan is either in default or close to being in default. 
 Once a loan is nonperforming, the odds that it will be repaid in full 
 are considered to be substantially lower‘551 
 
and it would seem that they have gone unnoticed. Essentially, NPLs are 
loans that are of late payment in nature or unlikely to be repaid. The 
consequence of such is that the lender will be disadvantaged and exposed 
to financial reverberations if, for example, many borrowers are late in 
paying or do not pay. 
 
Unfortunately, there is absence of a universal categorisation of NPLs552 
and definitions can differ between countries. Furthermore, there is no 
agreement on what the criteria should be.553 Considering that loans are 
one of the largest items on a bank’s balance sheet, then it seems bizarre 
that there is no universal definition and the fact that it changes between 
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countries 554  is worrying. NPLs are being discussed by the Basel 
Committee which is logical considering that it was a big problem during 
the financial crisis due to high debts and bad loans causing significant 
harm for banks.555 That being said, there has been no breakthrough 
yet.556 
 
The European Commission note that there are still high levels of NPLs in 
EU member states even with a decreased amount since 2014.557 The 
outlook for banks with a high amount of NPLs is damaging due to impact 
on profitability and the ability to lend reduced.558  
 
Ring-fencing and NPLs have been acknowledged here because they are 
two areas which are either being implemented like the former or being 
discussed like the latter, arguably as a result of the financial crisis. 
However, both are out of the scope and remit of the research and will not 
be discussed further. Additionally, ring-fencing is not a response directly 
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from the Basel Committee and NPLs is an area that is too large to be 
discussed. They have been highlighted because they fall within the 
timeline of Basel III and both look to strengthen financial stability.  
 
The next section will detail the enhancements and reforms559 made, both 
new and existing, to show that Basel III appears to be the most robust 
iteration to date. As Abdullah and Khadaroo explain, ’The Basel III 
regulation attempts to improve banks’ capital and liquidity requirements 
and their resilience to shocks and panic, such as the fear of bank runs‘.560 
 
BASEL III - STRUCTURE AND BUFFERS 
 
Unlike the differences between Basel I and II where there was a clear 
distinction, Basel III is more of an enhancement and in most part it has 
added to the previous two iterations rather than replacing them 
completely (particularly Basel II) and works alongside to enable a 
stronger set of regulations.561 Therefore, in a dissimilar fashion to the 
structure used for Basel I and II, this section will look at some of the 
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major enhancements and changes made by the Basel Committee.562 The 
main areas include:  
 
• Total capital ratio  
• Tier 1 capital 
• Tier 2 capital 
• Tier 3 capital 
• Conservation capital buffer 
• Countercyclical capital buffer 
• Leverage ratio 
 
What can be seen from the areas detailed is that, ’…the industry is 
witnessing a seismic shift from ”ubiquity“ to ”precision“‘. 563  Thus 
highlighting the significant changes made in Basel III. Barfield is of the 
view that this is due to increased capital and liquidity costs. The author 
would stipulate that this precise approach will help with further financial 
crises by increasing capital and liquidity measures. 
 
There has also been other important work undertaken by the Basel 
Committee564 which has contributed to Basel III and effective banking 
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practices since the financial crisis. These have included: an update on 
finalising post crisis reforms565 which highlights the regulatory responses 
as well as what is left to do, including items such as supervision and 
implementation; better alignment of remuneration 566  which tackles 
excessive risk taking (prompted by incentives) by aligning remuneration 
with risk and performance; and a bank resolution framework567 aimed at 
banks that are too big to fail and which have required tax payer bailouts 
in the past.  
 
Total capital ratio 
 
Total capital ratio has undergone a massive overhaul in Basel III from 
what was 8 percent seen in Basel II to a potential 13 percent568 which 
includes new capital buffers. One of the main reasons for this jump in 
percentage points was that during the financial crisis many banks did not 
possess enough equity to withstand large losses. Consequently, the Basel 
Committee decided to assess and increase the total capital ratio required 
by a bank against RWA.569 To comprehend this increase one needs to 
consider how this is constructed i.e. total capital ratio constitutes Tier 1 
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and 2 capital and two new buffers; conservation capital and 
countercyclical capital which fall under Tier 1.570 It is a major change and 
one which reinforces bank’s capital base.571 
 
What will be alluded to over the coming subsections is that the total 
capital ratio is composed of several elements that are further split into 
common equity (core capital) and non-core capital. When exploring the 
potential risks and shortcomings of capital ratios later in the chapter, it 
will be affirmed that, ’…the new definition of capital is much more 
restrictive than the pre-existing regime. Not only are minimum capital 
ratios much higher, but the definition of what qualifies as capital is much 
narrower…‘.572 Furthermore, it has been stated, ’…banks are still able to 
shift their promises and hence, also shrink their capital requirements. 
Banks can easily deal with the new Basel regulations, because they avoid 
them by finding loopholes‘. 573  Examples of such can be seen with 
Goldman Sachs and Sumitomo Mistui Financial Group. 574  Although, 
Masters et al. say that people familiar with this deal and the professional 
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relationship of purchased protection was never intended to reduce 
regulatory capital.575 
 
Tier 1 capital 
 
When contemplating Tier 1 capital one must understand that the primary 
purpose is to absorb losses on a going-concern basis i.e. the ability by a 
bank to absorb losses whilst still trading.576 It is without doubt one of the 
most crucial and fundamental parts of the Basel regulations, hence the 
revised measures. Foster notes that for large banks the failure of 
instruments such as preferred stocks were overlooked and in the market 
place this jeopardised the credit worthiness of those banks. 577  It is 
because of this that Basel III has increased Tier 1 percentages. In many 
ways it is a first line of defence for banks and enables a bank to operate 
without entering insolvency proceedings, administration or liquidation.578 
Therefore, creating a strong line of defence with the correct amount of 
capital will allow a bank to stand a better chance of protecting them self 
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https://www.nyif.com/articles/changes-in-us-banking-regulation-tier-1-capital-requirements 
accessed 19 April 2018. 
578 Clayton Utz, ‘Basel Introduces Tough Capital Rules Affecting Hybrid Securities’ 
http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/news/201101/17/basel_introduces_tough_capital_






against financial losses. As a result, Basel III will force banks to hold more 
capital.579  
 
Excluding the aforesaid conservation and countercyclical capital buffers 
which will be discussed at a later point, Tier 1 capital has been given a 
tighter definition580 and can be separated into two parts, Tier 1 common 
equity or core capital (CET1), and additional Tier 1 capital or non-core 
capital. These definitions can now be applied. 
 
CET1 is crucial in many ways for the survival of a bank as it includes the 
core capital required against RWA. When analysing Basel III one can see 
that there are very strict requirements that stipulate what categories fall 
under CET1, the most important one being common shares/stocks.581 
Other categories include items such as stock surplus, retained earnings, 
other income or disclosed reserve and regulatory adjustments.582 
 
CET1 and common shares is when a bank issues stock to investors in 
return for money. Importantly here is that not all common stock can be 
categorised as CET1. In order to be classified as common stock the stock 
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needs to be the most subordinated claim in a situation of a liquidation 
process i.e. when there is no liquidation process then no shares can be 
paid back or cancelled from the bank.583 
 
CET1 stipulates a 4.5 percent minimum level of capital to RWA and 
additionally to this, hence the name additional Tier 1 capital, is the 
requirement that a bank must put aside the equivalent to 1.5 percent of 
RWA which will include hybrid instruments to aid loss absorbing. 584 
Therefore, additional Tier 1 capital includes items not included in CET1.585 
One of the main parts of additional Tier 1 capital is preferred stocks and 
this type of stock normally pays the most in dividends, but preferred stock 
does not grant any voting power to the owners. In comparison to common 
stocks, preferred stocks are only a subordinate part of a banks’ deposits 
and creditors. However, like common stocks preferred stocks have no 
maturity date.586 
 
At this stage (excluding the new capital buffers) total capital ratio stands 
at a minimum 6 percent of RWA. This consists of 4.5 percent CET1 and 
1.5 percent additional Tier 1 capital and was applicable from 1 January 
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2015.587 This is an increased difference from Basel II which set the total 
Tier 1 capital at 4 percent.588 
 
Tier 2 capital 
 
Tier 2 capital is now a single category and the upper and lower 
terminology has been amended.589 Basel III has kept the lower tier which 
decreased from 4 percent to 2 percent on 1 January 2015.590 Essentially, 
Basel III has unified Tier 2 capital and changed its definition.591 
 
When considering Tier 2 capital the vital point to remember is that it 
comes into contention (gets absorbed) when a bank has to declare 
insolvency. This can be ascertained from Basel III which states Tier 2 
capital as gone-concern592 i.e. capital that is given to depositors when a 
bank is either winding-up or in a state of insolvency; leading law firms 
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concur with such.593 Accordingly, it is still an important mechanism to 
have in place to protect a bank from financial losses. For example, 
Baumgartner594 notes that Tier 2 capital will absorb losses during a state 
of insolvency, although, ’…the money of an issuer is not guaranteed 
because it gets absorbed in the case of a default‘.595  
 
Basel III states that for an instrument to be included there is a five year 
minimum maturity period and it will amortise in the remaining five years 
before maturity.596 What this means is that as a general rule a bank will 
not be able to end its position for those assets. Under Basel III there are 
only two exceptions to the general rule. One, when a bank is able to issue 
a new asset that is able to generate the same capital if not more than the 
previous asset. Two, when a bank can show that all other assets in 
possession resemble a higher amount than the 2 percent minimum 
required by Basel III.597 
 
At this stage (excluding new capital buffers) total capital ratio stands at 
a minimum 8 percent. This consists of 4.5 percent CET1, 1.5 percent 
                                               
593 Clayton Utz, ‘Basel Introduces Tough Capital Rules Affecting Hybrid Securities’ 
http://www.claytonutz.com/publications/news/201101/17/basel_introduces_tough_capital_
rules_affecting_hybrid_securities.page accessed 30 October 2015. 
594 O Baumgartner, Basel 3 Capital Requirements - Overview and Critical Evaluation (Grin 
Verlag 2013) 11. 
595 Ibid. 
596 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel III: A Global Regulatory Framework for More 
Resilient Banks and Banking Systems’ https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs189.pdf page 18 







additional Tier 1 capital and 2 percent Tier 2 capital. This was applicable 
from the 1 January 2015.598 
 
Tier 3 capital 
 
When considering Basel I and II it was highlighted that Tier 3 capital was 
not introduced until many years after Basel I was published and was then 
carried forward to Basel II. A further change occurred with Basel III in 
that Tier 3 capital will now be abolished599 and phased out.600 This was 
one of the first major changes that would occur in the third iteration, the 
next two being capital buffers.  
 
Taking into account that Tier 3 capital no longer exists, the other two 
tiers are not new forms of capital. The only changes being that the 
definition of capital was tightened,601 a higher minimum total Tier 1 
capital from 4 percent to 6 percent introduced, a higher minimum CET1 
from 2 percent to 4.5 percent introduced,602 and the reduction of Tier 2 
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capital from 4 percent to 2 percent was applied (excluding new capital 
buffers).603 Denning believes the increases are a good thing, specifically 
CET1 and welcomes the changes being made.604 On the face of it this 
would seem the case. However, as will be illuminated in due course these 
increases may present some issues such as the cost of implementation. 
 
The arrival of capital buffers 
 
In theory the Basel Committee could not continue Tier 1 and 2 capital in 
the same manner as it operated in Basel II. Improvements were needed 
after much criticism and as a result of the ramifications from the financial 
crisis. The problem was that during the financial crisis the possibility of 
borrowers paying back their loans began to increase leading to and during 
the financial crisis, this in turn created a huge burden for many banks.605 
This was further exacerbated by the callous behaviour shown by banks 
with large bonuses still being paid to employees in the midst of the 
recession.606 The author accepts that some areas of a bank’s business is 
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profitable compared to other areas that are not, equally, to recruit and 
retain bright individuals requires money. However, this contributed to the 
de-stabilisation of the Basel regulations and banking world, and the 
bonuses would have contributed to the demise for some of those 
banks.607 
 
As already discussed, for many banks there was insufficient levels of 
capital during this period of time. Some banks were unable to recognise 
liquidity risk, some banks misinterpreted liquid for illiquid assets608 and 
in turn had low levels of capital to counter financial downturn.609 The 
Basel Committee stated that banks had failed to take account of liquidity 
risk and the base principles thereof, even when there was an array of 
liquidity to be had.610 To combat this problem and improve financial 
stability, the Basel Committee introduced two new mechanisms which 
would attach to the Tier 1 capital framework, otherwise known as the 
conservation capital buffer and the countercyclical capital buffer. Both 
add up to 2.5 percent resulting in a potential 5 percent extra capital 
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needed for banks to find, and this positively means more funds are 
available to defend a bank during a financial crisis. The former can be 
lowered in times of distress thus showing flexibility, the latter can protect 
against excessive credit growth and is activated only during this time.611  
 
In theory, a bank should save more money in economic prosperity to be 
able to absorb financial losses when economic hardship arrives. If applied 
correctly a bank should be able to maintain stability and have the ability 
to regain capital at a faster rate. Whilst this is a plausible concept, 
according to Pinsent Masons it is still too early to say whether this 
mechanism will succeed. The full scope and effect of the third iteration 
will not be clear for some time.612 
 
Essentially, the conservation capital buffer was introduced to encourage 
capital discipline when banks may be short of capital. The countercyclical 
capital buffer was introduced to stop the cyclicality of risk.613 These will 
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Conservation capital buffer 
 
The conservation capital buffer is an additional percentage that a bank is 
required to account for in order to maintain stability and is in the form of 
CET1. It can be defined as, ’…to ensure that banks build up capital buffers 
outside periods of stress which can be drawn down as losses are 
incurred‘.614 It can be used during times of stress which in turn will 
constrain earning distribution. As McKee and Barker point out, the 
intention by the Basel Committee it seems is for the conservation capital 
buffer to support strong supervision and bank governance. 615  For 
example, it is to a certain degree in place to curtail some of the behavior 
seen at the beginning of the financial crisis with distributions of dividends 
still being paid despite the financial turmoil that was unfolding.616  
 
Bearing the above in mind, it has been discussed so far that Tier 1 capital 
before capital buffers stands at 4.5 percent CET1 and 1.5 percent 
additional Tier 1 capital. With the conservation capital buffer this 
increases the minimum amount of CET1 by 2.5 percent. Therefore, at this 
stage CET1 is set at a minimum of 7 percent (4.5 + 2.5) that a bank 
should hold. The figure of 7 percent will not come to fruition until 1 
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January 2019.617 What can be ascertained from this is that more capital 
is now required by banks, in theory this should improve a bank’s 
resilience to financial repercussions in the market. 
 
Banks should build their reserves of CET1 in times of economic 
prosperity618 so that in times of economic hardship these reserves will be 
hit first to absorb losses. Matten purports, ’The capital conservation buffer 
is intended to be built up in good times to enable a more resilient banking 
sector to weather the storms of a downturn or even another crisis‘.619 
Although, as Matten explains, whether the conservation capital buffer will 
erode in adverse conditions whilst attracting sanctions remains to be 
seen. This will be alluded to in the weaknesses section. What should be 
stated at this point is that the idea behind the conservation capital buffer 
is that to build capital reserves in periods of economic prosperity, which 
in the author’s opinion is feasible and logical, then a bank will be able to 
build sufficient funds to combat periods of stress and market stagnation.  
Basel III stipulates rules that should be abided by in order for the 
conservation capital buffer to be brought back to its original level of 2.5 
percent when a financial crisis occurs. There are three ways in which a 
bank can increase its depleted percentage level: decrease annual 
                                               
617 Slaughter and May, ‘Basel III: A New Capital Adequacy and Liquidity Framework for 
Banks’ https://www.slaughterandmay.com/media/1550585/basel-iii-a-new-capital-
adequacy-and-liquidity-framework-for-banks.pdf page 24 accessed 10 November 2015. 
618 F Cannata and M Quagliariello, ‘A Brazilian Perspective on Basel III’ in L Rodrigues 
and P Oliveira, Basel III and Beyond: A Guide to Banking Regulation after the Crisis (Risk 
Books 2011) 411. 
619 R Barfield, ‘Defining Capital’ in C Matten, A Practitioners Guide to Basel III and Beyond 






dividend payments, decrease share buybacks, or decrease bonus 
payments.620 It would seem that these mechanisms are in place to rectify 
the negative consequences of market instability during less prosperous 
times. 
 
The Basel Committee has provided guidance and a table which states five 
categories on how a bank should allocate funds at different levels from 
4.5 percent to the 7 percent and above standard.621 For example: 
 
 ’Depending in which category the capital of a bank is the more  
 money it has to save in upcoming periods to recover its buffer.  
 E.g. a bank’s ratio is 5.5%. Therefore its conservation buffer is  
 only at a level of 1% and has to recover another 1.5 percentage  
 points. According to figure 4, a bank has to save a minimum of  
 80% of its upcoming earnings to do so‘622  
 
The figure 4 that Baumgartner refers to is a table taken from Basel III 
that shows the reaction between common equity percentage and 
minimum capital conservation ratios expressed as percentages.623 The 
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way in which a bank can increase their conservation capital buffer using 
the example stated is by adopting any of the aforementioned three i.e. 
decrease dividend payments, share buybacks, or bonuses. The only other 
way for a bank to make up the percentage level would be to raise new 
capital. This appears to be a solid approach and one which offers several 
routes for banks to take on building capital levels back to the required 
levels stipulated by the Basel Committee. 
 
Furthermore, the Basel Committee detailed what is unacceptable 
behaviour in relation to banks that have depleted their capital buffers. 
What this means is that banks should not continue to distribute dividends 
by using future predictions of recovery.624 
 
At this stage, total capital ratio stands at 4.5 percent CET1, 2.5 percent 
conservation capital buffer which contains CET1, 1.5 percent additional 
Tier 1 capital (non-core capital), and 2 percent Tier 2 capital resulting in 
a minimum 10.5 percent total capital ratio to RWA. Similar to the 
minimum CET1 figure of 7 percent, the minimum total capital ratio will 
not reach 10.5 percent until 1 January 2019.625 This is purely to do with 
the fact that for some banks it will take several years to allocate such 
funds and comply with this percentage.  
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Whilst having more capital reserves does not necessarily mean a bank 
will survive a financial crisis, as other factors matter such as liquidity 
which will be discussed in due course, it is in the author’s view a 
significant improvement in that by requiring a bank to hold more capital 
will assist in defending against economic instability. Overall, the aim it 
seems is to create an environment whereby there is sufficient capital for 
banks and the financial sector to continue their business activities.  
 
Countercyclical capital buffer 
 
When considering the countercyclical capital buffer one should see it as 
a complementary tool to the conservation capital buffer in that it is an 
extra form of money that can be utilised in an emergency. It can be 
described as having been created, ’…to protect the financial system from 
periods of excess aggregate credit growth, avoiding a build-up of 
systemic risk in this phase of the credit cycle‘.626 In essence, it is to 
further mitigate pro-cyclicality and the Basel Committee have stipulated 
that its main aim is to protect in periods of excess aggregate credit 
growth and it may also help against the build up of credit cycle.627 
 
The countercyclical capital buffer will work as a macro-prudential tool i.e. 
it will control the credit flow at a consistent level which is adjusted by 
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economic cycle. The benefit of this is that it should reduce the lending of 
a bank in times of credit expansion. As Matten explains, ’The counter-
cyclical capital buffer is a macro-level buffer that will be built up when 
there are signs of ”excessive“ credit growth‘.628 During these periods of 
credit growth the countercyclical capital buffer should act to slow down 
lending, some have described it as, ’…a brake on bank lending‘629 and 
this is enabled by the cost of credit increasing. When applied correctly a 
bank should have credit remaining during periods of stress. 
 
The percentage required by a bank when allocating money aside for this 
buffer is not pre-determined, it is a range of 0-2.5 percent which will be 
determined by the credit growth of said country.630 The reason why the 
Basel Committee did not state a precise figure unlike the conservation 
capital buffer, is because national authorities/regulators (regulators) are 
able to set this percentage and this is largely because they are in a more 
commanding and better position to determine what percentage is 
appropriate.631 Therefore, if a country was to conclude that there was a 
danger of excessive growth in credit building, then the countercyclical 
capital buffer would be implemented and banks would have to allocate 
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monies for this buffer.632 This is arguably a good thing and as Binham et 
al. note, will force banks to set aside capital.633 
 
Banks should not be alarmed by the countercyclical capital buffer as the 
regulator cannot randomly announce when it is needed, but rather 
investigate and analyse micro and macro economical facts of the 
economy before making a decision. Credit growth over the last few years 
should be considered and development of gross domestic products 
analysed, amongst other economic data. Once collated, an estimate on 
what the future growth will look like for the bank will be derived. If 
needed, the regulator will then notify the bank to how much more is 
required for future loan business. A bank will have twelve months to reach 
the percentage requested 634  and restrictions can be put in place to 
support this task. Equally, the abolition of such requirement(s) can take 
place if it is decided that the bank no longer needs this buffer. As Binham 
et al. suggest, the buffer can be turned off during bad times.635 If no 
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longer required then those funds can be allocated to other areas of the 
bank.  
 
In general, banks that possess the right amounts of capital should have 
limited problems when a financial crisis develops. If banks operate in 
several jurisdictions then an average percentage must be implemented 
to all those jurisdictions where the bank has credit exposure.636 Similar 
to the conservation capital buffer it is still too early to infer how successful 
this mechanism will be, but at this moment in time it is very much a 
strength of Basel III. 
 
The countercyclical capital buffer brings an end to the total capital ratio 
that a bank must now hold under Basel III. What has been discussed 
comprises of Tier 1 common equity (core capital) CET1 at 4.5 percent, an 
additional Tier 1 capital (non-core capital) at 1.5 percent, a conservation 
capital buffer in the form of CET1 at 2.5 percent as well as a 
countercyclical capital buffer in the form of CET1 at 0-2.5 percent, 
followed by Tier 2 capital at 2 percent. In total, a bank conforming to 
Basel III will have to potentially hold a maximum 13 percent with a 
minimum being 10.5 percent total capital ratio637 if no countercyclical 
capital buffer is required. If one compares this to the previous 
arrangements under Basel II then this has increased from 8 percent to 
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13 percent. For many banks, trying to gain an extra 5 percent of capital 
may be a long and arduous task, however in the aftermath of the financial 
crisis all banks should want to arrive at this standard in order to protect 
and continue safe trading. That being said, perhaps this is not a common 
belief with all.638 
 
The maximum total percentage of 13 percent will not be complete until 1 
January 2019 when other parts of Tier 1 capital are phased in, and it may 
take several years for some banks to comply. Furthermore, it may not be 
applicable to some banks as part of the 13 percent will be made up of the 




The Basel Committee decided that RWA should not be the only way that 
a bank and regulator assess capital requirements. The Basel Committee 
agreed that this was to introduce a simple and transparent mechanism 
to supplement other measures in risk based capital requirements.639 For 
clarity, leverage ratio has been described by the Basel Committee as, ’…a 
simple, transparent, non-risk based leverage ratio that is calibrated to 
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act as a credible supplementary measure to the risk based capital 
requirements‘.640 
 
One can interpret leverage ratio as an additional form of security that 
acts as a defence mechanism. The Basel Committee said that the 
underlying cause of the financial crisis was due to excessive on and off 
balance sheet leverage 641  and this is why leverage ratio has been 
introduced in Basel III. Additionally, the Basel Committee indicates that 
a bank need only compare Tier 1 capital with total exposure,642 the 
intention being to restrict a build-up of leverage that will stop 
measurement error and model risk.643 Simply put, ’The objective of the 
leverage ratio is to serve as a back-stop to the risk-based measure‘.644  
In addition, Kellermann and Schlag state, ’The BCBS (2009) considers 
the leverage ratio as the appropriate instrument, to safeguard the system 
of financial regulation and supervision against failure in risk 
assessment‘.645 It should be said that for those banks that have a huge 
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leverage of low risk on their balance sheet, then this will be a material 
factor as most will exceed the minimum figure required.646 
 
The leverage ratio does not fall under the category of Tier 1 or 2 capital, 
therefore this minimum percentage is not added to the aforementioned 
figures. For leverage ratio, a bank must hold a minimum of 3 percent. 
This figure was tested between 1 January 2013 and 1 January 2017.647 
Any adjustments to be completed in the first half of 2017 with migration 
to Pillar 1 at the beginning of 2018648 (for global systemically important 
banks this will be 1 January 2022).649 Also, and similar to Tier 1 capital 
where specific capital is stipulated under Basel III i.e. categories, the 
leverage ratio must be calculated using a specific method to determine 
exposure of default.650 
 
Leverage ratio appears intricate with several elements that need to be 
taken into consideration when calculating. Some of those considerations 
include the value of derivates (actual value on balance sheet plus future 
value) and if a bank is unable to reduce the value of some of its assets.651 
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The leverage ratio has gained popularity since its introduction with some 
countries bringing in higher percentage levels.652 
 
It is stated that, ’The Basel III leverage ratio standards ensure 
consistency between the capital and exposure measures in the design of 
the leverage ratio…‘.653 This is a difficult task because of it being a new 
mechanism as well as the disparity between many banks. Only time will 
tell in order to gauge how successful this mechanism is, but one criticism 
already apparent is that leverage ratio relies a lot on mathematical 
models and Kellermann and Schlag argue it to be based on wrong 
assumptions.654  
 
In addition to the above, leverage ratio is considered to be a 
supplementary measure and in reality it should be a primary tool to 
combat capital risks according to Moosa.655 It may also be difficult for 
some banks to comply, for instance those banks that are primarily based 
on public sector lending.656 These banks will need to change, this could 
be in the form of adapting their business model. 
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Due to the infancy of the leverage ratio tool, the Basel Committee 
appreciate that some changes are needed and that over the course of 
several years leading to the full implementation of Basel III in 2019, 
amendments may be required. To reiterate, this date will be the 1 
January 2017 with a migration date to Pillar 1 estimated on 1 January 
2018.657 On this basis, leverage ratio should be used with caution, not 
only because of its infancy but also because if calibrated poorly then this 
could lead to unfortunate consequences.658 It is not surprising then that 
Petitjean suggests that it should be handled with caution.659 In addition 
it is stated, ’…the minimum leverage ratio does not always function as 
the desired backstop…If calibrated incorrectly, the minimum leverage 
ratio instead becomes the binding capital requirement‘.660 Clearly, due 
care is strongly required. Kellermann and Schlag suggest that rather than 
having a minimum leverage ratio, a base risk weight should be adopted 
in which a minimum threshold would be created that reduces the impact 
of potential flaws seen in risk assessments. What this essentially means 
is that banks do not have as many options to deflate their own RWA, for 
that reason it is an effective backstop unlike minimum leverage ratio. The 
author of the research believes that leverage ratio has had a positive 
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response to date and from the period 2007 to 2015 there has been almost 




It has been illustrated how Basel III can be interpreted as an addition to 
or upgrade from, Basel II, and as such a continuation of the work that 
Basel I implemented beforehand. In some respects Basel III did not fully 
supersede but rather strengthened Basel II. 
 
The main enhancements and additions have been noted to highlight how 
Basel III intends on not only moving the Basel regulations forward and 
improve banking stability around the world, but to also increase financial 
stability to limit a financial crisis in the future. 
 
Total capital ratio has increased from what was a minimum 8 percent to 
a much stronger 13 percent, which encompasses the increases made in 
Tier 1 capital as well as the creation of the conservation and 
countercyclical capital buffers that added an extra 5 percent to the total 
capital ratio figure. In addition there was a reduction of Tier 2 capital from 
4 percent to 2 percent. Included is a leverage ratio of 3 percent which 
does not form part of the total capital ratio that a bank must now hold, 
but it is a signal of an extra line of defence for banks that should be 
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implemented to avoid excess build-up of leverage. This was one of the 
main problems of Basel II and for the financial crisis. 
 
Basel III appears to be more robust and refined, and to the uninformed 
person would appear competent. In order to highlight the positive 
contributions made as well as the negative, the next section of this 
chapter will arrive at a critical point, strengths and weaknesses. Bearing 
in mind that capital ratios, CRAs, and VaR will not be examined and will 
form part of Chapter 4. This is due to the problematic implications that 
these three areas play in Basel III. Similar to the strengths and 
weaknesses sections of Basel I and II, it will be illustrated that there are 
both strong and weak parts of Basel III and that the third iteration is a 
much improved set of regulations. However, there are flaws that need to 
be examined and rectified. 
 
STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
 
When considering Basel III it could be assumed that the third iteration 
would have few weaknesses and many strengths. Be that as it may, whilst 
Basel III is a positive step forward for banking regulation it is similar to 
Basel I and II in that it contains many weaknesses. Before these are 
considered and to remain consistent with previous chapters, the next part 









There are many strengths that Basel III has but only a selection of the 
most important and apparent ones will be discussed. These are and all 
encompass, the new refined definition of regulatory capital: 
 
• Simplified structure 
• Quality of capital 
• Quantity of capital 
 
The three points above was very much to do with the inadequacy and 
transparency issues that plagued Basel I and II. Due to the capital 
definition weakness, namely insufficient quality of capital and a lack of 
harmonisation, comes the strength provided by Basel III which improves 
both the quality and quantity of capital in a simplified structure. In the 
light of this and to reiterate, some of the improvements made were a 
more simplified structure, the quality of capital required by a bank was 
improved, and the quantity of capital required by a bank also 
improved.662 The refined definition of capital is more restrictive than 
before, with capital ratios being much higher and a narrower ambit of 
what qualifies as capital being introduced with a key focus on common 
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equity.663 Let that be said, in the author’s opinion this is very much a 
strength. Whilst this may be the case, Barfield suggests that banks need 
to prepare and have a plan in place, with raising fresh equity a most likely 
scenario.664 
 
Firstly, a more simplified structure was devised that enabled Basel III to 
be more cohesive and enabled a more refined layout in contrast to Basel 
II. The three tiers that existed under Basel II were evaluated so that Tier 
1 and 2 capital were amended and tightened, Tier 3 was removed 
altogether. Tier 1 capital now consists of CET1 (core capital) as well as 
additional capital (non-core capital). This equates to a percentage 
increase from 2 percent to 4.5 percent CET1 and additional capital being 
set at 1.5 percent. Tier 2 capital removed the upper and lower limit to 
now only include the lower limit, the percentage required now stands at 
2 percent rather than the previous 4 percent. 
 
By simplifying the structure the Basel Committee concentrated on capital 
under Tier 1 and what the criteria for that should be, as well as revising 
the percentage levels of capital to RWA. The Basel Committee removed 
the upper limit in Tier 2 capital because most banks underused this 
mechanism, and combined with the fact that the Tier 1 capital cost being 
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the same and more beneficial.665 Tier 3 capital was removed because of 
the advancements made in market risk over the last several years that 
meant there was no need to have a separate tier for this element.666  
 
Meneau and Sabatini note that one of the crucial improvements 
implemented was the harmonisation that the Basel Committee tried to 
create through Basel III. This can be viewed in relation to CET1 where in 
contrast to Basel II there was a lack of homogeneity resulting in an un-
level playing field.667 Under Basel III this was altered and improved and 
whilst the minimum capital required is still set at 8 percent to RWA (CET1 
and additional Tier 1 capital + Tier 2), the formula is very different. Tier 
1 capital now comprises of 6 percent of which 4.5 percent must come in 
the form of CET1. If compared to Basel II, the overall minimum capital 
to RWA was that the minimum 8 percent could be made of 4 percent Tier 
1 capital and 4 percent Tier 2 capital; the problem here was that Tier 1 
capital is more vital than Tier 2 capital. By making this significant change 
means that a bank can no longer split evenly between Tier 1 to 2 capital 
due to the shift of percentage changes.668 
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The key strength of a more simplified structure is that the focus of capital 
became more aligned and focused on producing a more robust guideline 
for allocating capital. Previously the 8 percent minimum capital to RWA 
ratio could be split equally between Tier 1 and 2 capital and this was not 
good for banking regulation. It did not make sense as Tier 1 capital is 
more important when it comes to core capital, this is because Tier 2 
capital operates for different purposes. By reducing the percentage in Tier 
2 capital from 4 percent to 2 percent and scrapping the upper limit stated 
in Basel II, thus allocating more percentage to Tier 1 capital (6 percent 
of which 4.5 percent must be CET1), this means that the Basel regulations 
have become more powerful and in turn invigorated the capital to RWA 
protocol. 
 
Secondly, the quality of capital stated under Basel III increased and 
provided a more strict definition of capital. Eligibility criteria were revised 
and the list of items to be deducted are solely from Tier 1 capital. 
Additionally, they have been rigorously assessed.669  
 
The quality of capital has been briefly highlighted in part throughout this 
chapter, as well as the aforesaid simplified structure surrounding the 
refined definition of capital and the obsolete equal split between Tier 1 
and 2 capital that once existed, therefore, these areas will not be 
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discussed further. Needless to say that it falls under the changes made 
to quality of capital. What will be explained are some of the parts of the 
eligibility criteria that have been revised which improve and strengthen 
the Basel regulations making it a clear strength and much needed 
improvement from Basel II and by doing so Meneau and Sabatini believe 
that it provides a more rigorous regulatory capital definition. Alterations 
include CET1, additional Tier 1 capital, and Tier 2 capital. 
 
CET1 has been designed so that certain criteria must be met for banks to 
then allocate funds. The criteria devised endeavours to replicate common 
shares which is the most highest quality of capital and is the best form of 
capital for loss absorbing; it has been defined as the purest form of 
capital.670 There are fourteen criteria that have been concocted and all 
link in some way to strengthen CET1.671 For example, under criteria eight, 
CET1 must be able to absorb losses whilst allowing a bank to continue its 
activities. Equally as important and interlocking with criteria eight, is the 
quality of lasting stated in criteria three. This means that those 
instruments under CET1 must not be repaid outside liquidation and by 
doing so this will not force a bank to raise new capital in stressed 
conditions. This means that instruments must be perpetual. 
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Additional Tier 1 capital, like CET1, has fourteen eligibility criteria and has 
been tightened under Basel III to become much more detailed than 
before.672 The impetus has largely come from the eradication of the term 
innovation and hybrid instruments, 673  the latter did not operate as 
intended and did very little by way of loss absorbing.674 By removing the 
terms innovation and non-innovation means that the weaknesses of such 
have been tackled i.e. no more incentives to redeem (criteria four).675 
Taking away this incentive enables a bank to be more efficient and to be 
less inclined to make the wrong decision. Additionally, two improvements 
have been made in the form of prohibition of dividend pushers and 
payment in kind of coupons. The former meaning if a payment of a 
coupon is made it triggers part of the instrument which then triggers a 
senior part of the same instrument. The latter meaning the payment of 
shares rather than cash. Furthermore and linking to CET1, is the idea 
behind perpetually (criteria four) and that additional capital should also 
provide a strong capital base, additionally dated instruments should not 
be in force unless a minimum five years is adhered to and that it is at the 
sole initiative of the issuer with the approval of the regulatory supervisor 
(criteria five).676 This means that dated instruments will no longer be 
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valid unless the aforesaid criteria is met. The restrictions made have 
produced a key strength in limiting this form of abuse and by eradicating 
the ability to redeem means that the quality of capital has been further 
strengthened. 
 
Tier 2 capital operates in a gone concern situation so that when banks 
enter into a liquidation process, the bank should be able to absorb loss 
through Tier 2 capital. Like CET1 and additional Tier 1 capital, Tier 2 
capital has been reinforced and (again) the Basel Committee have 
removed the incentive to redeem. The nine criteria points stated are 
illustrated by the Basel Committee which show how a bank should adopt 
Tier 2 capital.677 From a loss absorbent position, which like Tier 1 capital 
is poignant, Tier 2 capital is only concerned with depositors and senior 
creditors. Therefore, five years must pass before the instrument can be 
repaid (criteria four). This is to support a bank in times of stress and, 
crucially, the Basel Committee stipulate that Tier 2 capital is in place to 
absorb losses up to the point whereby a bank may no longer be able to 
operate.678 This would then limit the impact on tax payers i.e. a public 
bailout.  
 
The strength of Tier 2 capital is through the idea and philosophy that 
underpins it, it grapples with stress related incidents and tries to stop or 
limit the impact on a bank and it also tries to stop or limit the impact that 
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it may have on taxpayers. A key strength within the revised quality of 
capital. 
 
The three improvements of quality of capital resonate a deep feeling that 
the Basel Committee have really pushed capital forward with the 
enhancements made to CET1, additional Tier 1 capital and Tier 2 capital. 
The overall level of high quality capital has been immensely improved.679 
 
Thirdly, the quantity of capital has changed drastically under Basel III. It 
is clear that the financial crisis put a huge strain on many economies and 
raised questions around the mechanisms in place to withstand such 
events. One of those questionable areas was the quantity of capital within 
a bank to absorb financial loss. The improvements made by Basel III 
means that higher quantities of capital are now required by banks to 
absorb losses in future events similar to the recent financial crisis.680 The 
key strength of such is very simple, but obviously time consuming in 
nature when implementing. After all, and as Davies comments, the 
implementation period has been deferred and it will take time to put in 
place.681 That strength is the increase in capital that a bank should now 
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hold compared to the previous Basel regulations. It was explained earlier 
in this chapter that the overall total level of capital to RWA has increased, 
for many banks this will be a massive leap in required capital and may 
take a decade to reach682 hence the 2019 implementation date. Although, 
for some banks this may not be a problem683 as they have already begun 
to increase capital levels in excess of the current minimum. 684 
Interestingly, some have commented that it could be increased further 
and capital charges are too low.685  
 
The new percentages required by a bank that are stated in Tier 1 and 2 
capital have been illustrated, no further clarification is required other than 
to say that the reforms made form part of the new quantity of capital that 
has been carefully considered in the refined definition of capital by the 
Basel Committee.  
 
The real innovation of quantity of capital are the two new mechanisms 
created; the conservation capital buffer and countercyclical capital buffer. 
Both have bolstered the definition of capital and the quantity of capital 
needed by a bank. The former being mandatory at 2.5 percent and the 
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latter being optional at 0-2.5 percent, depending on the regulator who 
may deem it necessary due to excessive credit growth. 
 
It is clear that the two new capital buffers go hand in hand with the 
refined definition of capital and that the Basel Committee were of the 
opinion that not only more overall capital was needed, but two new forms 
of capital reserve that add to the overall required capital was also 
essential. With this in mind, consideration will be given to the two 
additional qualities of quantity of capital. 
 
The conservation capital buffer aims to ensure that banks create this 
buffer outside periods of stress in the market,686 this buffer can then aid 
losses as they occur. As Quagliariello explains, ’The requirement is based 
on a capital conservation rule linking the ability of banks to distribute 
profits - dividends, discretionary bonuses and share buybacks - to the 
distance from the target ratio‘.687 The strength of the conservation capital 
buffer is that it not only adds another percentage of capital which a bank 
should allocate funds to, but it also aims to reduce and stop the 
irresponsibility that some banks were portraying by distributing profits to 
create an image of financial strength; in some cases this was not true.688 
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Furthermore, it can be reduced in times of stress and void the argument 
that capital buffers cannot be used as real buffers. This will give banks 
more flexibility and encourage banks to enhance capital base. 689 
Therefore, to further bolster and strengthen the conservation capital 
buffer there will be limitations in relation to distribution policies.690 It 
should be kept in mind and linking back earlier in this chapter to what 
Matten explained, that whether this buffer will erode in adverse 
conditions whilst attracting sanctions is yet to be seen but could be a 
possibility. It is too early to say whether this will be the case, but as of 
this moment the conservation capital buffer is very much a key strength. 
Lekatis concurs and believes that the conservation capital buffer will 
strengthen a bank’s ability to withstand future adverse situations.691 
 
Unlike the conservation capital buffer, the countercyclical capital buffer is 
a macro prudential tool which is used when regulators deem necessary 
that credit growth is far too excessive.692 The main purpose and strength 
is to ensure that enough capital is built in good banking times so that 
protection is provided when the inevitable future losses occur in bad 
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banking times. Both of the two new mechanisms signal a key strength of 
Basel III and to the overall capital to RWA element. The biggest strength 
of this capital buffer is flexibility and that regulators can increase and 
decrease the percentages required.693 
 
In conclusion what can be deduced is that the by-product of refining the 
definition of regulatory capital has created many strengths which all 
coexist together harmoniously.  The three main strengths discussed as a 
result of the revised and refined definition of regulatory capital have 
included a simplified structure, better quality of capital and higher 
quantity of capital. All three link together as all three are a by-product of 
the improved definition of regulatory capital. Meneau and Sabatini are of 
the opinion that Basel III should become a more effective tool to bear 
banking losses694 as a result. This is, in the author’s opinion, a positive 
step forward. 
 
What can be extrapolated is that a narrow and tighter approach has been 
taken to what consists of regulatory capital, the criteria that capital falls 
under, the increase of percentages now required and the integration 
between them all. In the author’s opinion the overall key strength of Basel 
III is the improved definition of capital and this includes a simplified 
structure, better quality of capital, better quantity of capital and the 
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homogeneity between them all. By producing a better form of capital 
homogeny, Basel III has become a much stronger form of international 
guidelines.  
 
Unfortunately, whilst Basel III has many strengths, some of which have 
been examined, there are weaknesses that have developed.  Perez details 
just some of those weakness from barriers into the sector to reliance on 
CRAs. Perez is of the opinion that whilst Basel III has improved on some 




Having discussed some of the key strengths of Basel III it is necessary to 
consider some of the weaknesses, bearing in mind that capital ratios, 
CRAs and VaR will not be examined until Chapter 4. These include, but 
are not limited to, three areas, two of which have carried forward from 
previous Basel iterations. They are: 
 
• Restructuring of internal risk 
• Off balance sheet assets and activities 
• Reverberations and countries still recovering from the financial crisis 
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The first weakness will apply to how easy it is for a bank to manoeuvre 
and restructure internal risk so that it appears to have lesser risk and 
need lower capital requirements. The second weakness links to the first 
and involves off balance sheet assets and activities and usually means an 
asset (or debt) or financing activity which does not show up on the 
balance sheet; a problematic area for the Basel Committee as it was one 
of the main contributing factors to the financial crisis. The third weakness 
will consider the problems that still face banks in a European context due 
to the financial crisis and clash with the 2019 Basel III implementation 
date. 
 
Firstly, the restructuring of internal risk. In this context the main point to 
note which was evident and has carried across from Basel II, is that a 
bank can effectively restructure internal risk quite easily. Needless to say 
that this behaviour should have been restricted and eradicated entirely 
to help economic stability, rather than promote and allow the 
mismanagement and concealment by a bank.  
 
Internal risk can be restructured and this was evident during the financial 
crisis in the form of Credit Default Swaps696 (CDS).697 Meaning that the 
seller of a CDS will compensate the buyer in the event of a loan default 
or similar scenario. Some of those casualties included many investments 
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banks, although the one that most will remember is Lehman Brothers 
which owed around $600 billion, two-thirds being associated with CDS.698 
Whilst the liquidator of Lehman Brothers was able to pay off all debts 
due699 it does illustrate the devastating effects of CDS. It should also be 
noted that CDS can be affected greatly by CRAs700 and the credit ratings 
that are given to corporate bonds, for example. Daniels and Jensen 
identify that CDS can change around the time of an upgrade or 
downgrade from CRAs. This can happen not only during the event but 
also just before or after a new rating is given.701 Daniels and Jensen state, 
’…credit rating is a significant determinant of both CDS spreads and credit 
spreads for investment grade issues, and especially for non-investment 
grade issues‘.702  
 
Blundell-Wignall and Atkinson703 provide a scenario of how a bank can 
effectively find a loophole within Basel III by shifting their (bank) promise 
and decreasing their capital requirement. For example, bank A buys a 
corporate bond and pays $1000 to a company for this and in return the 
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company will make yearly coupon payments. Risk weighted at 100 
percent (Basel III) bank A will hold 8 percent ($80) on their balance 
sheet. Bank A can then make a CDS on this bond to bank B and short the 
bond. Due to bank B having a lower risk of default, bank A will only have 
to hold $16 (20 percent risk weighting/8 percent Basel III/$1000 bond). 
In this example the bank has been able to reduce the capital reserve 
requirements.704 
 
Not only is CDS beneficial to restructuring risk and increasing leverage 
ratio for all practical purposes,705 it can be very lucrative,706 but the main 
point here is that a bank can legitimately restructure internal risk and 
create lower capital requirements that is required of them. To put this 
into context, Vause highlighted that at the peak of 2007 the notional 
amount of CDS was about $60 trillion.707 An astounding amount and this 
example fully illustrates the market in which this has grown since the 
middle 1990s; in 2001 it was $628 billion.708  
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It should be acknowledged that there has been consultation of closing 
this loophole,709 although this has yet to take any real effect. Until this 
issue is resolved then banks can continue doing business whilst evading 
the intended effect of Basel III. This means that a chain is created 
whereby one collapse could trigger other collapses. Consider swapping 
out for example, as Haynes states, ’When a swap contract is sold it cannot 
simply have its benefits and obligations passed on in the way that can be 
done with exchange traded and OTC futures and options. In the case of 
a swap the parties have an ongoing contractual relationship‘.710 So it 
would not be easily reversible by company B with company A, meaning 
company B would have two options; one, that company A are willing to 
cancel the original contract, or two, that company B will have to find a 
new counterpart. The second option is most likely, yet company B would 
still have ongoing obligations and a degree of retained risk. Therefore, it 
can be seen how a chain can be created and can affect all parties.   
 
The second problem with Basel III is off balance sheet assets and 
activities711 (OBS). The true magnitude of OBS did not really come to 
light until the financial crisis. As will shortly be explained, OBS has been 
in operation and utilised for many years. It has been discussed and 
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included, albeit to limited levels, since Basel I. However, the financial 
impact that OBS can cause was not fully appreciated until it was too late 
on contemplating the financial crisis.712 It is only now in Basel III that 
OBS is gaining more inclusion and a prominent role with the third 
iteration. Thiemann believes that Basel III has been innovative in the way 
that is addresses OBS with measures such as the liquidity coverage 
ratio713 (LCR) and the net stable funding ratio714 (NSFR), and that the 
Basel III aims are going in the right direction.715 
 
OBS links to the first problem (restructuring internal risk) and is harmful 
for Basel III. OBS problems have plagued the Basel regulations since 
Basel I.716 The beginning of OBS can be traced to commodities trading 
and derivatives. The first currency swaps started around the 1960s and 
wider derivatives took a little longer to progress but essentially gained 
momentum during the 1980s. Chorafas explains:  
 
 ’…wider derivatives took some time to gain momentum and,  
 because of  its relatively small size when in the early to mid-1980s 
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 banks asked regulators where to write such deals, the answer was 
 ’off-balance sheet‘(OBS). This decision introduced a great amount 
 of opacity into deals involving novel financial instruments, and the 
 regulators came to regret it‘717 
 
It would not be wrong to assume that there would be an effective way of 
regulating OBS now that Basel III is in force and over two decades have 
passed. Yet it is still proving a problem after the financial crisis718 and it 
is an area so vast and complex that it cannot be fixed quickly. Ciro and 
Longo are of the opinion that OBS still continue to produce problems for 
regulators.719 This is to do with the characterisation of OBS, disclosure 
and perhaps most importantly the overall regulation.  
 
One of the main problems with OBS is that it does not appear on a bank’s 
balance sheet but is still categorised as assets and liabilities. Even if they 
are it can be hard for even experts to notice.720 The repercussion of such 
is that when assessing the financial health of a bank (by an investor, or 
a purchaser who is not fully aware of their risk burden)721 it is difficult to 
identify and track all assets and liabilities, specifically risks, and this is 
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because OBS only appears (generally) in the accompanying notes.722 For 
example, OBS can become hidden liabilities such as CDOs (see above 
regarding internal risk restructuring and CDS). In this instance, a CDO 
may contain debt obligations which can become toxic and can be 
completely illiquid. The effect this can have will be detrimental, especially 
for investors whose exposure would be heightened. An example of this 
can be viewed from the subprime lending that contributed to the financial 
crisis, risky and toxic products were bundled together and sold on so that 
a bank could either remove the asset off their balance sheet entirely, or 
move it to their OBS.723 Seitz et al. state that some banks made their 
bottom lines more attractive by moving their liabilities and as a result 
blur, or disguise the information that investors and regulators would 
see.724 Essentially, banks succeeded as leading to the financial crisis OBS 
was cleverly disguised and the true financial health of a bank, in some 
instances, was illustrated as strong and healthy.   
 
Another problem with OBS is bank leverage. Historically leverage comes 
into play through deposited funds or other balance sheet items such as 
bonds. Additionally, leverage can also be linked to OBS through 
securitisation and over the counter derivative transactions. 725  What 
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happened prior to the financial crisis included banks building up high 
amounts of leverage (both on and off balance sheet) and Basel I and II 
were partly to blame due to the regulatory restrictions at the time, the 
evidence of such not only comes from regulation but how Basel III has 
introduced leverage ratio into the iteration to stop the build up of 
leverage.726 
 
Fundamentally, what happened was that at the beginning of the financial 
crisis banks started to deleverage their positions, i.e. sell their on and off 
balance sheet assets which in turn would reduce their debt and enable a 
safe return to better capital levels. Unfortunately, the safe haven of better 
capital levels was not reached by many as the problem included the 
following: build up of OBS before financial crisis, a sell off of mainly OBS 
as financial crisis started, several banks deleveraging at the same time, 
banks then stop selling which froze the market. Whilst deleveraging can 
work for one bank and return that bank to safer capital levels, several 
banks trying to deleverage at the same time can have seismic 
repercussions.727 The serious effects that OBS can have on the Basel 
regulations, which was evident during Basel II and still apparent now with 
Basel III, can be summed up as the following:  
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 ’…before the onset of the crisis, banks accumulated leverage both 
 on and, especially, off their balance sheets…banks were able to  
 expand leverage in ways that were previously impossible - by  
 largely relying on new financial products, they managed to extend 
 the short-term funding  of their medium- and long-term assets‘728 
 
The devastating effects of OBS continued after the financial crisis, even 
with the onset of Basel III. Banks began to sell their bad assets that 
formed part of their OBS and this destabilised economies further. OBS 
has been epidemic for the banking community that began with Basel I 
and II where evidence suggests that the regulations encouraged banks 
to hide assets and risk through regulatory arbitrage, Capie and Wood 
note that banks did this to ensure the right amount of economic capital 
was correct and exceeded the regulatory capital required.729 This is one 
of the main factors that led to the financial crisis and has continued with 
Basel III, although it should be noted that Basel III is in the process of 
improving this with regulation such as uniform credit conversion 
factors730 at 100 percent. Simply put, credit conversion factors, or CCF, 
converts OBS to credit exposure, although it should be noted that it does 
not include derivatives. The problem with this improvement is that it 
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affects other areas of finance such as trade finance instruments (including 
letters of credit) which receive the same treatment as other OBS items.731 
In addition, other improvements such as the new liquidity requirements 
i.e. LCR and NSFR, do not help OBS much either.732 Petitjean is of the 
opinion that OBS, including on balance sheet assets, should be minimised 
at the earliest opportunity.733  
 
The underlying problem with OBS and one which the Basel regulations 
cannot eradicate, is derivatives. This commodity forms part of OBS and 
cannot be taken out or excluded. Equally, with Basel III looking to enforce 
stricter rules in relation to OBS and adding them to on balance sheet 
activities, it begs the question as to how effective this will be. After all, 
the rules in place leading to the financial crisis were very strict which led 
banks to delve into the opaque area of OBS. If the Basel regulations 
become more stringent734 then the author believes it will only make 
matters worse. The future is uncertain, what can be said is that it will 
take several years for banks to make the relevant changes needed and 
to have sufficient funds to safeguard OBS. Large economies are only just 
making the necessary changes (China 2016)735  to this complex and 
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problematic way of operating. This will be an interesting area of 
development over the coming years and fundamentally, ’…companies still 
want to have more assets and fewer liabilities on their balance sheets‘.736 
 
Thirdly, the reverberations from the financial crisis that are still being felt 
by many countries. From a European context, as of 2013 the euro zone 
was out of recession,737 however, even though some of the worst hit 
countries are recession free they are still building and strengthening their 
economy738 and there is still a lot of work to be done. 
 
What the third weakness alludes to and means for Basel III, is that due 
to many countries still recovering from the financial crisis, not only will 
the implementation date be very demanding for those countries, e.g., 
Portugal, Spain and Greece where the GDP is slowly rising (although GDP 
does not always equal growth and other mechanisms should be 
considered),739 it also means that national economies may shrink.740 As 
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Baumgartner explains, ’…the introduction of Basel III is simply too early 
for most of the European countries‘.741  
 
Combined with the problem of the implementation date and that some 
countries have already missed key phasing-in parts, 742  for some 
countries within Europe the full recovery period is not estimated to 
happen until 2020743 and if this is the case then it arrives at a pivotal 
point for Basel III with the date of full implementation scheduled for 
2019. The problem that arises is that how can a country that has only 
just become stable, profitable and fully recovered, be also compliant with 
Basel III. It is plausible that at some point the implementation date may 
be delayed further and countries may delay the process of incorporating 
Basel III into domestic law.744 Only time will tell to see how Basel III 
develops and whether a delay in implementation will help countries such 
as those mentioned. This is the consequence of Basel III being created in 
a reactive rather than proactive process i.e. publication of Basel III 
released shortly after the financial crisis that has since lasted for several 
years for some countries. Typically, a recession (on average) lasts for ten 
months, but the most current recession has lasted far longer745 and this 
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could have a huge impact on countries around the world and the future 
success of Basel III.  
 
In conclusion, the weaknesses considered have been the ease of 
restructuring internal risk which enable banks to effectively reduce their 
overall capital requirement; linking to this problem is OBS which allows 
false readings of financial health; and finally the reverberations that are 
still being felt by many countries within a European context and the 




It can be argued that Basel III is more reactive than proactive due to the 
events of the financial crisis, although Basel III had been planned several 
years before. Whilst not revolutionary in the form of an entirely new 
iteration like Basel I and II, Basel III continued with the work beforehand 
and developed it further by improving, eradicating and creating many 
areas. Those focused on were: 
 
• Total capital ratio 
• Tier 1 capital 
• Tier 2 capital 
• Tier 3 capital 





• Countercyclical capital buffer 
• Leverage ratio 
 
The first four points can be merged into total capital ratio now required 
by a bank and it was stipulated earlier in this chapter that many 
significant changes took place regarding this area of Basel III. 
Specifically, a tighter definition of capital, changes to percentages against 
RWA, the eradication of the upper limit leaving only the lower limit in Tier 
2 capital, and the removal of Tier 3 capital entirely. 
 
Moving forward, the Basel Committee created two new capital buffers 
both of which would fall under Tier 1 capital, thus increasing the capital 
required against RWA. A leverage ratio was also created but an unrelated 
area to the aforementioned points. 
 
What this actually meant for the Basel regulations was that Basel III 
would be more focused on capital and applicable facets746 and this can be 
appreciated through the revised tiers, including key changes to 
percentages and the removal of Tier 3 capital, the creation of two new 
capital buffers which totalled a potential 5 percent to RWA increase, and 
a leverage ratio of 3 percent. To surmise, one can conclude that the Basel 
Committee considered what Basel II had done, both good and bad, then 
revised, created and eradicated certain points to make the Basel 
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regulations more robust and aligned to current economic conditions. 
There are several key strengths that have come from the improvements 
made. Those focused on were: 
 
• Simplified structure 
• Quality of capital 
• Quantity of capital 
 
A more simplified structure meant that capital became more aligned and 
produced a more robust set of guidelines. The three Tiers were re-
evaluated, percentages increased, Tier 2 capital refined and Tier 3 capital 
removed entirely. The great strength that came from these changes was 
that Basel III became more harmonised and as such a better document 
to comply with. 
 
The quality of capital also improved to include a tighter definition of 
capital and the eligibility criteria was made to be more structured and 
detailed. Main areas of improvement included CET1, additional Tier 1 
capital and Tier 2 capital. 
 
The quantity of capital was also structured differently and a bank should 
now put to one side a range from 10.5 percent to a potential 13 percent 
against RWA, this includes the arrival of two mechanisms; conservation 
and countercyclical capital buffers. Effectively this means that a bank 





As with Basel I and II, Basel III would be no exception to weakness and 
some of the main issues included: 
 
• Restructuring of internal risk 
• Off balance sheet assets and activities 
• Reverberations and countries still recovering from the financial crisis 
 
The first weakness surrounding internal risk re-structuring is that banks 
are still able to do it. The example of CDS was given which explained how 
a bank can effectively and legitimately decrease its capital requirement 
by moving round its assets. In a way, this cheats the Basel regulations 
by exploiting this loophole. 
 
The second weakness linked to the first and the issue of OBS of a bank 
was explored. It was illustrated how problematic this area of banking can 
be and, crucially, affect the Basel regulations and how an entity can 
disguise assets, debts or financing activity. 
 
The third weakness is that there are many countries still feeling the 
effects of the financial crisis. The example of Europe was given and it was 
explained that although Europe is out of recession, many countries are 
still gathering pace at a slow rate when it comes to increasing stability 
and GDP growth. What this means is that come 2019 many countries will 
have only just recovered. In the light of this it will be difficult for a country 





Basel III. It may be the case that Basel III is delayed further or countries 
delay implementing. 
 
Basel III has rectified and addressed many of the concerns and criticisms 
in Basel II.747 It is appropriate to suggest that Basel III is on the correct 
path and will enable a more stable financial system.748 However, there is 
still much work to do,749 some of that work will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
 
In conclusion, Basel III is a vast improvement and whilst there are issues, 
the adoption of Basel III is not a matter of when as it will be implemented 
with varying domestic adjustment,750 but the author would state further 
that it is more a matter of implementation (full) itself across the board so 
that a level playing field can be achieved. The next chapter will arrive at 
a pivotal point. Three key weaknesses of Basel III will be examined to 
support the research title. These three risks have been purposely omitted 
in the weakness section of Chapter 3, and only briefly highlighted in 
Chapter 2 (CRAs and VaR) in part. They are capital ratios, CRAs and VaR. 
These will now be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 4 - BASEL III RISKS AND SHORTCOMINGS 
 
In Chapter 3 the research considered Basel III in the context of what the 
third iteration endeavoured to achieve and the significant changes that 
resulted from its creation. Rather than focusing on the structure of Basel 
III, it was explained how Basel III continued with the work undertaken 
during Basel II and propelled it forward by making important changes 
such as adding new measures. For instance, the countercyclical capital 
buffer and removing measures no longer needed such as Tier 3 capital. 
 
Some major enhancements included a simplified structure, better quality 
of capital and better quantity of capital. However, as with previous 
iterations Basel III did not begin its tenure fault free and this included 
problems such as restructuring of internal risk and OBS in the form of 
disguising risky assets. What Chapter 3 illustrated was that Basel III 
became a much more refined and improved set of regulations that were 
modified and enhanced, and as a result it became much more superior to 
Basel II and by de-facto Basel I. 
 
The research now arrives at a pivotal point. A brief history shortly before 
the Basel regulations began was portrayed, followed by the enactment of 
Basel I, the major restructuring that took place which led to the creation 
of Basel II, and the financial crisis which encouraged and arguably 





of these milestones in the hope of establishing more competent banking 
regulation and greater financial stability. 
 
By considering Basel I and II in a timeline fashion, it enabled the research 
to arrive at Basel III and the current economic time so that the research 
title could be tackled head on. To reiterate, the primary purpose of the 
research is to examine the risks and shortcomings of Basel III with 
specific regard to capital ratios, CRAs and VaR. Some of the Basel III 
weaknesses were discussed in Chapter 3 but the three aforementioned 
were omitted as the author of the research believes these to be most 
detrimental for the current iteration. On this basis, the objective of 
Chapter 4 is to examine capital ratios, CRAs and VaR in order to support 
the notion that Basel III still requires alterations and improvements. 
 
Over the coming chapter the emphasis will be on the following three 
weaknesses that are briefly summarised now. 
 
Capital Ratios - Basel III has seen the most significant changes to date 
in terms of percentage increases from Basel II. This chapter will focus on 
the increases made, which for some banks could be both time consuming 
and precarious in that it may take a long time to achieve the minimum 
amount now required. Additionally, and more importantly, it may be too 
costly for banks to implement Basel III. The fact that the Basel Committee 





will also be explored as this poses the problem of focusing too much on 
capital ratios whilst neglecting other areas. 
 
CRAs - Credit ratings agencies have long been used to determine the 
financial stability and strength of banks around the world. It will be 
argued that there still remains a heavy reliance on those companies that 
perform such tasks, and the ability to do so, and the bearing they have 
on the banking world. Problems that will be explored include high 
concentration i.e. there are only three big players in the market, over 
reliance on CRAs within the Basel regulations, the poor rating process for 
debt sovereignty, and conflicts of interest between CRAs and clients. 
 
VaR - The third weakness is value-at-risk, a risk calculating tool that has 
gathered momentum since its late arrival in Basel I. The argument here 
is that VaR does not capture credit risk or even basic risk in some 
instances. It is a complex model that inevitably exudes deficiency and 
this chapter will capture those risks. Consideration will be given to the 
inability of VaR to calculate in volatile markets, difficulties with complex 
products, over reliance of VaR by the Basel Committee, VaR being applied 
incorrectly which can lead to negative results, and the three conventional 
approaches to calculating VaR. 
 
Before the three weaknesses are explored it is worth noting the following 
statement by Gottschalk about the negative implications that come from 





or the macro-economy of a country, but also the structure of the banking 
system and its credit patterns…‘. 751  This statement highlights the 
strictness and rigidness of the Basel regulations. With that in mind, 




The capital ratio is a key component of the Basel regulations and has 
been significantly developed since Basel I. Capital ratio is the key 
measure in determining the strength of a bank, which is calculated as the 
ratio of capital to bank assets.752 The Basel Committee created target 
ratios that a bank should put to one side in order to protect against 
financial instability, simply put it is how much a bank should allocate for 
risky assets. It can be referred to as Basel ratios, BIS ratios, or capital 
ratio as it has been throughout the research. 
 
It was highlighted and discussed to great lengths the changes made in 
Basel III in respect of capital ratios and the increases made in percentage 
levels from Basel II. It was noted that the capital ratio percentage level 
did not change much between Basel I and II, but significant alteration 
was conducted for Basel III. 
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The Basel Committee asserted that the changes for banks and higher 
capital ratios would not mean higher costs, not in the long term at 
least. 753  This does, however, highlight that in the short term the 
strenuous task for raising new funds to increase capital levels may be too 
much for some banks and as Jenkins and Shafer note, some banks will 
find themselves scrambling to obtain funds whilst Basel III nears the 
deadline of full implementation.754 
 
It appears with Basel III that the Basel Committee have taken the 
approach of increasing capital ratios, applied Tier 1 and 2 capital 
modifications, and added new capital ratios i.e. conservation and 
countercyclical capital buffers. The modifications made and the creation 
of two buffers have increased capital ratios from 8 percent to a potential 
13 percent of capital to risk based assets. The problem here is that this 
can be a huge increase in funds for some banks in order to remain 
compliant.  
 
In order to highlight the weaknesses of capital ratios, two aspects will be 
considered in this section. Firstly, the sharp increase in percentage levels 
which may be too much for some banks to comply with and cost intensive 
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even within the timescale set of 2019. For instance, it has already been 
strenuous for many banks trying to meet the higher demands put 
forward755 and this presents a huge problem for many banks. Secondly, 
it can be argued that the Basel Committee believe that by increasing 
capital levels then this measure will provide enough safety for when the 
next financial crisis occurs. This is somewhat incorrect as it is not just 
about the amount of capital that will support a bank in hard times, other 
facets exist such as the quality of capital or, and more importantly, the 
amount of liquidity within a bank. Nonetheless, by focusing heavily on 
capital ratios it does beg the question of whether too much effort and 
hope has gone into one area of banking regulation, similar to a silver 
bullet stopping a future financial crisis. Whilst this may be the case, it 
should be acknowledged that others have argued the increase is not 
enough.756 It can be viewed from Basel II and now Basel III, that banking 
regulation is no simple task and the regulations are both lengthy and 
complex. To explain the risk of capital ratios, the two aforementioned 
points will now be discussed.  
 
Capital Ratios - Too costly and unachievable by 2019 
 
The huge impact for a bank under the new capital regime imposed by 
Basel III is not only the timeline in which this should be achieved but also 
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the cost i.e. the increase in monies that will be needed in order to comply 
with the new percentage levels. It was estimated that €200 billion was 
needed by European banks in order to satisfy the first implementation 
stage in 2013, and €340 billion for one hundred and forty five of the 
largest banks worldwide.757 Bearing in mind that there are more phased-
in implementation stages for banks to comply with leading to 2019, it is 
clear from these figures that the biggest risk of Basel III and capital ratios 
is the huge capital increase that will be required to comply with the 
current regulations, including the long term effects on the economy.758 
As will be explained in this section on capital ratios, there are many 
dimensions that arise from the increase in percentage levels that 
heighten risk and portray shortcomings.  
 
Furthermore, KPMG note that the higher costs for banks will not only 
mean raising more funds,759 but also the side effects such as lower 
profitability and decreased business operations.760 To add further fuel to 
the fire, Gual states, ’…even in the long term or in a steady state 
situation, an increase in capital requirements has an appreciable effect in 
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terms of increasing the cost of financing a banking institution‘.761 It is 
evident that these increases will have side effects, the problem here is 
that they could be more harmful than good. Perhaps more importantly 
and poignant to the risk raised by capital ratios is the immediate and 
short term cost of such changes. Gual concurs and states:  
 
 ’…it is in the short term…when obtaining new equity on the capital 
 markets can prove particularly costly…in addition to capital  
 shortages, there could be problems of asymmetrical information  
 (adverse selection) that make obtaining funds more difficult or  
 expensive‘762  
 
There are several facets of risk that come from higher capital ratios. For 
instance, most banks may now have to reduce lending to the wider public 
and industry and there may be increased costs.763 This is due to the fact 
that before Basel III the capital requirements of a bank were much lower 
than that which is now required. For example, in a retail banking context 
this means that in the past banks would have had more funds to lend to 
the wider public, under Basel III the extra money that a bank would have 
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had previously is now being allocated to higher capital requirements.764 
Baumgartner argues that it will be worse for corporate banking where 
lending to small and medium sized businesses could be severely affected 
by banks who are not able to lend to fund new projects.765 The basis for 
this is that there are high risks associated with lending to small and 
medium businesses due to the high risk of those businesses defaulting. 
What this actually means is that if a bank is willing to lend to such a 
business then more capital is required in order to offset the risks posed 
by default. The new regulations under Basel III in terms of capital ratio 
in this scenario is that a bank is now financially inferior compared to Basel 
II. It is clear how Basel III can stifle and restrict lending, as Baumgartner 
explains, ’…a bank…has to hold more capital reserve and will face higher 
capital costs‘.766 
 
Higher capital ratios does not only equate to lending problems, it can also 
mean lower returns i.e. return on equity767 (ROE) and may force some 
banks to reduce their business levels (link to reduce lending) due to 
decreased levels of equity achievable.768 This could lead to some banks 
withdrawing from their operations in some of the countries that are 
                                               
764 O Baumgartner, Basel 3 Capital Requirements - Overview and Critical Evaluation (Grin 
Verlag 2013) 19. 
765 Ibid 20. 
766 Ibid. 
767 The net income returned which is a percentage of shareholder’s equity. In essence, it 
measures profitability.  
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operated in, due to profitability.769 As Baumgartner states, ’Due to the 
increasing capital requirements under Basel III, many banks will face a 
decreasing Return on Equity (ROE)‘.770 Additionally, Bohme et al. stated 
that, ’…75 percent of the ROE impact across all capital-market 
businesses…is driven by the new capital requirements for market and 
counterparty risk…‘.771 The negative impact of this is that if banks are 
lending less then economies and markets around the world will be 
negatively affected and growth will be slow or could stagnate. The Basel 
Committee stated that there will be a low downturn in GDP772 growth,773 
indicating that by implementing Basel III will not be too costly for banks. 
Yet the evidence discussed so far suggests otherwise. On a similar note, 
it should be appreciated that banks should not rush the implementation 
stage(s) as this could greatly affect GDP to higher levels.774 Evidently, 
worldwide GDP growth will be down775 and this will slow the recovery rate 
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Industry’ http://www.capco.com/uploads/articlefiles/381/file_0_1420721376.pdf page 13 
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for banks and countries still clambering for survival due to recent 
disastrous financial times. 
 
Timescales also pose a huge problem for capital ratios and with the 2019 
deadline now here, it is fair to say that for many banks this will be too 
soon. There are many factors due to this, but the main risks in the authors 
opinion are those that have been discussed.  
 
The Basel Committee has set a very demanding timescale that needs to 
be implemented 776  and with many areas to comply with it seems 
appropriate to argue that there will be many stragglers who will not be 
able to implement by 2019. The strain that Basel III is having on banks 
and countries around the world is clear to be seen. India, for example, is 
one of those countries where the Reserve Bank of India extended the 
implementation date to be more in line with the international agreed 2019 
period as opposed to an earlier 2018 implementation date that was 
originally set.777 Whilst the Reserve Bank of India will still be in line with 
the 2019 target date, albeit March 2019, there was an initial target of 
achieving the Basel III requirements earlier in March 2018. This highlights 
to a certain degree that targets may need to be extended. Further to this, 
                                               
776 CAPITA, ‘What will be the Challenges of Implementing Basel III?’ 
http://www.capitatransformation.co.uk/markets/documents/what%20will%20be%20the%2
0challenges%20of%20implementing%20basel%20iii%20nov12.pdf accessed 9 March 
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and to illustrate the arduous task of implementing by 2019, a recent 
study emphasised that only a small number of countries that are subject 
to the new rules actually met the 1 January 2013 first implementation 
stage,778 signalling the difficulty that banks are facing to put Basel III in 
force. It has been argued that one of the reasons for this delay is that 
Basel III was created via notice and comment procedure,779 meaning that 
opinions were sought, time was given for those opinions, then action 
would be taken based from those opinions. Consequently, the process is 
slow and has experienced delays. 
 
The difficulty is that the recommended date will still be too soon, 
especially when the first phase (1 January 2013) was delayed by more 
than one leading economy.780 Keeping in mind that 2019 is already an 
extended implementation date (Basel III was originally set for 2015 full 
implementation)781 then it would be unlikely that the Basel Committee 
will extend further. At present it would still appear that a much later 
implementation date is required. 
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The biggest problem for banks is not only the risks stated throughout this 
subsection, but also the risk of the unknown in that there are still a lot of 
measures to be put in place and regulation to implement.782 Only time 
will tell to see how realistic and achievable the 2019 date will be.  
 
What can be deduced from the material above is that the risk posed by 
capital ratios are the costs of adhering to and complying with Basel III, 
and the demanding nature of capital ratios and that many banks will 
struggle to implement the regulations set.783 This could produce several 
negative implications for banks such as reduced lending, reduced 
business, withdrawing from business operations in countries that a bank 
may operate in, and decreased levels of profitability and equity 
achievable which could mean less trading in the economy and would 
mean higher costs for retail banking and business banking customers.  
 
In light of what has been discussed, attention should be given to the 
second problem of capital ratios and in the author’s opinion how the Basel 
Committee appear to have concentrated heavily on higher capital ratios 
as the saviour of Basel III, and in effect neglected other aspects of 
banking regulation. It has been a consistent trend since Basel I whereby 
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783 Essentially, while the capital levels have increased which run the risk of producing 
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consequence of adhering to the higher capital levels and implementation period that is 





capital has been the sole focus of the Basel Committee, and whilst capital 
is a paramount part of the Basel regulations it should not be the main 
factor in making banking regulation and economies around the world 
robust. The problem that is now faced, unlike Basel I and II, is that Basel 
III comes at a time when financial stability is needed more than ever 
before. More scrutiny will now be placed on capital ratios than in the past 
due to the magnitude of what pre-dated Basel III. 
 
Capital Ratios - Still the sole focus of the Basel regulations 
 
It can be argued that the focal point of Basel III is capital ratios and this 
can be viewed from a recent paper on Basel III reforms.784 This is evident 
through the changes made to Tier 1 and 2 capital, the removal of Tier 3 
capital, the introduction of two new capital buffers, and the overall 
increases in percentage level rising from a minimum 8 percent to a 
potential 13 percent. The problem is that the Basel Committee have 
essentially put all their resources into one area and spent the majority of 
time on capital ratios in the hope and expectation that by increasing 
capital levels in banks will stop future financial crises. It is easy to 
comprehend as capital was severely hit during the financial crisis and as 
Bailey rightly points out, the capital adequacy regime dates back to Basel 
I.785 Therefore, it is something that has remained as a key element from 
                                               
784 Bank for International Settlements, ‘High-Level Summary of Basel III Reforms’ 
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the creation of Basel I where capital was a huge concern. It would appear 
there is an over reliance on capital ratios and the main risk that can be 
extrapolated from this is that what if this new approach is breached? 
What if a bank that has more capital than it had during the financial crisis 
is still penetrable by another financial crisis? The answer has already been 
viewed in the recent financial crisis. With less time spent on other areas 
of banking regulation, it is highly unlikely that the remainder of the Basel 
regulations would enable a bank to defend in times of economic turmoil. 
For example, it was stated, ’Inadequate capital is only one of the 
problems that can beset a financial institution during a crisis. Some 
institutions that seemed well positioned when the recent crisis struck 
suffered not from a lack of capital but from a lack of ready cash - - what 
bankers refer to as ’liquidity‘‘.786 This is true and it has been recognised 
that banks need more liquidity,787 unfortunately it is hard to see how the 
Basel Committee have rectified this issue as Basel III still focuses on 
capital ratios of which liquidity plays a small part and has until only 
recently become a more dominant player. This can be interpreted from 
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the 2013 paper on the importance of liquidity and the monitoring tools to 
aid such.788 
 
Furthermore, and to cement the notion that capital ratios will not be the 
saving grace of Basel III, Acharya also concurs that the Basel regulations 
(not just Basel III) has focused too much in respect of capital 
requirements and this has ultimately led to other issues being 
neglected. 789  The classic example of Bear Stearns 790  bank among 
others791 is a prime case in that Bear Stearns was strongly capitalised 
and deemed to be so by the Federal Reserve,792 but still failed due to the 
financial crisis; the universal business model proved too much.  
 
In the example of Bear Stearns, it was a case of having a high amount of 
mortgage related assets leading to the financial crisis in which the 
housing market had risen for many years beforehand.793 The problem 
was that while Bear Stearns was heavily capitalised, it could not meet the 
                                               
788 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel III: The Liquidity Coverage Ratio and 
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obligations in place.794 The problem here, although this was not just 
limited to Bear Stearns, is that there was the assumption, at least in the 
United States,795 that investment banks could always borrow against 
their securities that were owned.  
 
Many years before the 2008 financial crisis, Bear Stearns adopted the 
approach of securitisation and repackaging techniques and this was 
incorporated before many others.796 Hence, Bear Stearns was one of the 
first to securitise risky mortgages. This developed into Bear Stearns 
becoming embroiled in the CDO market around the beginning of 2000. 
 
A major problem for Bear Stearns that would eventually come to pass, 
was that of all the stages involved in a CDO (structuring, managing and 
investing), Bear Stearns was a part of it all. The problem here is that 
when the 2008 financial crisis took hold, this would have huge 
implications due to the asset management part797 of the business798 that 
created a tightening on liquidity. 
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When a collapse of funds began to occur it affected the reputation of Bear 
Stearns. In the beginning, Bear Stearns tried to sell the risky securities 
in place, although this only made the matter worse due to it affecting 
price valuation in combination with illiquid assets. Confidence began to 
deteriorate, and Bear Stearns tried to allay any fears by giving a 
collateralised loan of over $3 billion but this did not suffice.799 
 
The eventual demise of Bear Stearns came from a run on the bank,800 
those investors feared the worst and pulled assets which is surprising in 
the sense that in early 2008 stock was around $93 yet by March and the 
takeover agreement of J.P. Morgan was agreed, stock was at a mere 
$2.801  
 
The case of Bear Stearns was that although it was not the largest bank, 
it was the most leveraged.802 It is a prime example that if the business 
model is not diverse it can lead to devastating effects. The model in place 
in respect of subprime CDOs showed that performance and survival in 
terms of effectiveness was paramount.803  
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In the end, by concentrating on one area of banking regulation shows 
that it is detrimental and will lead to many risks even if the capital ratios 
of Basel III are met. It should be recognised that Basel III has introduced 
stricter liquidity requirements to alleviate this dependency in recent times 
and since the quoted paper of 2013 earlier, although, there is still a heavy 
reliance on capital ratios and monies that should be put aside as a 
precaution. Therefore, if attention is pinpointed to one area then this 
could result in missing other issues that need to be considered. 
 
The point being made due to the over reliance of capital ratios is not 
necessarily the amount now required by a bank as this was discussed in 
the previous subsection, the point being made is that there is a common 
belief that by increasing capital requirements, i.e. capital ratios, a bank 
will be more funded and better placed to withstand a financial crisis. The 
author of the research does not dispute that banks will be better funded 
if they are able to reach the targets set by 2019, far from it, the author 
is stating that there is an over reliance on higher capital ratios and the 
true effectiveness of what can be achieved. This sole focus is spreading 
across the world and can be seen by the current EU requirements804 
which go even further by requiring banks to hold even more capital than 
that stated in Basel III. Thus indicating the narrow standpoint of higher 
capital requirements equaling stronger banks.  
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From what has been discussed, the author would argue that there is too 
much focus spent on capital ratios by the Basel Committee and this needs 
to be addressed otherwise this could prove fatal when the next financial 
crisis occurs. The issue here is that by accounting for and protecting one 
area of banking, can result in another area proving to be problematic. 
Consider the case of Dexia whereby capital levels were good but costly, 
and it shows as Groen articulates, that supervisors and regulators put too 
much emphasis on capital ratios.805 In conclusion Groen states, ’…the 
case of Dexia clearly shows that a high core Tier-1 ratio does not 
automatically imply that the bank is safer‘.806 In the end the perceived 
low risk business model used by Dexia in regard to public sector banking, 
proved fatal.807 
 
Unfortunately, it does not appear that the issue of capital ratios as the 
pinnacle of the Basel regulations and defender of financial crises will 
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Capital Ratios - Conclusion 
 
From the material discussed it seems that since Basel I there has been a 
key focus on capital requirements and capital ratios, after all capital 
adequacy is often described as the central concept in banking 
regulation.808 It is understandable why capital ratios would be a key area 
for the Basel Committee as there is the strong argument that the more a 
bank has in capital reserve the better equipped a bank will be in a 
financial crisis. On this basis it is easy to comprehend why the Basel 
Committee have focused on capital ratios and in recent times have made 
significant changes and improvements. However, and this leads to the 
heart of why capital ratios pose such a huge risk, it is all well that a bank 
has vast amounts of capital to protect and absorb against a financial crisis 
but it has been evidenced in the last decade that even if a bank is heavily 
capitalised it does not mean a bank will be safe.809 This has been most 
evident in cases such as Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill 
Lynch.810 It is clear, being heavily capitalised cannot protect against a 
seismic shift in the market. 
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It seems appropriate to ponder why the Basel Committee still allocate so 
much time and effort to capital ratios especially with the events that 
unfolded during the financial crisis which illustrated that regardless of 
high capital levels, banks still falter. There appears to be a fundamental 
belief that capital adequacy is the central concept of banking regulation 
and the holy grail of financial stability. As Posner states, ’One of the 
central concepts in banking regulation is capital adequacy‘.811 It should 
be remembered that capital adequacy is what a bank should have in 
reserve according to the capital requirements set i.e. the ratio of a bank’s 
capital to assets; the author would suggest that this ideology needs 
reassessing and it is thus proposed that attention needs to be focused on 
liquidity levels. For instance, there are signs that Basel III is introducing 
better standards for bank liquidity levels.812 So rather than focusing on 
minimum capital requirements more emphasis should be on liquidity so 
that assets can be easily turned into cash in case a bank requires so. 
What has been most evident over the past few years and since the 
financial crisis, is that banks did not have enough liquid cash to continue 
trading and the levels of capital against a bank’s RWA was not enough to 
shield when the financial crisis fully developed. In history, banks have 
required government assistance or failed because they have had 
insufficient capital, liquidity or both. The author of the research would 
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suggest that capital requirements now set by the Basel Committee are 
strong, liquidity on the other hand needs improvement i.e. higher 
minimum requirements.  
 
In the next chapter, Chapter 5, recommendations will be put forward to 
combat some of the problems detailed in this section and a key focus will 
be on liquidity levels in order to improve capital ratios. 
 
CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 
CRAs813 have been around for many years and determine whether a 
company, bank (which will be primarily focused on in this context) or 
country, is able to meet their obligations in respect of debts and fixed 
income securities. A definition can be ascertained by the International 
Organisation of Securities Commissions814 (IOSCO) in which they state, 
’…an opinion regarding the creditworthiness of an entity…expressed using 
an established and defined ranking system…‘.815 In short, ’Credit rating 
agencies provide investors with objective analyses and independent 
                                               
813 The functions and services provided by CRAs can be traced to the early 19th century 
and were provided by business and financial press, credit reporting agencies (emphasis 
on reporting) and investment bankers. See H Langohr and P Langohr, The Rating 
Agencies and Their Credit Ratings: What They Are, How They Work, and Why They are 
Relevant (John Wiley and Sons Ltd 2009) 375-376 for a succinct description of the 
aforesaid three.  
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assessment of companies and countries that issue such securities‘.816 
Essentially what this means is that CRAs evaluate and determine the 
creditworthiness of those entities.817  
 
CRAs are used by three key entities: corporate security issuers, investors 
and banks.818 In the context of the research, banks are the predominant 
entity considered. The Basel Committee has extensively used CRAs since 
Basel II which began in consultation during the latter years of Basel I. It 
can be viewed that the rating scales which Basel II possessed closely 
reflected that of CRAs ratings. 819  In fact, CRAs precede the Basel 
Committee and regulations. It is the aforementioned that has been 
intertwined and is one of the ways that the Basel Committee feel the 
regulations will be better strengthened. The main three: Fitch, Moody’s, 
and Standard and Poor’s,820 were established from the early 1900s821 and 
to this day are still the main rating agencies. 
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Ratings range from AAA being the highest to C or D being the lowest822 
depending on the rating agency. 823  The highest rating indicates the 
strength and ability to repay a debt, compared with the lowest rating and 
the likelihood of default. Very few are rated AAA, for example, Microsoft 
in terms of a company and the United Kingdom in terms of a country 
have held this status in recent times.824 There are many that have poor 
ratings which means that higher interest rates will be given due to an 
increased probability of default. Therefore, it is clear to see how this 
relates to the Basel regulations and also how it has developed over time. 
Additionally, it reflects how imbedded CRAs have become in the Basel 
regulations. 
 
The key beginning of CRAs and the inclusion in the Basel regulations came 
toward the end of the 1990s and later years of Basel I.825 In 1999 the 
Basel Committee proposed that credit ratings should take a more 
prominent role and would be promoted and utilised through Basel I in 
respect of overall capital in banking institutions.826 It is easy to see why 
the Basel Committee wanted to incorporate CRAs due to the common 
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perception (prior to Enron 2001) that CRAs were sound.827 This was 
largely due to an immaculate record and success of rating effectively; 
Moody’s being the only agency in the past twenty years to show an 
anomaly.828 It is evident that in light of this positive record CRAs were 
deemed trustworthy, stable and the value that came from rating 
effectively was positively accepted. 
 
In theory the whole idea behind CRAs and what they try to accomplish 
i.e. evaluating creditworthiness, is undoubtedly positive for the banking 
and finance environment. In the context of the research, if a bank’s credit 
rating is illustrated then better judgment can be made by those involved 
such as whether to invest or not, whether to loan money or not and so 
on. It also means that in line with the Basel regulations, those banks that 
have higher ratings will not have to put as much money aside against 
risks compared with those banks with lower ratings that inevitably would. 
Indeed, it is easy to appreciate why the Basel Committee would want to 
incorporate CRAs. Additionally, the work undertaken on the inclusion of 
CRAs in the Basel regulations was no small task as explained by Estrella 
et al. when CRAs began their prominent position endorsed by the Basel 
Committee.829  
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Unfortunately, an over reliance on CRAs and ratings being formulated 
(some not accurate, see example below) has been detrimental, equally 
CRAs contributed to the loose lending standards at the time which aided 
the housing boom, 830  the financial crisis is an indicator of this. For 
example, Lehman Brothers was still rated A or above by the big three 
leading up to their collapse in 2009, 831  thus signalling an issue 
surrounding the rating of banks. If the three largest CRAs in the world 
can get it wrong and it leads to a distorted picture, then surely the role 
that ratings play in the Basel regulations needs to be re-evaluated. As 
Hurst puts it, ’…there is widespread agreement that credit rating 
agencies(CRAs or CRSs) deserve a significant portion of the blame…‘.832  
 
Whilst it can be argued that the rating of Lehman Brothers was not wrong 
and was in fact based on current figures and it was the speed of change 
that affected the crash of Lehman Brothers i.e. events at that time were 
progressing rapidly and accurate ongoing analysis would have been all 
but impossible,833 it is still difficult to justify that the CRAs did not get it 
wrong.834 For instance, an argument was put forward by Moody’s that the 
rating given was based on government support that was applied to Bear 
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Stearns earlier that year; this should not be a concrete defence. 
Nevertheless, there are several reasons why this may be the case such 
as an over reliance of CRAs and regulation (or lack of) of CRAs. To 
circumvent this problem the European Commission, for example, in late 
2010 invited a consultation on the area of rating agencies and although 
the consultation period was short it highlighted four concerns that needed 
to be tackled in order to reform the role that CRAs performed. Whilst 
developed in a European context, it can be applied outside of Europe. 
These were: 
 
• Reduction of concentration 
• Reduce over reliance 
• Enhance the process by which sovereign debt is rated 
• Combat conflicts of interest835  
 
There are other issues836 but the four highlighted appear to be the most 
damaging. It should be noted at this stage that there were concerns 
surrounding CRAs prior to the financial crisis with criticisms such as CRAs 
being too slow to adjust ratings, lack of independence, and no 
accountability (even though CRAs play a huge role in the banking world). 
Therefore, and to add to the argument put forward that CRAs pose a huge 
                                               
835 R Barfield, A Practitioners Guide to Basel III and Beyond (Thomson Reuters 2011) 
403-404. 
836 Council on Foreign Relations, ‘The Credit Rating Controversy’ 






risk to Basel III, the four aforementioned issues that have plagued the 
Basel regulations from the beginning through to Basel III, will now be 
considered. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies and high concentration 
 
The three main CRAs: Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s, control 
the market. The latter two in recent times own 80 percent of market 
share around the world.837 In fact, if all three are combined then 95 
percent of the market is covered.838 This validates the widely accepted 
notion that the area of credit rating is highly concentrated. 
 
There are many theories 839  why credit rating has become highly 
concentrated, ranging from investors preferring to have a select few in 
order to evaluate fewer results, to other theories such as the nature in 
which agencies have to evaluate many entities in order to cover the 
market widely.840 Accordingly, this makes it difficult for smaller CRAs to 
operate or even be created. In a world where reputation is key, the 
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aforesaid three are able to continue without any notable competition and 
the effect of such is that concentration is a byproduct. This can lead to 
many issues as will be discussed now. 
 
The concentration issue stems from the early 1900s when all three major 
CRAs were established and an investor pays business model was in 
place841 i.e. investors would pay those rating agencies to provide a credit 
rating. In the 1970s this changed to an issuer pays business model842 i.e. 
CRAs will charge issuers for a credit rating. Typically the bond issuer will 
pay the CRAs and then the rating will be publicly made to investors for 
free; this is the norm in modern banking times.843 At present all three 
major CRAs employ the issuer pays business model and this creates 
another problem under the auspice of risk posed by CRAs. Namely, those 
issuing the bonds i.e. banks, will pay huge sums of money to be rated 
(favourably). In addition, the rating agencies themselves will want to 
continue business with those banks and in turn this opens the door to 
those agencies rating higher or maintaining a high rating to conserve 
business with clientele.844 
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In 1975 the United States Securities and Exchange Commission845 (SEC) 
implemented the status Nationally Recognised Statistically Rating 
Organisation846 (NRSRO), a gold standard which all three major CRAs 
received. This cemented the big three as the main players in credit rating 
and in turn this stifled competition and limited those wishing to establish 
as an alternative rating agency. As Chang comments, ’The NRSRO label 
is the SEC’s stamp of approval and signifies that a ratings agency is 
credible and reliable‘.847 One of the problems with this label system is 
that smaller firms cannot gain NRSRO status and this means competition 
is stifled. 
 
Fitch became the third largest rating agency by 2000 and until 2007 when 
NRSRO status became closed, it was only those three CRAs that held this 
status. In 2010 there were eleven known NRSRO CRAs848 and as of 2016 
there were ten.849 However, it is most evident that only three exist due 
to the size and longevity of all three. 
 
The status of being recognised as a NRSRO is undoubtedly obvious. As 
Marston points out, it portrays that if the entity being rated is rated well 
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by a NRSRO, then it makes it easier and quicker for those entities to issue 
bonds etc.,850 it also exudes confidence in that debts will be paid on time. 
 
It can be appreciated how the big three began, progressed, and continue 
to be the main three providers of credit rating around the world. This high 
concentration has festered a huge problem, a problem not only in general 
terms of rating the creditworthiness of those wanting to be rated. The 
bigger problem is the incorporation of rating agencies in the Basel 
regulations and how the Basel Committee has placed much emphasis on 
this mechanism. This has created a massive risk because if CRAs cannot 
be completely reliable then change needs to occur. This could be in the 
form of tighter regulation, less emphasis on CRAs and the role within the 
Basel regulations, or more competition. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies and over reliance 
 
Since the introduction of CRAs and discussions within the Basel 
Committee during the late 1990s to include within the Basel regulations, 
it can be said that there has always been an over reliance placed on 
CRAs851 and the positive impact that ratings can have in order to reinforce 
financial stability. CRAs have become so entrenched in the banking world 
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and it is easy to see why they have become so popular.852 Gavras is right, 
the idea behind rating an entity to highlight good and bad 
creditworthiness is desirable and the sizeable business that the big three 
have carved out is also luring for those that require credit ratings.  
 
The consequences of the huge role that CRAs have played in recent times 
was demonstrated during the financial crisis with Moody’s and Standard 
and Poor’s contributing the most in negative terms.853 There is no need 
to explain what happened during this time as this has already been 
covered, but what should be explained are some of the issues that 
underpin the over reliance of CRAs as this will illustrate the problematic 
roots that form CRAs. 
 
One of those issues is hardwiring. What is meant by this is that CRAs 
have become so involved and heavily incorporated into the banking and 
finance world that it seems to be common nature for CRAs to be included 
in most spheres such as regulatory framework and financial contracts,854 
or, and in the context of the research, implemented through the Basel 
regulations.  
  
                                               
852 Panayotis Gavras, ‘Ratings Game’ 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2012/03/gavras.htm accessed 14 April 2016. 
853 Rachelle Younglai and Sarah N Lynch, ‘Credit Rating Agencies Triggered Financial 
Crisis, U.S. Congressional Report Finds’ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/13/credit-
rating-agencies-triggered-crisis-report_n_848944.html accessed 12 May 2016. 
854 Pragyan Deb and others, ‘Whither the Credit Ratings Industry’ 
https://www.bankofengland.co.uk/-/media/boe/files/financial-stability-paper/2011/whither-






In addition, the impact that SEC had in introducing NRSROs would have 
contributed to CRAs becoming entrenched in the banking world, 
especially for the big three.855 It is obvious that overtime how the big 
three have become eminent and the NRSRO status further aided this 
cause.856 If CRAs are viewed as being so helpful and invaluable then it 
would seem the obvious choice for the Basel Committee to incorporate 
them into the Basel regulations. After all, the Basel Committee are trying 
to enhance financial stability which CRAs should, in an ideal world, 
contribute too. 
 
It is easy to see why CRAs have become so instrumental and inevitably 
this was used through the medium of the Basel regulations to help 
strengthen and promote financial stability. This is partly due to many 
positive aspects that pre-dated the financial crisis, such as CRAs being 
trusted and operating independently. Due to this, the market as a whole 
can become more informed of the creditworthiness of banks and other 
appropriate entities, and CRAs can signal a future crisis or encourage 
those banks that have been downgraded to improve and become more 
financially stable,857 for example.  
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It may be disconcerting to some that one of the main contributors to the 
financial crisis are still going to be used, and it is not surprising that some 
commentators in this area have suggested a complete severance of 
external rating agencies.858 Furthermore, in the context of CRAs being 
instrumental some have stated, ’I thought we had moved away from that 
and I thought no regulator wanted us to effectively do that‘.859 This was 
referring to CRAs playing such a huge role in the United States subprime 
mortgage crises. Meaning that if CRAs was one of the contributing factors 
of the financial crisis, then why is it that CRAs are still being used and in 
the same manner. 
 
Keeping this in mind, the question that is relevant to ponder here is why 
would an instrument such as CRAs be used when they have caused many 
problems around the world and continue to maintain a commanding 
position in the ratings arena? The answer is simple, CRAs would not be 
allowed to partake any longer.860 This being said, it would not be feasible 
to eradicate CRAs in their entirety as they do serve a purpose and provide 
many benefits. The author would suggest, however, and as will be put 
forward in Chapter 5, that a public credit rating agency may alleviate 
some of the issues.  
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On reflection, it is not possible to remove CRAs in their entirety. It may 
be possible to reduce an over reliance placed on CRAs through the Basel 
Committee, which the author believes could help, however the author 
also supports the idea of a public credit rating agency.861 Needless to say 
that the Basel regulations and the banking world should analyse CRAs 
and their role in the market place. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies and process which sovereign debt is rated 
 
The third risk of CRAs is the ability to rate sovereign debt correctly (this 
risk is not new to the banking world). The inability of CRAs to effectively 
rate sovereign debt has been evidenced before, the 1997 Asian financial 
crisis862 being an example. Additionally, Gaillard notes that Moody’s did 
not downgrade any European country between the period of 1999-2008 
(or upgrade between 2009-2013 (middle of)).863 Worryingly, CRAs made 
several upgrades between 1999-2009864 which does raise a question on 
the ability of CRAs to rate effectively and correctly. There was a belief 
from 1999 that there would be a convergence among European members 
                                               
861 There are many reasons why it would not be possible to withdraw CRAs from the 
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due to monetary union865 and this could be the reason (or one of) as to 
why no country within Europe was downgraded, including ignorance of 
political problems, development levels and competition, etc. Another 
viewing angle would be that CRAs wanted to keep a good relationship 
with those countries it rated,866 however this clearly unravelled once the 
financial crisis unfolded. 
 
The notion of CRAs not rating sovereign debt correctly has been strongly 
supported, Bayar notes:  
 
 ’It can be easily seen…that the big three CRAs didn’t assess the  
 developments in the economies of Eurozone correctly and so they 
 didn’t give right sovereign credit ratings on time and later they  
 have made successive unmeasured downgrades in order to  
 compensate the past undone downgrades‘867  
 
The three major CRAs should have had some inclination that something 
was going to happen leading up to the financial crisis as all three have 
been established since the early 1900s and are not new to credit rating 
protocol. In spite of this, a recent paper articulates how the Basel 
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Committee are still very much in favour of and positively view CRAs, and 
that overall the announcements they give consist of rich and varied 
information.868   
 
There are many ideas why CRAs are unsuccessful or questionable869 when 
rating sovereign debt (some of which have been discussed in a European 
context above) and perhaps this reason can be applied to why none of 
the big three detected an imminent threat leading to the financial crisis. 
In a general context this could be one of two things, too slow to act which 
was evident in the case of Greece,870  or that CRAs were being too 
lenient871 which could be due to keeping clients happy or preserving 
business, money and profits. Either way, there is a big risk posed by CRAs 
not being able to effectively rate sovereign debt in a correct and 
constructive manner.872 
 
Recently one of the three major rating agencies accepted a fine totalling 
over $1 billion for fuelling the sub-prime mortgage market in the United 
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States.873 Signalling not only an acceptance that a rating agency got it 
wrong but also that there is a problem in this area and CRAs have 
contributed to the financial crisis.  
 
Keeping this in mind, it is easy to see how the inability to effectively rate 
the creditworthiness of an entity or product can create a huge problem. 
In the context of rating sovereign debt, the European example of Greece 
is a recent case of the impact that CRAs can have if the process of rating 
creditworthiness is conducted wrong.874 Greece was still in the midst of a 
rescue package from the European Central Bank many years after 
requiring aid. In order to rectify this problem it seems that several options 
are available and should be considered. Either increase regulation of CRAs 
which would be out of scope of the Basel Committee being a non 
authoritative entity, or limit the use or eradicate the use of CRAs in the 
Basel regulations. This way CRAs should perform better in the former, or 
less used in the latter. 
 
Credit Rating Agencies and conflicts of interest 
 
The final risk posed by CRAs is conflicts of interest and this largely stems 
from the issuer pays business model i.e. being paid by the issuer to rate 
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those securities rather than being paid by investors; which is arguably a 
friendlier mechanism less prone to abuse. As Reiss rightly points out, 
’…Their business model was based on serious conflicts of interest, 
conflicts that should and did undermine the trust that others had in 
them‘.875 Unfortunately the issuer pays business model is unlikely to 
change, as Foley points out, because the market for CRAs would 
shrink.876  
 
There are several problems that fall under this risk which are CRAs not 
wanting to disgruntle their client (issuer), CRAs acting as consultants for 
the issuer over the structuring and underwriting process, CRAs would 
more than likely want to continue to do business with the issuer in the 
future, and CRAs employees being too close to some of those whom they 
rated.877 These will be discussed now.878 
 
Firstly, CRAs will not want to upset their client by giving them a bad rating 
because there will be a desire to keep the business relationship going.879 
From a revenue perspective it is comprehendible that CRAs will want to 
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continue a business relationship with their issuers in order to constantly 
receive a steady flow of income. The problem here is that at what point 
does the importance of a business relationship that provides revenue for 
CRAs pass the need to overtake the importance of providing a trustworthy 
and correct credit rating for investors to judge entities. It seems that this 
has been neglected in recent economic times and the financial crisis 
shows the truth in that money and profit takes precedence over honest 
and accurate ratings. As Reiss notes, ’…the profit motive drove the 
agencies to recklessly expand the market for their services‘.880 This is the 
consequence of being paid by the issuer. 
 
Secondly, a conflict arises for CRAs if they are involved in both the 
structuring and underwriting process for the issuer. A conflict could 
develop if during the underwriting process the CRAs have to give a lower 
rating to that which was given during the structuring process. This 
overlaps somewhat with the first problem and CRAs not wanting to upset 
their client, however, this should not be of paramount concern when the 
aim for CRAs is to produce a fair and true rating. Therefore, if CRAs are 
influenced by their client relationship then this can impact on the final 
rating. This has been evident on reflection of the financial crisis.881  
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Thirdly, CRAs will want to continue to do business with the issuer and this 
creates the dilemma in that if a low rating is given then the issuer may 
not come back and may go elsewhere for rating requirements. As such, 
CRAs would be incentivised to give higher ratings to keep the issuer 
happy. Similar to risks one and two, the third problem again links to the 
notion that CRAs do not want to upset their client by publishing a low 
rating. Lowry and Reisberg suggest that in order to appease their client 
it seems that CRAs are more than willing to publish higher ratings in order 
to keep their clients happy.882 The repercussion is that rating(s) given 
may be misleading and overly generous.  
 
Fourthly, it is arguable that some of the CRAs employees were too close 
to the entities in which they would rate. Goldman Sachs is a prime 
example whereby SEC investigated and concluded that investors were 
misled. 883  The problem here was that Goldman Sachs had misled 
investors into toxic debts involving Paulson & Co., and the construction 
of collateralised debt known as Abacus 2007 and concealed that Paulson 
& Co. were in fact with Goldman Sachs betting against Abacus 2007. 
Goldman Sachs appeared to accept some form of wrongdoing when they 
issued a statement through their website explaining that marketing 
material was incomplete and that it should have mentioned the role that 
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Paulson & Co. played884 and agreed to a settlement with SEC in 2010. 
However, it should be noted that Goldman Sachs denied the allegations 
put forward by SEC which led to the investigation. Not only does this 
example illustrate the close relationship issue, it also portrays another 
side of this risk, being pressurised. The example of Goldman Sachs 
involved Moody’s and Standard and Poor’s, both were pressurised into 
giving Abacus 2007 (amongst other toxic debts) solid credit ratings, these 
were then sold which resulted in devastating consequences.885 The emails 
that were obtained leading to the investigation of Goldman Sachs clearly 
showed knowledge of what was going on and rather than serving their 
investors, they served themselves through acts of deception. 
 
To circumvent this problem it would be appropriate that CRAs should be 
accountable for their actions. The suggestion being that if CRAs have 
strict rules to adhere to which in turn would punish those that stepped 
out of line, then the argument would be that CRAs are less likely to 
commit some of the risks and weaknesses put forward throughout this 
subsection. Essentially, more accountability could reduce the problem 
created by conflicts of interest and has been proposed by the European 
Commission,886 for example. 
                                               
884 Goldman Sachs, ‘Goldman, Sachs & Co Agrees to Settlement with SEC’ 
http://www.goldmansachs.com/media-relations/press-
releases/archived/2010/settlement.html accessed 23 May 2018. 
885 J Lowry and A Reisberg, Petter’s Company Law: Company Law & Corporate Finance 
(4th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2012) 426. 
886 European Commission, ‘Regulating Credit Rating Agencies’ 
https://ec.europa.eu/info/business-economy-euro/banking-and-finance/financial-
supervision-and-risk-management/managing-risks-banks-and-financial-





Credit Rating Agencies – Conclusion 
 
It has been illustrated why and how CRAs are a huge risk for Basel III 
and have been since their introduction during the consultation period 
toward the end of Basel I and the major incorporation in Basel II. This 
has continued with Basel III and it seems unlikely that CRAs will be used 
less or relied on to a lesser extent anytime soon. The problem with CRAs 
is split into many segments and there are numerous reasons that make 
this area complex. Due to this, this section was further divided into four 
parts explaining how and why CRAs overall are extremely dangerous for 
the Basel regulations and banking regulation. Attention was given to high 
concentration, over reliance, poor sovereign debt rating process, and 
conflicts of interest.  
 
High concentration was considered and how the market has become 
saturated and that whilst there are many CRAs in reality only three are 
used. This gives great power to those agencies. A brief history was 
explained so that greater understanding of how these three agencies 
came to be so powerful, whilst also discussing the investor pays business 
model and issuer pays business model and the problem that the latter 
creates. The outcome of such is that to alleviate this risk either tighter 
regulation is needed, there needs to be less emphasis on CRAs, or more 






Over reliance was considered and how an over reliance by the Basel 
Committee has been placed on CRAs and their effectiveness in supporting 
financial stability. It was explained how CRAs became so involved in the 
Basel regulations, the impact of this in recent times and the financial 
crisis, and developments in the banking world that encouraged over 
reliance through SEC and NRSRO. Since the financial crisis more attention 
and scrutiny has been placed on CRAs by many leading authorities. Yet it 
does highlight the problem by having an over reliance on CRAs and what 
damaging effects this can produce. The recommendations would be to 
reduce the importance placed on CRAs in future Basel iterations, or an 
extreme stance would be to not have any reliance on CRAs whatsoever, 
although this stance is not supported by the author. 
 
The poor sovereign debt rating process was considered which included 
the process and how this is conducted. The main problem is that CRAs 
have either rated a sovereign nation incorrectly or were too late to act 
and change a rating for a sovereign nation. It was considered what type 
of impact this can have with an example given of a leading rating agency 
accepting a huge fine, in turn the author believes that this act signalled 
an acceptance that CRAs not only get it wrong but that there is a massive 
problem in this area and the value of such ratings. Some of the 
recommendations that would appear to appease this problem would be 






Conflicts of interest was considered, taking into account the issuer pays 
business model that arguably encourages this problem. This risk was 
further explored into sub areas: CRAs not wanting to disgruntle their 
issuer, CRAs acting as consultant for both the structuring and 
underwriting process, CRAs wanting to maintain harmony with their 
issuer, and employees of CRAs being too close to the entities they rate. 
These four sub areas were considered individually but all of them lead to 
conflicts of interests. The main recommendation for conflicts of interests 
would be to look at regulation in order to rectify this problem. 
 
Overall, it can be appreciated that CRAs are a major risk for the Basel 
Committee, the Basel regulations and the banking world. There does not 
appear to be one reason why CRAs pose such a risk, rather that many 
emanate from CRAs due to this area being so intricate. Emphasis was 
placed on four problems that came from the European Commission report 
in 2010 887  that highlighted the aforesaid. The recommendations 
suggested by the author (tighter regulation, less emphasis on CRAs, more 
competition, reduce importance/reliance, limit use/eradicate, more 
accountability) that resulted from each problem given by the European 
Commission report will be discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
The last part of this chapter will move onto VaR and how this has and 
continues to affect the Basel regulations and the banking world. 
                                               








This section of Chapter 4 will consider the risks associated with VaR and 
how they have impacted the economy and proven to be a shortcoming 
for the Basel regulations. VaR will be discussed in its general capacity 
rather than delving into the many strands that it now operates.  
 
VaR has many forms whether it be internal rating based models seen in 
a bank’s banking book, VaR and SVaR in a bank’s trading book, credit 
value adjustment VaR888 (CVA VaR) which covers counterparty risk, or 
operational VaR889 (OpVaR) which covers operational risk.890 Therefore, 
due to the many areas that VaR covers some of this is out of the scope 
of the research. It is best to view VaR in its general capacity and that all 
the models mentioned have some form of actuarial nature that involves 
sampling empirical data or stating distribution, and then estimating a 
quantile for that distribution.  
 
It should be noted that this section on VaR will expand on the information 
discussed in Chapter 2 which was highlighted due to VaR becoming more 
ingrained and prominent with the announcement of Basel II. 
Furthermore, VaR was omitted from Chapter 3 because of the extensive 
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discussion that would take place in this chapter and due to the 
information commented on in Chapter 2. 
 
Before highlighting the weaknesses of VaR, it is wise to discuss the 
background and how VaR became a dominant force as a leading market 
risk tool. It should be appreciated from the outset that the Basel 
regulations use VaR as the de facto risk model to calculate regulatory 
capital.891 
 
It would be useful at this point to recollect the definition of risk to fully 
appreciate what VaR tries to do. Risk has been described by Choudhry 
as:  
 
 ’Any transaction or undertaking with an element of uncertainty as 
 to its  future outcome carries an element of risk: risk can be  
 thought of as uncertainty…It is useful to define risk in terms of a  
 risk horizon, the point at which an asset will be realised, or turned 
 into cash…All market participants, including spectators, have an  
 horizon…the horizon is the time period relating to the risk being  
 considered‘892  
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On this basis, and when the horizon has been established which in this 
context will be ten days set by the Basel Committee, a working definition 
of risk has been described by Choudhry as, ’…the uncertainty of the future 
total cash value of an investment on the investor’s horizon date‘.893 The 
uncertainties that face those in the financial market (such as banks) 
would be the volatility of asset returns and the types of risk that banks 
are usually exposed to would be bond and capital markets. The different 
types of risk such as market risk, credit risk and liquidity risk have already 
been discussed, therefore they will not be considered here. As will be 
highly evident throughout the remainder of this section the difficulty in 
trying to improve, or in some cases remove VaR, is difficult because it 
has become the established measure of risk exposure for banks; it has 
even spread to non-financial institutions.894 What this means is that VaR 
has become so widespread that it has intertwined and imbedded itself 
into banking regulation and economies around the world. It will be 
explored that this is not necessarily a good thing and has huge 
implications. 
 
What is Value-at-Risk? 
 
VaR can be defined as, ’…the worst loss that might be expected from 
holding a security or portfolio over a given period of time…given a 
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specified level of probability‘.895 In general terms this means that one 
could lose everything of their entire value of the portfolio that is held. It 
is based on probabilities and as such there is no certainty that can be 
ascertained from using this risk measuring tool. In actual fact, it reflects 
a level of confidence which is set beforehand. VaR, simply put, is a risk 
measuring tool for volatility of a bank trading book. It is a tool used to 
assess a bank’s risk exposure and is used by many, such as traders and 
risk managers. What can be deduced from this is that VaR has a huge 
responsibility and task in calculating risk for those entities that use it. 
This is further promoted by the Basel regulations that encourage the use 
of VaR. The combination of such is that it is widely used, the problem 
from this is that VaR can have devastating consequences if the incorrect 
figure is calculated. 
 
VaR is not a new mechanism when determining risk and was included in 
Basel I during the late 1990s896 when the Market Risk Amendment was 
introduced to help aid banks with their foreign exchange and traded debt 
securities. To assist this process, VaR was incorporated to allow banks to 
assess their market risk capital requirements and this was the starting 
point of how VaR began in Basel I. It became more prominent in Basel II 
and continued through to Basel III. It can be argued that one of the main 
risks and shortcomings posed to the Basel regulations began with the 
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inclusion toward the end of Basel I and it has continued to grow since 
that point. 
 
Troublingly, there are risks surrounding VaR that have been known for 
many years yet still this mechanism is used. Perhaps one of the reasons 
why VaR is still so eminent is that it has operated for many years and has 
evolved over time, equally it is used by many leading banks. It is easy to 
appreciate why having one risk measuring tool can be so alluring, as 
Bray-Stacey articulates, ’I think the idea of having a single risk statistic 
was alluring for everyone…‘.897 So it is acceptable to appreciate that by 
having one leading risk calculating tool would be so easy to use and 
incorporate rather than several. Regulators and industry professionals 
have tried to improve VaR898 but there is still room for debate to how 
effective VaR actually is. As will be shown over the coming subsections 
VaR contains many risks from the inability to calculate volatile markets 
to the approaches used to calculate VaR. What this means is that from 
its first introduction in the late 1990s to recent times, VaR has been a 
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The rise of Value-at-Risk 
 
One of the main approaches to measuring risk before VaR was the 
Notional Amount Approach. This is where a bank would assess the 
quantity of their market risk in relation to the trading desk. The main 
advantage of this approach was its simplicity, for example a risk of £10 
million of equity in an oil company could be presented to the board as 
measures of market risk; a very simplistic approach to take. However, 
there were serious flaws to this approach such as the inability to 
recognise that different assets possess different price volatilities, and that 
it did not differentiate between short and long term positions. It can be 
ascertained from this that there was a need to have a risk measuring tool 
that could be effective and stable. 
 
The Nominal Amount Approach was not the only risk measuring tool prior 
to VaR. There were variations of VaR long before it was coined VaR, such 
as the Modern Portfolio Theory by Harry Markowitz in 1952899 in which 
the mathematics that form the foundation of VaR was created, or the first 
regulatory measures put in place by SEC in 1980 in which SEC tried to 
align capital requirements to losses incurred with a confidence level and 
horizon stated, however, this was termed and described as haircuts900 
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and not VaR.901 A haircut in this context is simply the difference in price 
between which a broker firm can buy and sell a security.902 
 
Essentially, VaR or what everybody knows and defines as VaR, was 
created in 1994 by the bank J. P. Morgan Investment Bank, when the 
president at the time, Dennis Weatherstone, asked for a report to be sent 
at the end of every day (by the employees) regarding the bank’s degree 
of risk combined with an equivalent risk measure.903 The department that 
operated within the bank became an important part of J. P. Morgan 
Investment Bank for focusing and specialising in risk and analysis. It was 
the risk measure used that the aforementioned bank called 
RiskMetrics,904 which is what everybody now knows as VaR and is used 
around the world by banks. Even though VaR was technically in existence 
prior to 1994, the birth of VaR as a recognised name was created during 
the end of 1994. VaR was included in the Basel regulations during the 
late 1990s and in a wider context VaR has become the standard practice 
in measuring and reporting market risk. This has further been extended 
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and used in relation to credit risk,905 signifying the far reaching nature of 
VaR.  
 
It should be accepted that VaR is a very useful tool in measuring risk 
during normal market conditions. In normal market conditions VaR is 
accurate in calculating overall market risk.906 In essence, VaR can capture 
several key components such as volatility, curve, and basis risk. 
Therefore, it is easy to see why VaR became so popular. However, in 
stressed non-stationary times VaR portrays serious limitations and the 
reason for this is simple compared to the complexity of VaR. The reason 
is because VaR is based on the assumption that volatilities are stationary. 
Importantly, this is not the case when volatile markets begin and in turn 
VaR becomes all but useless. This will be considered in the risks 
subsection. 
 
In practice VaR gives a probability statement of a portfolio change due to 
market factors over a period of time. The basis of VaR is that it illustrates 
how likely or unlikely losses will be rather than a precise figure, and 
despite the criticism this should always be borne in mind. On this basis 
most VaR calculations are completed on a short term measurement, in 
the context of the research this is normally ten days for market risk 
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measurements stated by regulators907 and is in relation to a given level 
of probability (confidence level) of which the Basel Committee stipulate 
is 99 percent. For example, if a portfolio had a daily VaR of £10 million 
and a 99 percent confidence level, the daily losses expected from this 
portfolio would only surpass £10 million one day every one hundred days. 
 
In summary, it can be ascertained that VaR is a risk measuring tool that 
is used by banks to calculate the probability of their portfolio losing 
money in the short term, longer horizons can be used but the research 
will not consider this point. The rise of VaR has been briefly discussed to 
evidence how VaR began and progressed into mainstream banking and 
financial regulation. To further understand VaR it should be considered 
how VaR is calculated to comprehend how it operates and the risks that 
stem from this model.  
 
What can be deduced at this early stage is that VaR can be a good tool 
for measuring market risk in stationary economic times, as Rogachev 
notes this is why it has become the mainstream tool that is used all 
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There are two phases to calculate VaR. Firstly, one should calculate the 
forward distribution of the portfolio, or in other terms the potential money 
return on the portfolio at the chosen horizon. There are three approaches 
in which this can be done and these will be discussed shortly. Once this 
has been calculated it is then plotted on a graph to show the likelihood of 
losses being incurred.909 Secondly, a bank should identify the required 
percentile so that a specific number can be read from this. Once this is 
complete then VaR can be identified.910 With this in mind, the Basel 
Committee introduced a confidence level of 99 percent. Essentially, VaR 
is the worst case loss at the stipulated 99 percent confidence level.911 The 
figure of 99 percent is quite high, as Zimper suggests this could be to do 
with the high capital charges in place.912 
 
When calculating VaR the bank will consider their risks in economical 
capital terms and regulatory capital terms. Economical capital terms 
mean what a shareholder should invest (or set aside) to limit the 
probability of default. Regulatory capital terms equate to the minimum 
amount of capital stated by the regulator. There is usually a difference 
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between the figures derived from an economical capital figure and 
regulatory capital figure due to the confidence level and time chosen 
being different. To put this into context, in some instances a bank might 
choose a higher percent confidence level to what is imposed by the 
regulator i.e. 99 percent stipulated by the Basel Committee. A bank may 
also choose a different time that VaR is calculated over, thus using a one 
day time of liquid positions or ten day time for illiquid positions. In 
comparison, the regulator states ten day time slots for any position. 
Therefore, it is clear to see the differences that occur between economical 
capital terms and regulatory capital terms.  
 
Generally, one day VaR is used to measure market risk and this is done 
on a daily basis of the portfolio value(s). In regulatory capital terms this 
is increased to ten day VaR when reporting regulatory capital 
requirements; this is more inline with the research due to the Basel 
regulation requirements. 
 
Before the three approaches that a bank will normally calculate forward 
distribution are discussed, for clarity the factors that drive volatility and 
the returns on a portfolio must be considered whether that be trading or 
investment to appreciate the factors that influence VaR. Once those 
factors are realised the bank can then generate the forward distribution 
of that portfolio. Then and only then, can a bank calculate the mean and 
quantiles to obtain the portfolio VaR. It is important to appreciate that 





that take place and the risk factors will depend on a case by case basis 
due to the portfolio in question. For example, a stock portfolio will depend 
on prices of individual stocks that contribute to that portfolio, 
alternatively a bond portfolio will depend on the degree of granularity 
against the risk. 
 
It was explained earlier that there are two phases for calculating VaR, to 
calculate forward distribution and that the bank should identify the 
required percentile so that a specific number can be read from the 
calculation. It will now be discussed as to how a bank should create these 
distributions in order to calculate VaR effectively. This will specifically 
relate back to an earlier comment regarding the approaches that were 
stated in the first phase. With this in mind and now referring back to the 
first phase in calculating VaR stated earlier, attention will be given to the 
three ways in which the calculation of forward distribution of a portfolio 
can be derived, also taking into account the market risk factors that have 
just been discussed. On this basis the bank, specifically the risk analyst 
or similar person, will need to choose a relevant approach for calculating 
distribution. These are: 
 
• Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach 
• Historical Simulation Approach 






As Farid notes, these approaches are the most conventional forms of 
calculating distribution and the primary methods for calculating VaR.913 
There are more advanced methods, however the research does not intend 
to explore VaR to that level but rather the weaknesses of VaR in general 
and the three aforementioned. 
 
Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach  
 
Under this approach one assumes that all the risk factors and portfolio 
values are log normal distributed. Log normal distribution is the 
continuous probability distribution in which the logarithm of random 
variables is normally distributed.914 Thus a simpler calculation can be 
achieved because the first two moments of a normal distribution (mean 
and variance) are completely characterised. Therefore, the risk analyst 
can calculate the return distribution by using these two figures from the 
multivariate distribution of the risk factors concerned and composition of 
the portfolio being assessed. The formula used can be demanding on the 
best of minds and with recent criticisms of VaR, one questions as to 
whether those calculating VaR using this approach are qualified and 
intellectually able. The Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach also 
requires the volatility of each risk factor to be extracted from a historical 
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period, therefore historical data from previous investment periods is 
required.   
 
There are many ways to calculate risk factors under this approach. For 
example, a historic volatility approach is the simplest, but if a seismic 
shift in the market takes hold then this can seriously distort volatility over 
the forecasting period. A more sophisticated approach would be to weight 
previous data unequally, this will then enable more weight to be given to 
recent data and allow for a potential seismic shift without affecting 
volatility.  
 
The author believes that this approach becomes convoluted due to the 
user being able to adopt further measures in calculating VaR using this 
approach such as using the generalised autoregressive conditional 
heteroscedasticity model or the exponentially weighted moving averages 
model.915 Both models require, and are based on, the provision that 
future volatilities can be forecast and predicted from historic price 
movements. This ideology is open to criticism as both models assume 
that future price movements based on historic data will be correct. What 
this means is that this approach is reliant on being able to forecast future 
volatilities and that the historic data used will be correct. For such an 
important task there should be more certainty on how an approach to 
calculating VaR is basing its calculations and the underlying foundations 
                                               






being based on assumptions. Whilst it would be unfair to state that an 
approach should guarantee the calculations used, there should be more 
conviction in the approach.  
 
Another problem is that by allowing further models to operate within this 
approach only makes it more confusing and stricken with more calculating 
formulas. One model under this approach would create a simple and 
coherent mechanism that banks could use to calculate their risk. 
 
Historical Simulation Approach 
 
The second approach for calculating forward distribution is not one that 
is based on assumptions and in theory is very simple. To apply this 
approach the risk analyst will use data from the last one to three years 
of historical data as a minimum to produce purposeful results,916 but 
generally longer periods will be used averaging three to five years and 
more. 
 
The usual scenario when this approach is applied is when analysing VaR 
of a whole portfolio. On this basis, the risk analyst will consider the 
changes in relevant market prices and rates over the course of the 
preceding years. The portfolio being examined is then revalued by 
applying the changes that would have been noticed from the risk factors 
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observed in the historical data. This will then enable the risk analyst to 
determine the distribution of the portfolio returns which can be associated 
to the VaR of the portfolio being derived. There are three steps that are 
involved in order for this process to be accomplished. Firstly, to select a 
sample over a period of time of the actual daily risk changes. Secondly, 
apply those changes to the current value of risk factors reevaluate current 
portfolio and calculate across all positions. Thirdly, create a histogram of 
the portfolio values.917 
 
It can be said that the real positive of the Historical Simulation Approach 
is that it uses actual historical returns and data. Included in this data are 
rare events and in some instances market crashes. Hence, this approach 
captures non-normal distribution of risk factor returns. As Choudhry 
explains, ’They capture the dynamic nature of correlations as well as 
scenarios when the usual correlation relationships break down‘.918 It is a 
good resampling method and as such, simplicity is the byproduct.919 
These are some of the reasons why the Historical Simulation Approach 
can be viewed positively,920 however the fact that this approach relies on 
past data is also its vulnerability. The main problem with the Historical 
Simulation Approach is that it relies on, by its very nature, a set of 
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historical data and consequently on the abnormalities of this data. This 
means that the previous data is presumed reliable and can be used to 
forecast the future, which is a dangerous thing to predict. As Li et al. 
purports, ’It is based on the assumption that history is repeating itself‘.921 
The problems that emanate from the Historical Simulation Approach will 
be discussed in more detail shortly. 
 
Monte Carlo Simulation Approach  
 
The third approach that is commonly used is the Monte Carlo Simulation 
Approach, an approach deemed to be more flexible than the previous 
two.922 This approach uses the notion of repeatedly simulating random 
processes in relation to market prices and rates. What this means is that 
each simulation gives a predicted value of the portfolio over a period of 
time. It is believed that if this is conducted several times then a truer 
picture can be created of the distribution.  
 
Like the Historical Simulation Approach, there are three steps that a risk 
analyst will need to cover. Firstly, the risk analyst will specify all the 
relevant risk factors and the dynamics of these risk factors. Secondly, 
construct price paths using random numbers. Thirdly, to value the 
portfolio for each path. This process must be completed many times in 
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order to arrive to what is deemed a true distribution figure of the portfolio 
return. Similar to the other two approaches, the Monte Carlo Approach 
with a VaR at the 99 percent confidence level is then calculated at the 
mean of the first percentile. The strength of this approach is that it is 
more realistic than the previous two and because of this it is more likely 
to be accurate and achieve a clearer picture of risk.923 The main weakness 
of the Monte Carlo Approach is the heavy and burdensome task due to it 
being computer intensive.924 As such, this approach cannot determine 
large and/or complex portfolios. This will be discussed shortly. 
 
How do banks use Value-at-Risk? 
 
With regard to what has been discussed so far, it can be deduced that 
banks use all three approaches for calculating risk factors, not necessarily 
at the same time. There is the suggestion that the Historical Simulation 
Approach is favoured the most925 and a recent paper concluded that as 
of May 2012, 75 percent of large banks were using the Historical 
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Simulation Approach926 and it still seems to be the case purported 2017 
by Laurent and Firouzi.927  
 
It is easy to comprehend why the Historical Simulation Approach is the 
most used when calculating VaR because it is quick, fairly reliable, easy 
to implement and can deal with fat tails 928  due to no distribution 
assumptions. That being said, just because it is the most often used does 
not mean it is a competent approach to calculating VaR. Therefore, it 
would be wise to explore the recommendation suggested by the author 
and to use several techniques when calculating risk. 
 
Value-at-Risk - Risks overview 
 
It is poignant to being with the comment made in the subsection ’The rise 
of Value-at-Risk‘ and that VaR is an extremely useful tool to use when 
measuring risk in normal market conditions, emphasis on normal,929 
which is most of the time considering that major movements in the 
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market are not a regular occurrence.930 However, there are instances 
where disaster strikes and volatile market conditions take over. The 
recent financial crisis is a great example of this, before that was the world 
markets crisis in 1998 which battered the United States hedge fund Long-
Term Capital Management (Long-Term).931 A key problem with VaR and 
other risk measuring tools is that most investment banks use them and 
it is widely perceived that one can predict the future by looking at past 
volatilities;932 Long-Term being a prime example. 
 
The failure of Long-Term highlighted two confounding flaws that were 
evident throughout tenure. A reliance on formulaic model and an 
overwhelming sense of greed. The collapse of Long-Term is a huge 
reminder that despite a team of well educated Nobel laureates, PhD 
qualified, number crunching personnel, all of whom allowed a complex 
formulaic model to predict and define risk, can still succumb to financial 
markets. It must be said that for generally perceived intelligent people, 
the risk models used by Long-Term have been described as, 
’…unbelievably unintelligent…‘.933 It should be borne in mind and what 
can only be described as a robotic way to predict risk, that it is not 
possible to calculate exposure and risk by simply using the formula based 
model used by Long-Term. That being said, it should be appreciated that 
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the mathematics were perfect and as Haynes puts it, ’It was primarily a 
failure of common sense…‘.934 Furthermore, ’…if they kept increasing the 
size of the positions they took it could eventually freeze the relevant part 
of the market when there was a crisis‘.935 
 
The aura surrounding Long-Term was substantial as most hedge funds 
are managed by traders and stock brokers; a completely different breed 
compared to those involved with Long-Term. Whilst the financial 
downturn that took hold during 1998 was not foreseen (according to risk 
models alike) it is illogical to conclude that the model in use is correct 
and a catastrophic event such as 1998 will never happen, or unlikely to 
happen in hundreds of years. Therefore, it is nonsensical to think that a 
risk model can assume that one can accurately predict risk exposure for 
a long period of time. In this case it would seem indefinite and was further 
amplified by greed. In many ways it would appear that because this 
formula successfully worked for several years and reaped huge financial 
rewards, that it would continue to do so. In the end, the sheer arrogance 
by Long-Term and the belief that the markets would turn around (as they 
had done in the past and would do so again) actually failed. In 1998 Long-
Term did not recover.936 
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When the status quo is affected VaR appears to crumble quickly. There is 
a very simple answer, VaR is based on normal market conditions, 
volatilities and correlations that are stationary and do not change in value 
during this period of risk measurement. On this basis it would seem 
appropriate for a bank to use several risk measuring tools than to focus 
and rely on VaR alone. During the financial crisis there were many 
volatilities which VaR was unable to account for.937 
 
The risks of VaR do not stop here, VaR also struggles with non-linearities 
seen in more complex products such as subprime CDOs. It will be 
discussed shortly how this affected the housing market when the financial 
crisis first began in the United States. 
 
VaR also suffers from and has the tendency to be over relied on. The 
result of doing so and the notion that if most banks are using this 
mechanism is that it inevitably exacerbates market volatility, thus making 
the market more unstable and creating a weak market in which future 
                                               
11de-9320-00144feabdc0 accessed 16 November 2016, it shows a worrying picture in 
that despite the huge losses of Long-Term which totalled billions of dollars, the lead figure 
of Long-Term was able to set up a new investment firm so easily and quickly after the 
1998 disaster. Somehow John Meriwether went on to start a third investment firm. See 
Helia Ebrahimi, ‘LTCM founder John Meriwether returns with third fund’ The Telegraph 
(London, 5 October 2010) 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/8042233/LTCM-
founder-John-Meriwether-returns-with-third-fund.html accessed 16 November 2016 His 
tenacity is admirable, but not excusable. Regulation should be in place to stop this from 
happening. [This is more to do with financial and compliance regulation, however, there 
are lessons to be learned from this that can be applied to capital regulation]. 
937 A Burchi, ‘Capital Requirements for Market Risks: Value-at-Risk Models and Stressed-





transactions are going to be affected by the mechanism that is supposed 
to protect it.  
 
Another risk is that VaR can be applied incorrectly and interpreted 
wrongly. Whether by accident or intentionally to suppress risk numbers, 
the end product can be devastating considering the magnitude of this 
process.  
 
Finally, the risks posed by the three approaches to calculate distribution 
i.e. Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach, Historical Simulation 
Approach, and the Monte Carlo Simulation Approach all pose some form 
of risk. These will be looked at in turn shortly. 
 
In summary, some of the main risks that come from VaR are the 
following: 
 
• Inability to cope with volatile market 
• Struggles with complex products 
• Over reliance of VaR 
• Applied incorrectly 
• Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach 
• Historical Simulation Approach 






These are some of the main risks posed by VaR and in turn have big 
consequences for the economy, the banking environment and the Basel 
regulations. 
 
Value-at-Risk - Inability to cope with volatile markets  
 
The author would stipulate that the inability to cope with volatile markets 
is enshrined in the VaR methodology and it has been most evident in 
recent times that VaR provided very limited support to what has been the 
most disastrous financial crises in modern history; in the United Kingdom, 
for example, this was cited as the worst recession in one hundred 
years.938 The problem is simple, the approaches and models used are 
based on market conditions remaining stationary. As Crouhy et al. state, 
’Prices and values are assumed to have a ”smooth“ behaviour that 
excludes the possibility of jumps and other extreme events‘. 939  The 
author proposes that the failing of only calculating in stationary times has 
made VaR redundant in that if a bank is only going to use VaR in its 
general capacity i.e. not use any other model such as SVaR, then there 
is no point in calculating risk as there is a high chance that the results 
will be inaccurate.  
 
                                               
938 Nigel Morris and Sean O’Grady, ‘This is the Worst Recession for Over 100 years’ The 
Independent (London, 10 February 2009)  
https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/this-is-the-worst-recession-for-over-100-
years-1605367.html accessed 25 May 2018. 
939 M Crouhy, D Galai and R Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management (2nd edn, 





In addition, the events that unfolded from the United States hedge fund 
Long-Term and the financial crisis several years later are two high profile 
examples of the inability of VaR to predict market risks. What normally 
happens at this point, as did in these two events, was a drying up of 
liquidity combined with trading losses. What needs to occur is a broader 
approach to calculate risk. The only way for this to happen is for several 
models to be used so that a more in depth calculation can be derived. 
The advantages of using several models such as stress tests and scenario 
based analysis is straightforward and logical. By using different models it 
will benefit the calculating risk process in that all models have limitations 
and strengths, therefore the combination of one model that may be 
limited in one area could be appeased by another model which is stronger 
in that one area.940 
 
Value-at-Risk - Struggles with complex products 
 
Leading from the risk of VaR and its limitation of volatile markets is the 
argument that complex products such as subprime CDOs are not well 
captured by VaR. As Crouhy et al. comment, ’The subprime crisis 
highlighted, in a cruel way, the problem of making assumptions about 
correlations and assuming that return distributions are stationary‘.941 
                                               
940 Private meeting, Professor Moorad Choudhry, 23 March 2017 London. 
Whilst Professor Choudhry agreed that more that one approach could be used, he was of 
the opinion that it would not make much difference in that it would still provide a rough 
estimate. 
941 M Crouhy, D Galai and R Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management (2nd edn, 





Again, this is a problem stemming from VaR not being capable to 
calculate in volatile markets, in this instance it is the inability of VaR to 
capture non-linearities in complex products such as the aforementioned, 
which again has been evident in the recent financial crisis and can only 
be circumvented by using several models. The difficulty with subprime 
CDOs and the complex nature which poses a problem for VaR is that 
during a financial crisis, correlations move either way. In general, risk 
factors will follow this trend and this will, or can, create a sudden spike 
in risk i.e. non-linearity. Delving into this area further will illustrate the 
major weakness that VaR has in relation to CDOs. Let us briefly consider 
this point now. 
 
In most cases CDOs are highly leveraged products consisting of several 
tranches, the performance of each is crucial and will depend on the capital 
structure of the CDO;942 it will also depend on the amount of any realised 
credit losses. Due to various complexities there are several structural 
features that create non-linearities in performance and combined with 
the fact that potential loss amounts are difficult to predict and estimate, 
makes it a hard task to calculate. Taking this concept into the area of 
subprime CDOs the dangers are evident,943 and VaR is not up to task to 
estimate an accurate risk figure. In subprime CDOs collateral consists of 
                                               
942 Ibid. 
943 See R W Kolb, ‘The Origins of the Financial Crisis’ in M N Baily, R E Litan and M S 
Johnson, Lessons from the Financial Crisis: Causes, Consequences, and Our Economic 
Future (John Wiley & Sons, Inc 2010) 81 CDOs issuers persuaded CRAs to rate senior 






subprime bonds that form tranches of pools of individual mortgages. A 
typical subprime CDO will comprise around one hundred subprime bonds 
with ratings ranging from AA to BB, an average rating for these CDOs 
being BBB rated.944 During the financial crisis there was a downturn in 
the housing market and the recession that followed portrayed a loss 
correlation that affected most BBB rated tranches of subprime CDOs. This 
meant that if one BBB tranche was affected then most tranches of the 
same rating were also affected. As a result, most subprime bonds became 
unsaleable and rollover bond issues did not have a market. In reality this 
meant that banks and investors either did not suffer any financial losses 
or (and in most cases) they did suffer financial losses due to investments 
being wiped out.945 
 
The risk with VaR and complex products such as subprime CDOs, is that 
the VaR tool for measuring risk is not sophisticated and flexible enough 
to estimate the risk(s) associated with CDOs. The example explained 
about subprime CDOs illustrates this major flaw and that it is hard to 
estimate the parameters for which the amount of losses can be 
ascertained i.e. cumulative default rate of mortgages and loss given 
default to name but two. Due to the nature of this area and that these 
parameters are not stable due to the economic environment, VaR cannot 
cope with this type of risk. Similar to the first risk it would be appropriate 
                                               
944 M Crouhy, D Galai and R Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management (2nd edn, 
McGraw-Hill Education 2014) 544. 
945 Dan Wang, ‘Collateralized Debt Obligations and Credit Default Swaps’ 






to apply several models to limit the struggles that banks have when 
calculating and using complex models. 
 
Value-at-Risk - Over reliance 
 
Continuing with the theme of using several models for calculating risk 
comes the problem of VaR being over relied on.946 Aziz notes, ’Prior to 
the crisis, there was an over-reliance on VaR. It has almost become a 
silver bullet for measuring risk‘.947 Thus illuminating the culture that was 
widespread leading to and during the financial crisis. The problem here is 
most obvious, by relying on what model for measuring market risk allows 
for other problems to arise and provides limited flexibility. Over reliance 
is not a problem limited to VaR but other risk calculating models also. 
Kennedy said, ’The industry got a host of things wrong and one was the 
over-reliance on a single measure or set of measures, including VaR‘.948 
It can be argued that the Basel Committee, as well as the banking 
industry, were too late to react in that VaR was being relied on too much 
and too often. Whether this slow response was due to carelessness or 
there was a common belief that it would get better in time is hard to say. 
                                               
946 Jane Croft, ‘Value at Risk: The Danger of Relying too Much on Only One Tool’ 
Financial Times (London, 21 March 2011) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79752608-5371-
11e0-86e6-00144feab49a.html#axzz4H6rFFB26 accessed 12 August 2016. 
947 Tracy Alloway, ‘Modelling: Normal distribution is not Always the Norm’ Financial Times 
(London, 13 April 2012) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/67d05d30-7e88-11e1-b7e7-
00144feab49a.html?siteedition=uk#axzz4HZtJ6Myt quoting Andrew Aziz accessed 17 
August 2016. 
948 Jane Croft, ‘Value at Risk: The Danger of Relying too Much on Only One Tool’ 
Financial Times (London, 21 March 2011) http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/79752608-5371-





What is apparent after the financial crisis is that it is a fact that VaR was 
over relied on and it caused a serious amount of turmoil around the world. 
 
It can be appreciated from the aforementioned comments that it is widely 
accepted that VaR is over relied on by banks. The weakness here is that 
if all or most rely on VaR to calculate risk needs, then this can increase 
and make worse market volatility and in turn have the opposite effect of 
making markets stable. What this means in reality is that if assets are 
being sold in this type of market (volatile) then banks are essentially 
selling assets which can bring prices across the market down and increase 
volatility. Consequences leading from this are huge as it will depress the 
market and banks may be forced to exceed their own VaR threshold, this 
means that assets are sold to reduce this exposure and an endless bad 
cycle is created i.e. pro-cyclicality. It is most evident that other risk 
measuring tools need to be included alongside VaR to assist and 
strengthen this area of banking. 
 
Value-at-Risk - Applied incorrectly 
 
Due to the complexities of VaR it is apparent by its very nature that it is 
a complex tool to use and apply correctly. What this means is that 
calculation errors and old data can result in inaccurate reports.949 The 
production of any inaccuracies can be problematic for those using this 
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measuring mechanism and the financial crisis is a true example of this. 
The results of VaR through incorrect application or by intentional means 
can have devastating effects and wider repercussions, as will be explored 
now. 
 
VaR can be applied incorrectly either by mistake or by intentional means. 
Considering the repercussions of this, the mistake of applying VaR 
incorrectly can be very detrimental. Equally, the consequences of 
intentionally applying VaR incorrectly is too, and this has happened in the 
banking industry where VaR approaches and models are adjusted so that 
the ’correct‘ calculation is derived in order for better results, 950 
alternatively they can be used to change the outlook from high to low 
risk. In the London Whale scandal, ’…the outsized bets were enabled by 
the bank’s manipulation of its financial controls to downplay risk‘.951 The 
point being made is that VaR can be manipulated952 and this can lead to 
catastrophic results.953 One of the main consequences of this is that large 
financial losses amount, J. P. Morgan is a prime example where positions 
were valued improperly and minimized and reported and projected losses 
                                               
950 Michael A Santoro, ‘Would Better Regulations Have Prevented the London Whale 
Trades?’ The New Yorker (New York, 21 August 2013) 
https://www.newyorker.com/business/currency/would-better-regulations-have-prevented-
the-london-whale-trades accessed 11 April 2018. 
951 Ibid. 
952 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Comparative Analyses of Expected Shortfall and 
Value-at-Risk Under Market Stress’ https://www.bis.org/cgfs/conf/mar02p.pdf page 218-
219 accessed 11 April 2018. 
953 Lindo Xulu, ‘Value at Risk’s Apparent Manipulation’ 
http://www.financialmail.co.za/fm/2012/07/24/value-at-risk-s-apparent-manipulation 






were hidden.954 The main catalyst for manipulation, the author would 
argue, is that it was incentivised in order to not only reap huge profits 
but to make those profits appear low risk.955 Guldimann described this as 
asymmetric risk positions i.e. products that generate small gains and 
have minimal losses yet when they do they are big.956 
 
The alarming thought is that even if a bank is using the correct approach 
i.e. the Historical Simulation Approach, and it is being used to assess an 
appropriate risk, there still remains a chance that it will be incorrectly 
implemented957 where intensive models, for example, may incur a bug in 
the programming and this can affect the end result. This is normally seen 
in more complex approaches such as the Monte Carlo Approach in which 
the highly computer intensive procedure can create many inaccuracies if 
the simulation is run incorrectly i.e. only a small amount of scenarios 
have been tested. 
 
It is easy to see that mistakes can happen. A prime example of this was 
illustrated during the 1970s and Merrill Lynch.958 During the middle of the 
1970s Merrill Lynch started to dissect thirty year government bonds. The 
investment firm then began to offer the dissected components to the 
                                               
954 Steve Schaefer, ‘Former JPMorgan Exec Ina Drew Deflects Blame for London Whale 
Trades’ https://www.forbes.com/sites/steveschaefer/2013/03/15/ex-jpmorgan-exec-drew-
deflects-blame-for-london-whale-trades/#5fc0c6062d5d accessed 11 April 2018. 
955 Joe Nocera, ‘Risk Management’ 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html accessed 29 June 2018. 
956 Ibid, describing Guldimann’s asymmetric risk position. 
957 M Crouhy, D Galai and R Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management (2nd edn, 
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market as interest only and principal only instruments. In essence what 
Merrill Lynch did, incorrectly and by mistake, was apply a par yield 
formulation to value the instruments rather than the annuity rate formula 
for the interest only instrument and zero-coupon formula for the principal 
only instrument. Simply put, Merrill Lynch undervalued the former and 
overvalued the latter. Merrill Lynch then sold $600 million of the interest 
only instruments but none of the principal only instruments. The trader(s) 
involved in this transaction then hedged the thirty year bonds using a 
thirteen year timescale, which was correct, however, this was dependent 
on the bonds remaining intact. The second mistake made was to [still] 
base the bonds on a thirteen year timescale once all bonds were sold 
when they should have changed the timescale to thirty years. What this 
meant was that when interest rates began to rise losses began to amount. 
In summary, Merrill Lynch illustrated two things. One, the over and under 
valuation of the interest only and principal only instruments. Two, the 
incorrect timescale (duration) used once all bonds had been sold. Due to 
these two mistakes, Merrill Lynch incurred a loss of $70 million, thus 
highlighting one problematic area of VaR and that it is very easy to apply 
VaR incorrectly, and the repercussion can be costly as seen around the 
time of the financial crisis. 
 
To limit the problems of incorrect application and manipulation, better 





tighter regulation and penalties should be in place for those that 
manipulate the calculation.959 
 
Value-at-Risk - Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach 
 
In respect of the three main ways that VaR can be calculated, the first is 
the Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach. 960  This approach has 
several noticeable problems. For instance, it assumes normality of a 
return portfolio, it does not cope well with fat tailed distributions, and it 
requires predictions on volatility risk factors and the correlations of such 
returns.961 These problems point to a reoccurring risk throughout VaR 
and that is the ability to calculate accurately in volatile markets, of which 
it is limited.  
 
Let us consider the problems in more detail. This approach is based on 
normality of a return portfolio, or in other words a log normal distribution. 
It has been suggested that there is an assumption that most returns are 
log normally distributed.962 However, not all returns are and may contain 
a term called fat tailed distribution.963 When calculating distributions a 
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due course. 
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963 A fat tailed distribution is one which exhibits moderately extreme scenarios that happen 






risk analyst will plot on a graph these distributions which in a log normal 
distribution will shape in a curved fashion, thus showing the probability 
and the distribution of results. In a fat tailed distribution the shape will 
be different and where in a log normal distribution the line tails off quick 
highlighting the rarity of unlikely events, a fat tailed distribution will 
remain thick and tail off slowly. Meaning that a fat tailed distribution 
normally indicates extreme losses that will occur more frequent than a 
normal distribution.964 Therefore, if there is an assumption that most 
returns will be or are log normally distributed then the risks highlighted 
in a fat tailed distribution will not be seen and warning indicators will not 
be seen. If the Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach cannot calculate 
fat tails, alternative mechanisms are needed. 
 
Value-at-Risk - Historical Simulation Approach 
 
The second main approach is the Historical Simulation Approach.965 The 
main risk posed by the Historical Simulation Approach leads on from its 
main advantage and that it is not parametric and for that reason does 
not rely on setting parameters. However, the problem with this is that 
this approach will rely on historical data to calculate risk. The absolute 
dependence on specific historical data and distinctive characteristics can 
                                               
964 Financial Times, ‘Definition of Fait Tails’ http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=fat-tails 
accessed 17 August 2016. 
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be very damaging. Consequences can be distortion when predicting 
future events or ignoring the data of a previous market crash.966 
 
The drawback when analysing past data is that one assumes it is correct 
and reliable. What this means is that what once happened it will repeat 
itself again, and therefore these risks can be calculated on this basis. Yet 
this may not be the case, whilst a financial crisis may have happened in 
the past it is too hard to predict when one will happen again. It may also 
be the case that the data used is too old, even when the data may have 
been from the last few months. 967  This could be the result of new 
regulatory rules or new technology, thus producing inaccurate results. 
Further to this, the Historical Simulation Approach cannot accommodate 
any changes in the market and a key indicator of this was the introduction 
of the Euro at the beginning of 1999.968 As a consequence, the ability to 
anticipate structural change is mute. 
 
The final risk to note and arguably the worst, is the size of data used. 
Typically, one year of data will amount to around two hundred and fifty 
trading days. This means that there are potentially two hundred and fifty 
scenarios that can be analysed. What this means is that the results are 
extremely limited and may leave many gaps to be unanswered. Even if a 
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risk analyst considers the past five years, this will only lead to one 
thousand two hundred and fifty trading days i.e. scenarios. To put that in 
context and to highlight the weakness of this approach, the Monte Carlo 
Approach offers significantly more scenarios mounting to around ten 
thousand (on average), which is a much stronger return of data969 
compared with the Historical Simulation Approach.  
 
In summary, the huge weakness of the Historical Simulation Approach is 
that by producing a small sample of scenarios to calculate risk, the 
occurrence of unlikely events that could lead to devastating results for 
the economy are underrepresented and not highlighted. This could be 
supported by using the Monte Carlo Approach in addition as this would 
provide a bank with more results to measure risk accurately. It should 
not be forgotten that the Historical Simulation Approach is by far the most 
commonly used risk measuring tool for VaR and signifies huge 
popularity.970 What needs to be done is to look at ways in which the 
Historical Simulation Approach can be improved and made more robust. 
This would mean that the benefits of improving would cascade to all those 
that apply, which from the material discussed is substantial. 
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Value-at-Risk - Monte Carlo Simulation Approach 
 
The third and final approach used to calculate VaR is the Monte Carlo 
Simulation Approach.971 There are two noticeable weaknesses, one which 
is the ability to calculate the parameter of the distributions, and two, how 
the Monte Carlo Simulation Approach is extremely computer intensive for 
most banks to conduct.972 The former is a problem in that the risk analyst 
must be able to predict the parameters for distribution which covers areas 
such as variances and covariances. However, due to the complexity it is 
arguable to assert that many risk analysts struggle with this calculation 
and this may lead to incorrect estimates. The latter weakness is also 
linked with the complexity of this approach and that the computer 
resources needed are great and whilst this method can calculate many 
scenarios, it struggles with large and complex portfolios. If this approach 
cannot calculate large and complex portfolios then there are only two 
outcomes. One, results will not be accurate. Two, and leading from the 
first, other models need to be sought in order to compensate for this 
weakness and to give a more accurate figure. 
 
The best approach is an obvious one, to use all three approaches to 
gather and compile more reliable and accurate figures for VaR. This also 
complements a previous recommendation made in that VaR is limited in 
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volatile markets and one should use several risk calculating models and 
approaches to gain a clearer picture. By doing so, a bank can collate 
several forms of statistical data which will give a wider perspective of the 
field. 
 
Value-at-Risk – Conclusion 
 
It is apparent that VaR has many weaknesses from its inability to 
calculate risk in volatile markets to the three approaches used to calculate 
VaR. There are shortcomings that cannot be overlooked. What can be 
deduced from this is that a large task remains in order for VaR to be 
strengthened and for it to become more flexible, versatile, and accurate 
in producing risk data and numerical reporting.    
 
VaR is dependent on data surrounding volatilities and correlations and 
tries to employ a set formula to estimate future risk. VaR endeavours to 
do this based on stationary market conditions and that prices remain 
stable and smooth, not taking into account extreme events and possible 
reverberations. Due to VaR operating in this manner leads to many 
problems. It would not, therefore, be unfair to say that VaR is an 
unreliable risk measuring tool, which is exposed during volatile times. 
The inability to predict future volatility in the market is somewhat of an 






Unfortunately, there is no suitable mechanism that improves VaR in order 
for it to calculate both normal and volatile market conditions at present. 
If this can be accomplished along with longer horizons, then a better and 
stronger platform can be achieved. On this point it is worth stating that 
the Basel Committee did try to strengthen VaR by incorporating SVaR, 
and whilst this chapter is solely concerned with risks and shortcomings it 
would be unfair to not include a brief discussion on this addition (also see 
Chapter 2). Although, what will be pointed out is that there are 
weaknesses of SVaR too. 
 
In brief, SVaR is a tool aimed at decreasing the impact of pro-cyclicality. 
SVaR was introduced in Basel II.5 (see Chapter 2). What this meant was 
that a bank using internal models would now have to include a further 
calculation highlighting SVaR. The whole purpose of this and the reason 
as to why it has been reflected on here, is that the VaR tool that has been 
used since the adoption in the late 1990s, did not account for volatile 
market conditions. On this basis, SVaR was introduced to combat this 
problem and will, in theory, enable a bank to look at periods of stress 
outside of normal market conditions. As an end result, SVaR can be 
viewed as more of a stress test result. The way in which SVaR is 
calculated or recommended to be calculated, is to conduct calculations 
on a weekly basis by using historical data and regulators expect capital 






Whilst SVaR can be initially interpreted as an improvement to VaR, it is 
not without fault. This is the second reason as to why it has been 
mentioned at this point of Chapter 4 and that whilst the Basel Committee 
have tried to strengthen VaR, there are still risks associated namely, a 
stressed period calculation must relate to a period of stress a bank has 
encountered973 and this can be a massive computational task. Another 
risk is the structural challenges that present themselves with products 
that have been introduced after the stressed period calculation and where 
no historical data is available.974 Further to this, Cabana identifies that 
the bank industry opined that by including SVaR in addition to VaR 
actually double counts risk,975 additionally it does not incentivise banks 
to improve their own VaR models. 976  Needless to say that whilst 
intentions are in the utmost highest, VaR in general (including SVaR) still 
presents a huge risk for Basel III and banking regulation. The measures 
put in place since the financial crisis has yet to produce a real solution to 
this problem. On this note, it is no surprise that many critics have argued 
for VaR to be abandoned977 due to the amount of problems that persist. 
The author of the research would disagree with this argument and assert 
that VaR still has a place in the banking and financial sector, what needs 
to be done is for it to be strengthened by evaluating better, as well as 
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using other risk calculating tools to compliment VaR i.e. there should not 
be over reliance. By doing so, the author believes that VaR can still play 
an important role and assist appropriately through the Basel regulations. 
A similar stance was stated by Kennedy in which he said, ’The wrong 
response is to dispense with Var. The right response is to understand it 
for what it is and supplement it with other information…‘.978 The author 
would concur with this statement, simply because there are many 
positives that come from VaR. Also, there is no better alternative to use 
and it would be ludicrous to remove VaR entirely. It should be 
acknowledged that VaR is so ingrained in the Basel regulations that to 
take out VaR altogether would be very difficult and almost impossible due 
to its inclusion since Basel I. 
 
The general consensus is that Basel III is too fragmented979 and it is 
because of this that a new approach should be generated in order to deal 
with capital adequacy.  
 
To safeguard VaR as the primary risk measuring tool, a combination of 
models and approaches need to be used for every risk calculation. As 
Crouhy et al. stipulate, ’The many different dimensions of risk require a 
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range of complementary risk metrics, and always have done‘.980 Hence 
by taking a well rounded approach to risk a better formulated and detailed 
collation of data will be derived, and in return produce a better and more 
robust set of results that should enable a bank to make a stronger 
conclusion from the risk being quantified. If successful, it could also help 
with identifying volatilities and risks without delay.981 Burchi is correct, 
and this would be of great use going forward. If this can be achieved, 
whether partially or in full, then it will create positive effects for world 
economies. In Chapter 5 the recommendation put forward by the author 
of using several models and approaches, and better regulation will be 
explored; this encompasses the areas of risk detailed during this section 




In Chapter 4 the main three risks and shortcomings were examined. It 
has been highlighted that whilst the Basel regulations have improved 
since Basel I, there is still a lot of work to do in order for the Basel 
regulations to become more robust and for encouraging and supporting 
robust banking and financial regulation protocol. 
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Firstly, it was acknowledged that capital ratios are an integral part of the 
Basel regulations and for banking regulation. It was explained how it will 
be too costly for some banks to reach and the target set for full 
implementation is unachievable. It was also explained that capital ratios 
have been focused on too much and to the extent that other areas have 
been neglected such as liquidity levels, albeit an area which has been 
discussed in recent years by the Basel Committee. Liquidity and over 
reliance will be the main talking points in Chapter 5 when discussing 
recommendations on new measures going forward.  
 
Secondly, it was illustrated how CRAs have played a huge role since Basel 
II and the impact that this has had in recent times. The failure to foresee 
the financial crisis is the strongest evidence to date that indicates reform 
needs to happen. There were four major weaknesses explored: high 
concentration, over reliance, poor process by which sovereign debt is 
rated, and conflicts of interest. Regulation will be the main talking point 
in chapter 5 when recommending new measures for going forward. 
 
Thirdly, the final risk examined was VaR; a complex tool to calculate risk. 
It was highlighted how VaR contains many risks and that for such an 
important role it conducts, there are many inadequacies that raise serious 
doubt of it as a risk measuring tool, and inclusion in the Basel regulations 
has been questioned. Risks covered included: inability to cope with 
volatile markets, struggles with complex products, over reliance of VaR, 





Simulation Approach and Monte Carlo Simulation Approach. In Chapter 5 
it will be discussed how VaR can be improved by looking at other risk 
calculating models to support VaR, as well as looking at the ways in which 
the current approaches for calculating risk under VaR can be 
strengthened. The use of several models and approaches, and regulation 
will be the main talking points in chapter 5 when recommending new 
measures going forward. 
 
What Chapter 4 has endeavoured to articulate is that there are 
weaknesses of Basel III, similarly to Basel I and II, and that the author 
believes the three aforementioned are some of the most harmful. It 
should be appreciated that it is easy to criticise and pinpoint weakness; 
the hard part is to rectify those weaknesses. On this note the next and 
final chapter will consolidate the material discussed, offering 
recommendations to improve Basel III with future regulation in mind and 














CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Chapter 4 explored three main risks and shortcomings of Basel III; capital 
ratios, CRAs and VaR. The research has drawn a picture of how the Basel 
regulations began and developed over the years to the current period of 
time. It has also been illustrated that despite several versions of the Basel 
regulations there is more work to be done. The remainder of this chapter 
will draw from the risks and shortcomings expressed in Chapter 4, thus 
concluding the entire research. The main points will be as follows. 
 
Capital Ratios - The main issues here are cost and an unachievable 
deadline (and that by increasing capital levels will solve the problems that 
occurred during the financial crisis). In addition, over reliance by the 
Basel Committee in that capital adequacy is the central concept of 
banking regulation whilst neglecting other facets such as quality of capital 
and liquidity. The main talking point and suggested solution from these 
issues and how this can be narrowed further, will be to focus on liquidity 
levels whilst appreciating that an over reliance by the Basel committee 
has been evident for many years. In summary, liquidity will be the focal 
point of capital ratios in Chapter 5. 
 
CRAs - The main issues here are high concentration, over reliance, 
processes by which sovereign debt is rated, and conflicts of interest. The 
main talking point and suggested solution to be taken from these issues 





regulation, less emphasis on CRAs, more competition, reduction of 
importance given to CRAs and the over reliance of such, increase 
regulation or limit use of CRAs, and more accountability. These issues 
overlap and will be merged. In summary, regulation will be the focal point 
of CRAs. 
 
VaR - The main issues here are the inability to cope with volatile markets, 
it struggles with complex products, over reliance of VaR, applied 
incorrectly, and the three approaches to calculating risk which are the 
Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach, Historical Simulation Approach 
and the Monte Carlo Simulation Approach. Therefore, the main talking 
points and suggested solution will be the use of several models and 
approaches as this will encompass all of the aforementioned issues bar 
applied incorrectly, this will fall under the heading of regulation. In 
summary, the use of several models and approaches and regulation will 
be the focal points. 
 
There are two reasons why Chapter 5 will focus on the three aforesaid 
areas. Firstly, the author believes these to be the main issues surrounding 
Basel III and it continues from those weaknesses discussed in Chapter 4. 
Secondly, Chapter 5 concentrates on conclusions and recommendations 
and, therefore, the three aforementioned risks and shortcomings will be 
considered in order to devise recommendations so that Basel III can 
become stronger, especially with Basel reforms arriving in the not too 







The main talking points in this section will be liquidity levels whilst taking 
into account the issue of over reliance by the Basel Committee i.e. that 
capital adequacy is the central concept of banking regulation. Liquidity 
levels will be examined as this played a significant part in the financial 
crisis. Furthermore, it highlighted that whilst minimum capital 
requirements are paramount, sufficient liquidity levels are needed to 
further support financial stability. As Trevisan points out,982 adequate 
liquidity levels are also required.  
 
The financial crisis revealed that banks did not hold sufficient liquid 
means983 and uncovered that Basel II was inadequate and lacking robust 
regulation when it came to liquidity.984 Consider the case of Northern 
Rock985 where minimum capital requirements were exceeded but liquidity 
levels were low. 986  The business plan used was based not only on 
borrowing from the United Kingdom, but also the international money 
markets. In essence, Northern Rock relied on international money 
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markets to a far greater extent than others, so when the market began 
to erode Northern Rock was in a situation where they could not repay 
their loans. Interestingly the then FSA stipulated that Northern Rock was 
solvent and met the minimum capital requirements. It now seems that 
the FSA were trying to settle the nerves of those connected rather than 
accepting the true effects of what was about to unravel.987 Knowingly or 
unknowingly is a different matter altogether. Perhaps another reason was 
that nobody expected the bond markets to freeze.988 Haynes suggests 
that it was a combination of trying to instill confidence in the market by 
the then FSA and that the possible freezing of the bond markets was not 
anticipated. Either way, the crisis quickly unfolded.  
 
The author has stipulated that liquidity was a huge problem for capital 
ratios during the financial crisis, therefore it would be helpful to 
reconsider what liquidity is in order to comprehend the points that will be 
discussed over the coming section. Liquidity can be described as, ’…a 
bank’s ability to fund asset increases and meet financial obligations, 
without incurring damaging losses‘.989 The financial crisis illuminated the 
problematic area of liquidity and the impact it could have in banking. To 
tackle the problems that occurred during this time i.e. excess liquidity 
risk, weak quality of capital and excess leverage; the Basel Committee 
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introduced new liquidity regulation. Basel III was in part drafted in order 
to stop future financial crises caused by liquidity issues, and how further 
work is still required to improve this. Bearing in mind that Chapter 5 is 
concerned with conclusions and recommendations, ideas will be put 
forward to enhance this area of banking regulation.  
 
Capital Ratios - Liquidity  
 
The financial crisis made it clear that liquidity and banking regulation both 
need each other. The insufficient liquidity levels and quality of liquidity in 
banks leading up to and during this time were unstable and levels of 
liquidity were low. Due to confidence in the financial markets leading to 
the ease of acquiring low cost funding, it is now clear to see the major 
crash that would eventually take place. This meant that when market 
conditions reversed there was an extreme reduction in liquidity levels.990 
The consequences and repercussions meant central banks, as well as 
regulatory bodies, had to secure those banks and markets in which were 
being operated.991 
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The introduction of liquidity regulation in the form of two new liquidity 
requirements 
 
It is important to consider what the Basel Committee have implemented, 
then recommendations can be put forward. In September 2010 the Basel 
Committee with the aid of the Working Group on Liquidity,992 created new 
quantitative measures to tackle liquidity through Basel III. Jones 
comments, ’Prior to the crisis, asset markets were buoyant and funding 
was readily available at low cost. However, the rapid reversal in market 
conditions illustrated how quickly liquidity can dry up with the ensuing 
shortage potentially lasting for an extended period‘.993 
 
A keen focus was put on capital and liquidity levels. Lee suggests, ’…the 
rationale was that Basel III would negate the deleterious effects of 
liquidity shocks on credit extension‘.994 This is a valid point and one which 
was aided for the first time with detailed regulation in the form of liquidity 
rules 995  and can be viewed as a move in the right direction. This 
movement began with a paper that was published prior to September 
2010 during the turmoil of the financial crisis titled ”Principles for Sound 
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Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision“,996 and was promoted by the 
Basel Committee with an aim of improving liquidity risk management. To 
bolster these principles, the Basel Committee created two minimum 
liquidity standards based on those worked on with the Working Group on 
Liquidity in 2010. Both aimed to reinforce the principles laid out in the 
aforementioned paper and to further improve liquidity measures so that 
a future financial crisis could be curtailed. Essentially, the minimum 
liquidity standards should allow banks to become more resilient when 
faced with short and medium term problems.997 Cranston et al. are not 
wrong, by introducing liquidity measures through the Basel regulations 
does, in theory, acknowledge that liquidity is vital for financial stability 
and that it will improve banking regulation going forward. 
 
The two new measures are LCR and NSFR. The rather interesting point 
here is that this was the first time that detailed global liquidity rules were 
put in place998 and a milestone for banking regulation. Both measures are 
crucial for Basel III and liquidity measures as both aim to toughen capital 
and liquidity standards. It should be acknowledged that there are other 
traditional risk measures ranging from nonperforming assets to brokered 
deposits ratio, but the research will focus on LCR and NSFR as they were 
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both born from the financial crisis and promote the liquidity standards 
encapsulated in the 2008 Basel Committee paper.999 
 
We now need to consider what LCR and NSFR have striven to accomplish 
by contributing to stronger capital and liquidity measures. As will be 
exposed, more work is needed. 
 
Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR)  
 
The purpose of LCR is to make sure that banks are resilient in holding a 
sufficient quantity of liquid assets to cover all needs during a thirty day 
period.1000 This will be used in stressed conditions such as a credit rating 
downgrade, wholesale market restrictions, or secured funding is in need 
of collateral. These instances will require a bank to use their liquid assets 
to remain stable and efficient. 
 
Baber succinctly describes LCR as:  
 
 ’At all times, investment firms and credit institutions must hold  
 liquid assets, the sum of which equals or exceeds the liquidity  
 outflows less the  liquidity inflows under stressed conditions, so as 
 to ensure that these organisations maintain sufficient levels of  
                                               
999 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management 
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 liquidity buffers to address any possible imbalance between  
 inflows and the outflows, under gravely stressed conditions over a 
 30-day period‘1001 
 
Keeping this in mind, LCR has been described as a tool to strengthen 
banks and the ability to withstand adverse shocks in the market1002 and 
should allow a bank to withstand financial volatility until day thirty, at 
which point a supervisor should have put in place appropriate 
measures.1003 In short, LCR aims to soften liquidity stress events over a 
thirty day period.  
 
What LCR endeavours to achieve is to energise banks to hold high quality 
liquid assets1004 (HQLAs) that have no burden. This will address the 
problem that most banks had during the financial crisis whereby liquid 
assets were of poor quality and severely impeded. This can be associated 
to decades of decline in liquidity ratio which started from the 1960s when 
banks lent more and accumulated poor assets, as Elliott notes.1005 The 
introduction of HQLAs are to counterbalance and offset net cash outflows 
that are evident during times of short term liquidity problems.  
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What the Basel Committee are trying to do here is obvious in that by 
requiring banks to hold HQLAs means that these can be converted into 
cash with little cash loss (subject to haircuts) when needed. Essentially, 
HQLAs are of the highest quality and by nature most liquid. This was not 
evident leading to and during the financial crisis. The benefit of HQLAs is 
that they are unencumbered assets that can be converted easily to meet 
liquidity needs.1006 Ugeux raises a valid point and it is one that can save 
banks in the future, after all if high quality assets are plentiful and can 
fast and freely be turned into liquid assets, then a bank stands a much 
better chance of remaining stable during financial hard times. 
 
LCR is rather strict and in the absence of banking stress an ongoing 
minimum of 100 percent must be maintained by a bank. Further to this, 
in order to be classed as a HQLA the asset must be liquid in short term 
stress scenarios combined with being available for intervention by central 
banks.1007 Banks will be required to hold these HQLAs to meet extreme 
cash outflow for the next thirty days. Therefore, LCR can be expressed 
as stock of HQLAs over total net cash outflows of the next thirty days. 
Furthermore, the stressed cash outflow will include a segment of retail 
deposits and all wholesale funding which is due to mature within thirty 
days.1008 It should be noted that banks can offset part of wholesale 
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funding with an inflow of funds they have placed with other banks, 
provided that maturity is within the next thirty days. A further point to 
note is that a currency by currency basis will apply so that banks can 
survive major disruption in the market place and also exchange rate 
fluctuations that may affect currency convertibility, thus providing more 
stability. There are two types of assets under LCR, level 1 and level 2. 
The former containing cash and central bank reserves as well as securities 
backed by central banks and sovereignties. Level 1 can be held on an 
unlimited basis 1009  and has no haircut. These consist of coins and 
banknotes for example and are the most liquid of assets.1010 The latter is 
split into level 2a and level 2b, consisting of government securities, bonds 
and debt securities for level 2a, and lower rated corporate bonds or 
residential mortgage securities for level 2b. Level 2 can be held up to 40 
percent of stock and has a 15 percent (level 2a) and 50 percent (level 
2b) haircut.1011 In essence, to gain the minimum 100 percent stipulated 
by the Basel Committee would mean a 60/40 split between the two types 
of assets held under LCR.  
 
In summary, what can be ascertained is that HQLAs are assets that can 
be sold with little or no loss on the private market and should not be 
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affected in stressed market conditions.1012 A welcomed addition to the 
Basel regulations that should bolster the rules on liquidity. 
 
The implementation period for LCR began 1 January 20151013 and started 
at 60 percent. This will increase to 100 percent by 1 January 2019, thus 
increasing by 10 percent every year. It is wise to include an 
implementation period so that countries and banks are able to 
accommodate such regulation. Whether this implementation period of 
four years will suffice is yet to be seen. 
 
LCR is perceived to be a positive addition for the Basel regulations for 
many reasons, for example assets ’parked‘ with brokers. Petitjean states, 
’…assets that are ”parked“ with prime brokers by institutional investors 
can be very quickly withdrawn and no longer available as a source of 
financing in repo transactions‘.1014 This produced instability and severe 
cash outflows at times of crisis, which is not a desired effect during bad 
economic times. It is a positive step forward for liquidity because prior to 
this point parked assets could be withdrawn at speed, increasing the 
chances of instability. By introducing LCR a bank will have a safety net to 
protect against instances of this nature.   
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It is firmly believed that LCR will be an integral part of the reforms 
currently taking place and will enable the banking system to become 
more robust and durable in stressed scenarios.1015 With that in mind, and 
before the weaknesses of LCR are discussed and recommendations are 
suggested, the second new measure (NSFR) will be explored.  
 
Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) 
 
The goal of NSFR is to make sure a bank is able to support itself over a 
longer period as the financial crisis made it evident that the idea of long 
term loans with short term deposits being safe was refuted during this 
time.1016 Basically, banks began to increase funding from the capital 
markets and the short term aspects of such became unreliable. In respect 
of long term funding this can be described as the following:  
 
 ’Investment firms and credit institutions are to ensure that their  
 long-term funding requirements are sufficiently met with a variety 
 of stable funding instruments, in order to satisfy their financing  
 obligations in the long run as they come due, in an orderly 
 manner, under both normal and stressed circumstances’…these  
 organisations must ensure they (i) prudently assess the 
 quantity of assets they are not able to cover to cash during times 
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 of prolonged unpredictable and systemic market stress of at 
 least one year’s duration, and (ii) maintain at least an equal 
 amount of stable funding with an effective maturity that is 
 prudently assessed to be more than a year under stress 
 conditions‘1017 
 
In light of the aforesaid and in comparison to LCR, NSFR looks at longer 
term funding1018 of bank assets and the activities undertaken, and is 
designed as a more structural measure.1019 NSFR aims to create and 
ensure a minimum stable funding standard of one year horizon, hence 
the difference between it and LCR; although it does have a similar 100 
percent minimum level.1020 In essence, NSFR works to reduce maturity 
mismatches that can occur between assets and liabilities in relation to 
remaining contractual maturities that have one or more years to run. 
What NSFR promotes is the need for banks to hold long term debt or 
equity against difficult to finance products.1021 Davis states that NSFR 
operates as the following, ’…the more the bank’s liabilities are liquid, the 
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more the bank is required to hold liquid assets on its balance sheet…‘.1022 
This conclusion is sensible, after all liquid assets should be able to cover 
bank’s liabilities. The aim of NSFR is to reduce the reliance on short term 
whole sale funding in instances where market liquidity is plentiful, and 
because of this it endorses better liquidity measurement risk with on and 
off sheet balance facets.1023 As Wandhofer notes, this enables banks to 
reduce any over reliance on whole sale funding which was a cause of the 
financial crisis.1024 
 
NSFR can be expressed as available stable funding 1025  (ASF) over 
required stable funding1026 (RSF). This is so less stress and pressure are 
put on central banks and are thus excluded from NSFR. Basel III 
stipulates that the ratio should be greater than one in order to meet the 
requirements set and this will enable ASF to meet the RSF over the 
evaluation period.1027 The ASF is made up of several forms of stable 
funding from maturities over one year, stable deposits, less stable 
deposits, and unsecured wholesale funding if it is provided by non-
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financial corporates and sovereignties etc.1028 The RSF is made up of cash 
and money market instruments to unencumbered equity securities and 
unencumbered corporate and covered bonds ranging from 0 to 85 
percent.1029  
 
The implementation of NSFR was scheduled for 1 January 2018 due to 
the amount of time it will take banks to comply, compared with an earlier 
date for LCR.1030 However, due to issues with LCR among other teething 
problems, there was concern that it could be delayed 1031  or even 
cancelled.1032 It has since come to fruition.1033 To cancel NSFR does seem 
implausible as NSFR was only introduced in 2010 and has yet to be fully 
implemented. It would be irresponsible to cancel something that has not 
yet fully formed. Furthermore, it has been suggested that NSFR will be 
the easier of the two measures to adhere to and that most banks, those 
of a large nature at least, are already meeting the minimum 100 percent 
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requirement.1034 Therefore, perhaps what should be done is to amend 
and modify NSFR to make it more applicable and a useful tool alongside 
LCR. Either way, adjustments need to be made. 1035  As Schwerter 
highlights, Basel III did make the financial system more stable, but it also 
created incentives for market participants. Therefore, adjustments are 
required and LCR and NSFR are a step in the right direction. 
 
In summary and reference to both LCR and NSFR measures, if a bank 
believes that the guidelines cannot be met then the appropriate regulator 
should be contacted with a plan to comply within a suitable timescale.1036 
Until this is achieved, regular reports must be provided on the progress 
of achieving the required standards. The author would applaud this 
common sense approach as this will help a smoother transition for full 
adherence to the two liquidity measures. It is believed that NSFR as well 
as LCR will have a positive impact for the banking industry and will 
provide more resilience to a (still) fragile environment.1037 Whilst this 
may be true there are some notable weaknesses that need to be rectified 
in order for this to happen, some of which have been recognised by the 
Basel Committee1038 of which will be alluded to now. 
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There are problematic areas that surround LCR and NSFR which prohibit 
these new measures from becoming useful tools. For instance, the 
conflicting incentives that both measures promote that influence how a 
bank approaches funding.1039 Pinedo believes that NSFR, for example, 
would create an incentive to place more focus on longer term funding but 
the conflicting point here is that a bank will also have the desire to limit 
longer term obligations. Some of these areas will now be analysed to 
highlight the need for further work to the liquidity framework. There will 
be clear links with what has been identified in Chapter 4 i.e. high costs 
and implementation period. 
 
Firstly, high costs will be a problem for those banks that rely heavily on 
short term wholesale funding.1040 The is due to the Basel III regulations 
imposed i.e. LCR and NSFR, so banks that rely on short term wholesale 
funding will find it hard to meet these ratios. LCR for 30 days and NSFR 
for longer, means that banks will have to change the way in which they 
operate thus equalling higher costs to adapt to. Equally, it will hurt those 
banks that have insufficient quantities of HQLAs. This will mean that 
adjustments will be required to comply with these new minimum ratios. 
On the point of HQLAs, some banks argue that there are not enough of 
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them to obtain in the country that they operate in. This could be due to 
small government debt or less developed economies. Evidently, if there 
are no opportunities to obtain HQLAs then a bank will find it almost 
impossible to meet the Basel III requirements. 1041  This problem is 
currently immersing the Asian Pacific and Middle Eastern regions; 
although it has been recognised that alternative solutions are needed and 
have been accepted in some countries, for instance Sharia law which 
cannot use certain HQLAs such as interest bearing debt securities.1042 The 
discretion by the Basel Committee is sensible as obtaining HQLAs in 
compliance with Sharia law would have been hard to satisfy.  
 
Secondly, profitability will come into question due to banks having to 
adjust balance sheets so that more HQLAs are held, often being of low 
yield. The bank in this instance will need to raise more expensive retail 
deposits and medium and long term wholesale funding will need to be 
further sourced whilst reducing long term lending.1043 This will not only 
reduce the yield on a bank’s assets but also increase liabilities. Needless 
to say, a tough task for most that will cause problems. 
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Thirdly, international banks will be affected in that the ability to move 
funds and liquidity from one place to another will be more arduous.1044 
This is due to more control being asserted by local governments which 
will restrict what was once controlled centrally by a bank. In the end, the 
freedom to move will be stifled and flexibility will almost vanish as a 
consequence of these changes. The author would postulate that a 
problem may arise whereby an international bank is experiencing 
financial trouble due to a financial crisis in one market and may be reliant 
on liquid funds from its base in another market. If it is more difficult to 
move liquidity between jurisdictions, this could prove costly for said bank.  
 
Fourthly and similar to the first weakness, high costs will be incurred due 
to assembling data, monitoring mismatches and assessing those 
mismatches for maturities and putting in place robust plans should the 
worst happen.1045 The time and money needed to put in place recovery 
plans are detrimental in that pressure will be put on contingency liquid 
arrangements. In practice, constant testing will be required and different 
stress tests will need to be in place to recognise periods of 
abnormality;1046 this adding to the already high costs. A further hindrance 
is that the Basel Committee does not have as much experience in this 
area compared to capital which the Basel Committee have vast amounts 
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of research and data since Basel I.1047 As a consequence this is an achilles 
heel for the Basel Committee. 
 
What can be ascertained from the above weaknesses is that the risks 
associated with LCR and NSFR are not necessarily the mechanisms but 
rather the cost, time and structural changes that need to occur for 
implementation. This view also corresponds with a recent study in 
Germany which found that most large banks will struggle to comply with 
LCR and NSFR, yet smaller and medium size banks would be able to 
accommodate more easy.1048 The study suggests that because of the 
sheer scale of large banks, the cost, time and structural changes will be 
highly burdensome and difficult to accomplish, especially in the time 
period put forward by the Basel Committee. If large banks in an 
established economy like Germany are likely to find the liquidity 
framework difficult, then other large banks in leading economies will do 
so too. Angermuller believes that the new requirements will have a 
considerable impact and this is partly to do with the German banking 
market consisting of smaller banks rather than larger ones. Smaller banks 
in Germany have not faced the same problems as their larger 
counterparts and this often impacts on regulatory costs.1049 Bearing this 
in mind and what has been discussed around liquidity in the research, 
recommendations will now be considered in order to improve liquidity. 
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It should be acknowledged that making the liquidity framework stronger 
will alleviate the problem of the issue of over reliance; a problem 
previously highlighted in the research, therefore no recommendation(s) 
will be put forward in this respect because whilst liquidity falls under the 
auspice of capital ratios it moves away from high capital illiquid assets to 
high capital liquid assets; a problem that plagued banks during the 
financial crisis. 
 
It should be noted that the author acknowledges what the Basel 
Committee have tried to do with these liquidity measures in order to 
combat the problematic area of liquidity. However, there is still much 
more to do to improve the liquidity framework. 
 
Firstly, consideration needs to be given toward LCR, HQLAs and the 
optimistic implementation period. The addition of quality assets has been 
an important introduction for the new liquidity framework put forward by 
the Basel Committee. Whilst the author strongly endorses the addition of 
LCR alongside HQLAs, the author would recommend a longer 
implementation period to allow banks to acquire the amount required. 
Whilst a deadline for full implementation by 1 January 2019 has been set, 
it would appear too optimistic and tough to meet. Considering that LCR 
began on 1 January 2015, the gradual rise from 60 percent to 100 percent 





HQLAs take time to acquire, especially if a bank has many poor quality 
assets. Also, in some countries HQLAs are hard to come by (Asia and the 
Middle East) and a bank will struggle to obtain the minimum amount 
required. By allowing more time a bank will be able to obtain the 
necessary HQLAs without compromising on the asset itself or risking 
profits. Additionally, it has been found that many banks believe that a 
longer implementation date would allow those banks to facilitate toward 
full compliance and it would also allow banks to adopt less costly 
strategies. 1050  In a worst case scenario a bank may cut corners in 
reaching the target set. Whilst a longer implementation period is not ideal 
as there is always a risk that another financial crisis could occur in that 
time, it would seem the most appropriate action in order for it to be 
conducted correctly. The author would also suggest that the implications 
of some countries adopting the liquidity requirements earlier than 
expected can have potentially negative implications that could change the 
supply and demand landscape, 1051  thus reinforcing a longer 
implementation period. 
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Secondly, and following a similar path, are the implementation issues 
surrounding the EU with specific regard to HQLAs.1052 The issue is the 
complexity of current EU rules and trying to harmonise these rules with 
the Basel III framework. Also, it is apparent that like the United States 
the EU favours its own debt over others. What this means is that bank 
portfolio managers will struggle to optimise their portfolio over several 
jurisdictions. The second issue points to the first recommendation 
previously cited and that a longer implementation period is needed. A 
longer implementation period would allow problems such as those 
discussed within the EU to be extinguished and would also rectify 
favouritism towards own debt. It should be noted that the EU is not the 
only region to favour own debt, Droogenbroek comments that the United 
States also favour their own debt. The United States did this whilst 
finalising their LCR compliance procedure and only included agency 
mortgage backed securities in relation to HQLAs.1053 
 
Whilst a longer implementation period poses the risk of another financial 
crisis, it is unlikely1054 and in return there should be more co-operation 
and successful completion of the targets set by the Basel Committee. 
Unlike the first recommendation put forward in relation to HQLAs, it may 
take longer for the implementation period due to the rules and regulations 
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in place created by the EU. Therefore, it would seem logical to extend the 
implementation period. 
 
Thirdly, issues with HQLAs and definition of assets. The current definition 
of high quality assets is fairly narrow and strict. It would seem 
appropriate to reconsider the categories under this heading to include 
assets such as equities and gold.1055 This would also alleviate the problem 
faced by some banks whereby HQLAs are hard to obtain. It would also be 
helpful to include assets that are eligible at central bank level as history 
has shown that these type of assets are flexible and liquid during financial 
crises.1056 Due to the lack of future predictability of liquid assets, it is easy 
to see how valuable it could be to include a more diverse set of assets for 
banks to use. This would not only broaden the spectrum of HQLAs, it 
would also allow banks in Asia and the Middle East to obtain without 
hindrance. This would not affect the implementation period as it could be 
amended and included in the Basel regulations. 
 
The final recommendation is in relation to the ideology around liquidity 
risk management. This recommendation relates to liquidity risk 
management and what the culture was like during the time of the 
financial crisis. The problem that existed at the time was a culture of 
extremely high confidence and belief that the many years of vast money 
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and profit making was never going to stop. Many viewed the notion of 
liquidity risk management as regulation that needed to be complied with, 
almost a burden,1057 rather than an important tool to combat financial 
risk. It is this lack of respect and utter disregard for liquidity risk 
management was the downfall for a lot of banks. The idea that bonds and 
structured credit could be sold anytime, or that VaR was the perfect tool 
because it had always produced satisfying results, aided this further. 
 
It has been highlighted that loans were growing faster every year than 
stable funding and relying on VaR and other ratio based tools implied 
everything was secure and stable. So why question and place any real 
importance on liquidity risk management it could be argued.1058 It is easy 
to state that liquidity management should be taken more seriously, but 
considering the environment which existed leading up to the financial 
crisis would have been difficult for most to contemplate. Evidently, that 
is what happened.  
 
The author would suggest that all banks, regardless of size, create a 
dedicated department to liquidity risk management. It should consist of 
suitably qualified persons and it should not include anyone who was 
involved during the years leading to and during the financial crisis. 
Furthermore, authority should be bestowed on the liquidity risk 
management department due to potential repercussions if they have 
                                               






insufficient influence. By doing so, liquidity risk will be prevalent in all 
banks and it will be taken more seriously due to a dedicated team and 
that those working within the department will not have experienced the 
arrogant or naive culture that was rife before. This could be enforced by 
recommending and incorporating it into the Basel regulations as a best 




The new liquidity framework provides a strong set of rules for banks to 
adhere to when it comes to liquidity and it addresses some of the issues 
that led to the financial crisis. It further bolsters the principles laid down 
in the 2008 paper for better liquidity management.  
 
Since revisiting the principles1059 that were originally published in 2000 
i.e. Sound Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking Organisations,1060 
the Basel Committee have produced a set of guidelines since 2008. In a 
short period of time there is a noticeably better framework in place to 
combat liquidity issues. It is imperative that banks work efficiently and 
promptly to meet the requirements set by the Basel Committee. Whilst 
this will be difficult for all, some more than others, the financial crisis has 
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shown that having large amounts of capital which mainly consists of 
illiquid assets, are not able to save even the biggest of banks.  
 
Whilst a sooner rather than later approach would be ideal, it would not 
be practical and feasible to assume that all banks will be able to meet the 
deadlines set. The recommendations put forward by the author, for 
example a longer implementation period and a wider definition of HQLAs, 
would greatly help this cause. It would be advantageous to meet the 2019 
deadline, but unfortunately it is both unrealistic and burdensome. This 
could impact on lower profits for banks which in turn could mean that 
operations for those banks will be withdrawn or reduced in the countries 
operated in. Equally, the costs of having to implement over a short period 
of time could mean staff cuts and redundancies to retrieve monies spent 
on adhering to the new liquidity framework. 
 
In summary, the new liquidity framework is both necessary and beneficial 
for the prudent management and implementation of liquidity measures. 
It assists with the keen focus of Basel III - capital and liquidity standards 
and it will aid and support capital ratios and by default an over reliance 
placed on high minimum capital illiquid assets required by the Basel 
Committee since Basel I. It will also enable banks to raise a substantial 








CREDIT RATING AGENCIES 
 
At the beginning of Chapter 5 the main talking points in relation to CRAs 
were summarised. Specifically, these were tighter regulation, less 
emphasis on CRAs, more competition, reduction of importance given to 
CRAs and the over reliance of such, limited use of CRAs, and more 
accountability. All of these points will assist in strengthening banking 
regulation and also refine CRAs and their role in providing prudent 
financial reports. Some of these points will overlap and will be merged to 
form a more concise approach to tackling the issues that come from 
CRAs, and how to improve the negative effects that they have produced. 
To consolidate the aforementioned points, the main talking point will be 
regulation whilst bearing in mind the issue of over reliance. Regulation 
will cover the aforesaid areas listed as they all fall under the auspice of 
regulation in some form or other. 
 
In the author’s opinion CRAs had a detrimental impact on the banking 
sector,1061 which has been reported widely. Recommendations will be 
made regarding this area to help restore and strengthen the banking 
industry. It should be appreciated that CRAs were not the only weak link 
in the chain of events leading to the financial crisis (also consider that 
banks contributed and that banks were languorous when constructing 
                                               
1061 Matt Krantz, ‘2008 Crisis Still Hangs Over Credit-Rating Firms’ 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/09/13/credit-rating-agencies-2008-






their capital portfolio,1062 as well as constructing securitised bond sales 
that inflated bond ratings1063  for example. There are, in fact, many 
advocates for the theory put forward that banks were disingenuous when 
constructing securitised bonds.)1064 Let it be clear that the author does 
not agree with the notion that CRAs should be eradicated, but rather over 
reliance reduced.1065 
 
Regulation is the solution and will now be discussed.  
 
Credit Rating Agencies - Regulation  
 
It now beckons as to what has been done to limit the risks of CRAs by 
the Basel Committee and other policy makers. What can be observed 
since the recent recession is that CRAs should be better regulated and be 
held more accountable. The issues surrounding these problems among 
others have been discussed in Chapter 4, on this basis what needs to be 
considered here is what have the Basel Committee tried to do to rectify 
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this problem and bearing in mind any reforms and proposals that are and 
have been taking place around the world. 
 
Tighten regulation - What changes are taking place and have been 
suggested? 
 
First and foremost, the IOSCO model. A voluntary code of practice by a 
voluntary body, that encourages self regulation. It is a broad set of 
practices that have been endorsed throughout the world, particularly the 
United States and the EU. It should be said that the big three adhered to 
the practices put forward by IOSCO when it began in 2003. The author 
would assert that the reason for doing so was to maintain dominance in 
the market and by adhering to the IOSCO code enables the big three to 
continue the oligopoly.  
 
IOSCO was created before the financial crisis with a code of conduct 
fundamentals published in 2004. 1066  The date indicates that better 
regulation was required even before the financial crisis and thereafter. 
The fundamentals focused on practical measures and provided a 
framework for CRAs to implement the principles put forward and this 
would be on a macro basis.1067 However, contemplating the IOSCO model 
shows that self regulation does not work. The fact that one of the worst 
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recessions in history took place several years after this model was 
published is the obvious argument. The problem with self regulation is 
that it is open to interpretation and alteration. Equally, it does not help 
when there are structural deficiencies within a rating agency.1068  As 
EUROPA point out, ’Self-regulation based on voluntary compliance with 
the IOSCO code does not appear to offer an adequate, reliable solution 
to the structural deficiencies of the business‘.1069  
 
The model stated through the code aimed to deal with integrity, 
independence and transparency. 1070  The Committee of European 
Securities Regulators 1071  (CESR) published a paper shortly after the 
publication of the IOSCO code in which it stipulated several options to 
integrate the IOSCO code into European legislation; 1072  from full 
registration being the hardest approach to self regulation being the safest 
and easiest approach. The CESR chose the latter in what can only be 
viewed as conservative. The author would stipulate that this was to 
achieve a higher adoption rate of the IOSCO code. It could have also been 
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because historically CRAs have operated this way1073 as a result of CRAs 
being viewed as competent before the financial crisis, and that it would 
be difficult to enforce hard law i.e. statutory law to cover every aspect. 
 
It can be argued that if the CESR had taken a sterner approach and 
endorsed the full registration option, then the IOSCO model and code of 
practices may have succeeded. Due to self regulation being promoted, 
the model was likely to fail and the financial crisis portrays this. 
 
In light of the financial crisis the IOSCO model revised the code of practice 
in 2008 1074  and updated this to include acting responsible towards 
investors and issuers, to be more independent, and voice conflicts of 
interest among other topics. 1075  It changed from a macro set of 
regulations to micro set of regulations.1076 In 2009, IOSCO conducted a 
report based on the recent updated code of practice and found that the 
big three adhered to all. This is due to the big three already having their 
own code of conduct and the IOSCO code of practice was easier to 
integrate.1077 Smaller CRAs found it much harder to accommodate, the 
detectible reason being is that a code of conduct on the same level as the 
one concocted by IOSCO was not to the same extent. 
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The author argues that the IOSCO code fails on one glaringly obvious and 
rudimentary point that it is based on - self regulation - although it is good 
to observe that CRAs are being discussed as reform is needed and self 
regulation does not work.1078 The author would state that a firmer stance 
needs to be taken, that regulation needs to be set in stone and self 
regulation should not be given as an option as this can lead to 
modification. 
 
The IOSCO code has been criticised heavily for the reasons discussed and 
it is not surprising that it has been described as a toothless wonder1079 
as it cannot be enforced in any meaningful way. That said, it is a stepping 
stone nonetheless and can be improved further. This will be discussed in 
the recommendations subsection. 
 
Secondly, the Financial Stability Forum 1080  (FSF), now the Financial 
Stability Board1081  (FSB). In April 20081082 the forum suggested key 
improvements focusing on the quality of rating processes and the 
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assessment of underlying data quality by CRAs. 1083  Greater 
transparency1084 was the biggest issue and it was recommended that 
transparency was needed in rating practices as well as the publication of 
historical data. The forum went on to state that investors should consider 
how they use the data put forward by CRAs, that supervisory authorities 
should evaluate their role in relation to CRAs, and that supervisory rules 
are aligned with investor objectives i.e. due diligence and over reliance 
on CRAs. 
 
The suggestions put forward by the then FSF appears a better set of 
reform than the IOSCO model in that it works closely with national and 
regional initiatives1085 in key economic areas. The IOSCO model, due to 
its lack of legal enforceability combined with its self regulation option, 
falls short of becoming a crucial aid to the regulation of CRAs. That said, 
in the author’s opinion the IOSCO model is more far reaching and broad; 
consideration only needs to be given to the 2015 final report produced 
by IOSCO to realise the broadness of its capabilities such as broadening 
provision’s scope to apply to all securities, or broaden the scope of CRAs 
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having to maintain a review function, or replacing analysts with 
employees to broaden the scope of accountability.1086 
 
Thirdly, is the Securities Industry and Financial Markets Association1087 
(SIFMA). Like the FSF, SIFMA introduced recommendations so that CRAs 
can be better regulated.1088 Some examples include clear disclosure of 
ratings, disclosure of results for due diligence, and working towards a 
global framework.1089 Importantly, SIFMA encourages those involved, 
from legislators to regulators, to work more closely to accomplish the 
overall task of effective regulation of CRAs and the issues that were 
exposed during the financial crisis.  
 
Fourthly, the Turner Review.1090 The previous areas of reform have come 
from a United States and EU perspective, and it is worth briefly 
considering the United Kingdom and whether it has taken a similar 
approach. Rather than focusing primarily on CRAs, like IOSCO, FSF and 
SIFMA, the Turner Review considered CRAs along with other banking and 
financial matters in order to create a more stable banking system. 
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Interestingly, the report did not highlight CRAs as having a huge impact 
on the financial crisis rather that three issues that became apparent from 
the financial crisis were macro economic imbalance, financial market 
securitised trading instruments, and deficiencies in capital and liquidity. 
That is not to say that CRAs did not play their part and evidently the 
Turner Review recognised that reform was needed which was alluded to 
in the key recommendations put forward. 1091  One of these was the 
registration and supervision of CRAs to enable better corporate 
governance whilst managing conflicts of interest.1092 When considering 
the Turner Report in relation to the world stance on what should be done 
with CRAs, it can be viewed that the United Kingdom has taken a similar 
approach. 
 
Fifthly, soft law approaches have been discussed up to this point. It is 
prudent to consider some hard law regulation such as the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act 2010.1093 The Dodd-
Frank Act is in response to the too big to fail notion that was so apparent 
leading to and during the financial crisis and endeavours to tackle many 
problematic areas ranging from consumer protection to corporate 
governance. The Dodd-Frank Act also explores how credit ratings and 
CRAs can be better maintained and tackled i.e. Title IX Subtitle C.1094 
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Under the aforementioned, a new framework was created to not only 
regulate but govern CRAs as well as NRSROs. Congress is of the opinion 
that ratings were inaccurate1095 and the aforesaid Act endeavours to 
rectify this. Some of the areas that it looks to strengthen include 
governance, conflict of interest and transparency. The Act also 
encourages broader standards and the reduction of reliance placed on 
CRAs. 
 
The Dodd-Frank Act is a noticeable improvement for United States 
regulation, although it is too early to gauge how successful it has been. 
This is, in part, due to the many powers and provisions it gives to SEC 
and that SEC have yet to complete certain elements of mandates put 
forward by the Act for SEC to complete.1096 Nevertheless, it is a step in 
the right direction and other countries should follow suit. It should be 
acknowledged that in recent times there are plans to repeal large parts 
of the Dodd-Frank Act1097 and this could have huge implications for the 
better governance of CRAs and other related banking regulation issues. 
 
The final point to look at is what has the Basel Committee tried to do to 
tighten regulation in this area. Other than reversing the decision to 
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remove CRAs from the focal point of the Basel regulations,1098 the author 
would argue that the Basel Committee have done very little by way of 
tightening regulation in this sphere.  
 
Less emphasis on CRAs, reduction of importance given to CRAs and over 
reliance of such, limited use of CRAs - What changes are taking place and 
have been suggested?  
 
The International Monetary Fund1099 (IMF) has previously suggested that 
ratings given by CRAs have inadvertently affected and contributed to 
financial instability.1100 Despite this, there appears to have been little 
done in respect of reducing the emphasis, the importance, and limiting 
the use of CRAs and the reports they publish. Consideration will be given 
to what changes have taken place or have been suggested. 
 
Firstly, in the United States1101 and the EU,1102 some have suggested that 
a public credit rating agency should be devised. This does overlap with 
                                               
1098 Although they should not be removed entirely from existence, as they would be just 
replaced by identical entities. See H Langohr and P Langohr, The Rating Agencies and 
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Wiley and Sons Ltd 2009) 474 
1099 Consisting of many countries the IMF seeks to foster global monetary cooperation 
including financial security and international trade amongst other key aims. 
1100 John Kiff, ‘IMF Survey: Reducing Role of Credit Ratings Would Aid Markets’ 
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2010/RES092910A.htm accessed 16 
December 2016. 
1101 M. Ahmed Diomande, James Heintz and Robert Pollin, ‘Why US Financial Markets 
Need a Public Credit Rating Agency’ 
http://www.peri.umass.edu/media/k2/attachments/Why_U_S_Financial_Markets_Need_a_
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1102 Christian Scheinert, ‘The Case for a European Credit Rating Agency’ 
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the next subsection on more competition, but it may help in that less 
emphasis will be on the big three and that a fourth key credit rating 
agency should be used. This will be further discussed in the 
recommendations section as it has not come to fruition yet and could be 
of great assistance. 
 
Secondly, a common theme throughout the examination of CRAs has 
been the level of importance placed on them and not only from the Basel 
Committee. A consequence of this is that it has produced an over reliance 
of CRAs and the financial reports given, and the creation of a seal of 
quality.  
 
It should be appreciated that there has been no evidence to suggest that 
a reduction in importance and emphasis placed on CRAs will happen. In 
fact and perhaps the reason to why this has not happened, is the 
argument that by improving and tightening regulation will actually 
encourage over reliance of CRAs 1103  and this will not reduce the 
importance given but actually increase the same. The reason being is that 
if regulation is improved and it is much tighter than before, then it is 
enforcing the quality of CRAs and the work being conducted. A suggestion 
put forward has been to remove attention from the credit rating itself and 
focus on regulating the agencies.1104 If done, this would move the issue 
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away from the level of emphasis and importance given to CRAs and push 
the matter into the sphere of tighter regulation which could provide a 
solution to combating how CRAs derive the ratings published.  
 
Thirdly, and further to the opening comment of this subsection, the IMF 
have said that sovereign debt needs to be better managed; an issue 
highlighted in Chapter 4 by the author. This issue is not just by the ratings 
given but the over reliance of these ratings. More attention to detail 
should be assigned to the rating tasks stated by the IMF. Whilst this is 
comprehendible it is still with contemplation on how this would be done. 
In general, over reliance can be combatted by several solutions such as 
better analysis by users, authorities being more aware of adverse 
consequences, and policy makers accepting that smaller investors will 
rely heavily on CRAs. This may help the second point commented earlier 
in that the financial reports given by CRAs are seen as a seal of quality.  
 
What can be extracted from the above is that suggestions have been 
made but no solid policies have been acquired or put forward. Stronger 
action needs to be taken so that banking regulation is better supported. 
 
More competition - What changes are taking place and have been 
suggested?  
 
It can be said that more competition would help with the use of CRAs. If 





disband the current oligopoly and produce better competition. Whilst this 
may go against the idea of reducing the importance placed on CRAs in 
the last subsection; either take the approach of reducing the over reliance 
of CRAs or take the approach of creating more competition rather than 
relying on the current system. It is suggested that there is no problem in 
trying both or focusing on one.  
 
Firstly, the notion of a public credit rating agency. It has been suggested 
in the United States and highlighted in the previous subsection that a 
public credit rating agency would help,1105 especially in respect of the 
current issuer pays model.1106 It would also provide more competition to 
the big three in that whilst smaller CRAs have little impact in affecting 
competition, a public credit rating agency would have a more sizeable 
form factor in that it would be a public body and have the resources to 
fully compete with the big three. However, it should be noted that there 
has been some opposition in recent times from an EU perspective in that 
it is deemed to add little value, 1107  even though it was considered 
positively in 2010.1108 The author would suggest that one of the reasons 
                                               
1105 J Lowry and A Reisberg, Petter’s Company Law: Company Law & Corporate Finance 
(4th edn, Pearson Education Limited 2012) 449. 
1106 See DH Fischer, ‘The European Rating Fund’ (2018) 26(1) JFRC 72 for a discussion 
around the creation of a European Rating Fund which would act as a middle person 
between CRAs and the issuer. 
1107 See European Commission, ‘COM/2016/0664 Final’ http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1476967405955&uri=COM:2016:664:FIN accessed 16 December 
2016 in regards to the appropriateness and feasibility of supporting a European credit 
rating agency. 
1108 Aline van Duyne, ‘Reform of Rating Agencies Poses Dilemma’ Financial Times (New 
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for this change of opinion was due to political and economic factors. For 
example, the revenues it can produce are not only beneficial for the CRAs 
but also the countries in which they operate. So, less emphasis on the 
use of CRAs could hinder this revenue stream.  
 
Additionally, due to the potential scale of a public credit rating agency, it 
would be able to jump right in to tackling the competition issue (whilst 
there are over one hundred and fifty smaller CRAs, there is little impact 
due to size and scope) that has faced this area some time. It would not 
have to build a reputation or struggle to find funds to survive and 
compete as it would have a large investor to support from the beginning 
i.e. the tax payer. The only potential problem with a public rating agency 
as Haynes puts it, is that it could suffer from potential political 
pressure1109 and this could affect and be affected by one country to 
another. This has been seen in the past when French based Fitch did not 
downgrade French government debt when the other two big agencies 
did.1110 
 
Secondly, it has been suggested that more reform needs to take place 
due to competition issues not being addressed.1111 Further regulatory 
                                               
1109 Private meeting, Professor Andrew Haynes, 27 June 2018 University of 
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Rating by Moody’s’ The Telegraph (London, 19 November 2012) 
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changes need to be put forward and implemented in order for smaller 
firms to tackle the big three and this could be enforced through regulatory 
mechanisms. Although, there has been little by way of recommendations 
to support how this could be accomplished.  
 
Thirdly, the European Commission have stipulated that CRAs should 
disclose the information on ratings given and how they are based in order 
to increase competition, similar to the SEC 17g-5 rule.1112 Again, this is 
merely a recommendation and carries little weight. For further influence 
and from an EU perspective, a directive should be put forward to enforce 
a disclosure of information by CRAs and only then will this 
recommendation carry more weight. 
 
From what has been discussed there has been little by way of significant 
improvement to increase competition. It would seem that the best 
solution for the immediate future is to create a public credit rating 
agency. This would allow an immediate response to competition issues. 
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More accountability - What changes are taking place and have been 
suggested? 
 
It would seem logical that regulation and accountability go hand in hand. 
As Lowry and Reisberg purport, ’As CRAs become more and more 
regulated will that also mean they will be more accountable for their 
decisions in terms of liability?‘.1113 Consideration will be given to what is 
currently being deliberated in respect of accountability1114 and how that 
fits into the area of regulation because to state that accountability can be 
included in regulation is a tougher task than initially thought. This is 
because whilst CRAs provide reports and ratings on the creditworthiness 
of banks, they are only deemed to be providing opinions and not advice 
or recommendations. 
 
The only point to focus on here is the debate of whether CRAs provide 
opinions or whether they give advice. It is widely accepted that CRAs 
provide opinions1115 but that does and should not mean it is a barrier to 
responsibility and liability, as Lowry and Reisberg note.1116 The problem 
that develops from here is that if committees such as IOSCO and the 
European Commission accept that CRAs give opinions, then this has 
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created a form of belief that due to no advice and recommendation being 
provided CRAs should not be held accountable. This is particularly 
prevalent in the United States in which CRAs are protected under the First 
Amendment of the Constitution, freedom of press, and as such CRAs are 
viewed as giving an opinion in a journalistic capacity.1117 It should be 
noted that this was disputed in late 2009, but the case was later settled 
in 2013.1118 The difference between the United States and the EU seems 
to be one of ideological and traditional reasoning. The viewpoint from the 
United States stems from the Constitution and therefore dates back many 
years and this cannot be replicated from an EU perspective. Contrary to 
this, the notion of freedom of press is disputed in the EU and the idea 
behind this is that CRAs provide an investment grade which enables one 
to invest or not. The argument here, and consequently opposing the 
freedom of press and opinion notion displayed in the United States, is 
that press articles are opinions on public matter, whereas credit ratings 
are given so that investors can rely on them for accuracy when they are 
unable to do so personally. On this basis, CRAs should be held 
accountable for their ratings. In the United Kingdom for example, 
consideration can be given to Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990];1119 
the judgment being that the defendants were not liable for producing 
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statements that the plaintiff relied on. This can be applied to CRAs and 
credit ratings. 
 
Already it is clear to see that on trying to create accountability for CRAs 
is not an easy task. The comparison between the United States and the 
EU illustrates this point. Yet surely it must be a matter of when, not if, 
accountability will seep into regulation, especially in the aftermath of the 
financial crisis. 
 
Since the financial crisis there has been some interesting developments. 
In the United States over the space of several months in 2011, for 
example, three key moments occurred. The big three CRAs won a court 
case against Lehman Brothers whom held CRAs responsible for their 
demise, SEC issued a no-issue letter exempting CRAs from liability, then 
later that year legislation was repealed which pertained to CRAs being 
liable to lawsuit exposure if it so arises. 1120  This area is somewhat 
convoluted and there needs to be more uniformity in order to provide 
solid practices that can be used to govern CRAs as they should be. 
 
In summary the view in the United States is still one that favours CRAs 
and no liability, resulting in no accountability. In contrast to the United 
States the EU has taken a different approach and a non-legislative 
resolution was put forward detailing the ways in which CRAs are 
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accountable for the ratings they give and should be held liable under civil 
law. The resolution went further to state that ESMA should be allowed to 
perform ad hoc checks and that there should also be the creation of a 
European credit rating agency.1121 It was stated in a recent paper from 
the European Commission in 2016 that there would not be a credit rating 
agency servicing the EU. Although, it would be naive not to explore this 
option and this decision could change over time. 
 
What appears to be happening is that there is disparity between the 
United States and the EU. Whilst one is reinforcing traditional views, the 
other is proposing new reform. Solidarity and uniformity need to prevail 
here and will be discussed in the recommendations subsection. Perhaps 
what the underlying issue here is not one of opinion or advice, it is 




Firstly, there needs to be tighter regulation. There were several points 
covered under this subsection, namely the IOSCO model and code of 
practice, FSF, SIFMA, the Turner Review, and what the Basel Committee 
have done or suggested. There are two key weaknesses that are 
noticeable from the material illustrated. Firstly, the IOSCO code, and 
secondly the Basel Committee. The weakness of the IOSCO code is that 
                                               






it lacks enforceability1122 and the option of self regulation. Whilst IOSCO 
focused on integrity, independence and transparency, there was a clear 
oversight of enforceability.1123 There is also much more work to be done 
in order for smaller CRAs to adhere to the codes of practice. Additionally, 
sanctions cannot realistically be implemented as the IOSCO code is soft 
law by nature, thus allowing the big three to continue even when they 
may have breached their own code of conduct or that of the IOSCO code 
of practice.1124 Cleverly the big three have included an exclusion clause 
which limits responsibility and liability.1125 The second weakness is that 
the Basel Committee have done very little to regulate CRAs since the 
financial crisis. Thus, what needs to occur is a revision of the Basel 
regulations and how it can facilitate better regulation of CRAs going 
forward. 
 
Secondly, less emphasis on CRAs, reduction of importance given to CRAs 
and over reliance of such, and limited use of CRAs. The weaknesses that 
still persist from the changes that have taken place and the suggestions 
put forward is that the Basel regulations should reduce importance given 
to CRAs and that the creation of a public credit rating agency would help 
reduce the importance given to the big three, although, the amendment 
would still continue with the theme of CRAs having significant influence. 
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The weaknesses of the aforementioned is that due to the Basel 
Committee not taking a strong stance on the regulation of CRAs will mean 
the continuation of importance given and over reliance of CRAs, and the 
discussion(s) of a public rating agency has not materialised. This may be 
due to political issues, however as Fischer puts it, ’The public CRA could 
prevent any herding tendency because of its public backing and thus 
independence from the market‘.1126 
 
Thirdly, there needs to be more competition. The weakness here is that 
there has not been any meaningful change since the financial crisis, other 
than suggestions ranging from a public credit rating agency to regulatory 
change that will allow for smaller CRAs to compete with the big three. 
Due to the lack of policy change the main point to take from the material 
highlighted would be to discuss the creation of a public credit rating 
agency1127 as this may solves issues such as the current oligopoly. This 
will be considered shortly.  
 
Fourthly, there needs to be more accountability. It has been suggested 
that CRAs should be accountable for decisions made.1128 The underlying 
problem that was discussed concerned the different views that countries 
have as to whether CRAs provide an opinion or advice. It was explained 
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that the United States have taken a difference approach to the EU in that 
CRAs are seen as giving an opinion compared to the EU perspective and 
one of advice. The issue here is that there are many establishments that 
consider CRAs as giving opinions rather than advice, such as the IOSCO 
Committee and the EU Commission.1129 Adding to this is that CRAs are 
not considered to be giving advice under the definition and meaning put 
forward by the Directive on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation, or 
the Directive on Market Instruments1130 and this complicates the problem 
further in the sense that if leading committees and key directives are 
stating that CRAs are giving an opinion, then the argument that CRAs are 
giving advice is harder to contend. This will hinder the progress in the 
pursuit of making CRAs more accountable. 
 
The fact is that policy and law in this area has not changed much since 
the financial crisis. There needs to be solidarity and uniformity between 
the varying notions regarding what CRAs purport when providing a 
financial report i.e. opinion or advice. The author would stipulate that if 
a blanket agreement across the world was given and that CRAs offer 
advice not opinions, then this would make it easier for CRAs to be more 
accountable and liable to penalties and sanctions.1131 CRAs could be held 
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liable for inaccurate ratings,1132 although due diligence is very much 
required. Furthermore, even if the general consensus is that CRAs give 
an opinion then why should this exclude any form of accountability? The 
response is that it should not, especially when repercussions can be huge. 
It is in the author’s opinion that CRAs should be held more accountable.  
 
The following points will now be discussed in the recommendations 
subsection on what the author deems to be the most important in order 
to enhance CRAs and limit those risks and shortcomings. These consist 
of the IOSCO model and code of practice, the Basel Committee and the 
Basel regulations, the creation of a public credit rating agency, and 
solidarity and uniformity on the issue as to whether CRAs provide an 




Material has been put forward and the main risks and shortcomings were 
highlighted in Chapter 4 and narrowed further in this chapter, Chapter 5. 
There are still weaknesses, some new and some old that exist due to no 
changes being made or from policy changes or suggestions put forward 
that have not improved this area. Rather than discussing all the risks 
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stipulated, the following four areas that the author believes will 
strengthen CRAs the most, and will provide greater stability and 
prosperity, will be put forward. 
 
Firstly, the IOSCO model which fell under the subsection tighter 
regulation. It was explained how the IOSCO model is a voluntary code of 
practice. As such, it does not possess any legal power to enforce,1133 only 
to recommend best practice. The model began before the financial crisis 
and has developed since that point. The code encourages integrity, 
independence and transparency, and was published with the general 
ethos of self regulation. The code was assessed shortly after it was 
published in 2004 by CESR.1134 CESR stated that there were several 
options that could take place for it to be integrated into European law, 
from full registration to self regulation. The latter was chosen. It is 
arguable that the CESR were very cautious at this point on the basis that 
they wanted to observe to what extent IOSCO would be incorporated.  
 
In 2008 in the midst of the financial crisis, IOSCO updated and revised 
the code of practice put forward several years earlier. There was a key 
focus on responsibility towards investors and issuers, to be more 
independent, and to voice conflicts of interest amongst other areas. A 
survey conducted shortly after the revision of the IOSCO code found that 
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the big three complied, but smaller entities were struggling to do so. From 
a European perspective, the CESR should have chosen to recommend full 
registration rather than self regulation. Equally, the other issue is that 
IOSCO is a voluntary body. 
 
In order to improve the code endorsed by IOSCO and thus improve CRAs, 
enforceability should be considered. Whilst it would not be feasible to 
make the IOSCO model and code of practice compulsory, as this would 
be too difficult a task to enforce around the world, there should be 
support given by leading authorities and governments to incorporate the 
code into domestic law, like the Basel Committee. Therefore, the 
recommendation for tighter regulation would be to have authorities such 
as the EU to incorporate the IOSCO model into European law. This would 
allow for more authority and influence, and in turn this would improve 
CRAs. What will hopefully aid full implementation of IOSCO is the 2020 
strategic plan that was released in 2015,1135 which outlined the future 
plans, objectives and initiatives. This should increase the adoption of the 
code of practice endorsed, but only time will tell. If such changes occur, 
then this may help in delivering sanctions as at present it is hard to do 
so due to IOSCO being soft law and the big three occupying such a large 
portion of the market. Furthermore, sanctions would improve what is 
currently a very weak aspect of the IOSCO model from a United States 
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and EU perspective. For example, India and Singapore take a stronger 
stance and impose penalties, suspensions and in some instances revoke 
trading licences.1136 This would be a more sensible route to take in the 
author’s opinion as it would set a clear boundary in which CRAs should 
not pass, if they do so then there will be consequences. If such measures 
are in place worldwide then the author is of the opinion that CRAs are 
more likely to conform to safer practices.1137 
 
Secondly, the Basel Committee and Basel regulations. This risk is in 
relation to subsections tighter regulation as well as less emphasis on 
CRAs, reduction of importance and over reliance, and limited use of CRAs. 
The Basel Committee has done very little by way of tightening regulation 
as well as reducing the importance and over reliance placed on CRAs 
through the Basel regulations. Langohr and Langohr highlight this 
problem and note, ’…the excessive reliance on ratings created and 
maintained opaqueness between the ratings and investors‘. 1138  The 
problems that result from such is that independence and competition are 
affected.1139 
 
The author strongly believes and recommends that one of the best ways 
to tackle the issues discussed throughout the research and improve CRAs 
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is to spearhead the change through the Basel regulations. After all, the 
Basel regulations are implemented throughout the world and adhered to 
in varying degrees in many countries. Therefore, by either tightening 
regulation on how CRAs are used or the limiting of such through the Basel 
regulations, could have a positive impact for the banking world and 
regulation. The Basel Committee should take a bold decision to change 
the current system otherwise it is only a matter of time before 
repercussions are seen again.1140 
 
Thirdly, the creation of a public credit rating agency. This was in relation 
to less emphasis on CRAs, reduction of importance and over reliance, and 
limited use of CRAs as well as more competition. However, the author will 
discuss in relation to the latter as it is more important due to the current 
oligopoly that still exists.1141 The concentration of CRAs needs to be broke 
and a public credit rating agency could be the answer. As Blundell-Wignall 
comments in relation to CRAs, ’…you need to break the oligopoly…‘.1142 
Langohr and Langohr further state, ’This can only happen if the regulators 
level the playing field as much as possible‘.1143 
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It has been commented on how the big three have dominated the credit 
rating industry for many years and occupy most of the market, making it 
harder for smaller agencies to enter and compete thus restricting choice. 
The suggestion put forward from the United States and which was also 
debated in the EU, is to create a fourth credit rating agency that could 
rival the big three in size and resource, a public credit rating agency; 
Fischer believes that a public agency could prove beneficial.1144 Unless 
there is significant change by the Basel Committee through the Basel 
regulations to limit the use of CRAs or to tighten regulation, then in 
addition to this another solution would be to create a fourth rating agency 
not only to circumvent the problem of competition in which it is being 
discussed now, but to instil the notion that authorities and regulatory 
bodies are taking this seriously and that a public entity will be assisting 
in such an important matter. It would break the mold of the big three, 
provide reassurance that it will (being a public entity) put investors and 
the economical world first, not guided by profit, and that changes are 
happening to improve this troubled area. There is wide support for this 
alternative due to two big factors, non profit driven and non incentive 
based.1145 The end product is increasing competition.1146 
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The author acknowledges that whilst the current CRAs have an almost 
identical rating system,1147 and that a public credit rating agency may be 
affected by political issues and possess controversial characteristics from 
other CRAs,1148 the author would still argue that a public credit rating 
agency could be highly beneficial. The main argument being in relation 
to more competition and the assumption that being a public entity, is that 
it would operate in a different manner to the big three due to the nature 
in which it was created, therefore it could potentially break up the current 
oligopoly.1149 It has also been suggested that a United Nations style credit 
rating agency could work.1150 There are supporters and advocates for this 
notion that expressed positivism for a public credit rating agency.1151 
Furthermore, there would also be an argument that a public entity would 
operate more ethically, although this is hard to justify based on 
assumption alone. Evidently, this would be a better solution compared 
with the idea put forward for CRAs to be abolished as they would just be 
replaced with similar agencies.1152 Whilst it may be argued that a public 
credit rating agency would not have much impact, or that it would 
                                               
1147 Private meeting, Professor Andrew Haynes, 7 February 2017 University of 
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succumb to current criticisms,1153 the author would state that there is 
support for the introduction of a public body.1154 
 
Fourthly, the issue of solidarity and uniformity in agreeing on the notion 
of whether CRAs offer opinions or advice. This was in relation to more 
accountability which is still highly prevalent many years after the financial 
crisis.1155 It was discussed earlier that more accountability is harder to 
incorporate than initially thought. There is one glaring reason as to why 
this is, and that is a difference of opinion as to whether CRAs are giving 
an opinion or giving advice. In the United States it is the former whilst 
the EU is the latter. The author believes that the EU stance is more 
appropriate in that CRAs are providing an investment grade which 
enables an investor to invest or not, and if the rating was negligently 
rated too high, for example, the losses could be exponential. The 
argument put forward is that upon a credit rating being given, investors 
will then rely on the accuracy of those ratings. Furthermore, investors 
may be unable to collate those results themselves thus relying on the 
accuracy of CRAs. Whereas the freedom of press and opinion stance 
taken in the United States would argue that CRAs are merely giving 
opinions on public matter, the former is more appropriate as it would 
enable penalties and sanctions to enter the rules and regulations of 
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domestic law across the world. Currently, CRAs rely on the opinion 
approach based in the United States.  
 
The recommendation put forward would be to take the EU standpoint and 
create a level of accountability. This should deter CRAs from operating 
incorrectly or negligently, and it would also provide the foundation for 
policy to be made on what penalties1156 could be given on areas such as 
conflicts of interest. The hurdle that needs to be overcome is that of 
solidarity and uniformity.  
 
Accountability in general terms and putting aside the argument of opinion 
or advice, has started to take shape in India by the Securities and 
Exchange Board of India which have stated that CRAs should be held 
more accountable.1157 This is specific to India, but steps can be taken by 
other leading authorities around the world to take a tougher stance on 
CRAs. In fact, developments in the United States would suggest that a 
stronger stance toward CRAs is being conducted1158 despite the opinion 
argument discussed, but the true results are yet to be seen.  
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In summary, the author would recommend inserting a passage in the 
Basel regulations stating that CRAs provide advice and can be held 
accountable, or something less opinionated and direct and to state that 
it is up to the individual country to apply sanctions and penalties for 
issues surrounding accountability resulting from conflicts of interest and 
negligence. Additionally, another option would be for countries to create 
their own sanctions and penalties through domestic law similar to India, 
but this may take a long time to accomplish. The most appropriate way 
for it to become widespread resulting in uniformity and solidarity across 
the world in a faster timescale would be through the Basel regulations as 
it already operates in many countries.  
 
The only potential issue with the recommendation suggested is the 
adoption of such a clause and that the Basel Committee will want to 
remain neutral. However, this would be the best form of action to take in 
trying to achieve a general consensus on CRAs providing advice, or more 
specifically having penalties and sanctions in place that deter CRAs from 
such practices.  
 
In the end CRAs need to be more accountable for their actions. The author 
believes that if all countries share the same idea that CRAs give advice 
then this would enable penalties and sanctions to be easily created. If it 
remains that solidarity and uniformity cannot prevail on this issue then 
the next best option would be to collectively agree that CRAs should be 





conflicts of interest, promote safer and sensible practices and reduce 




The main focal point for CRAs under the research has been geared 
towards regulation encompassing tighter regulation, less emphasis on 
CRAs, more competition, reduction of importance given to CRAs and the 
over reliance of such, limited use of CRAs and more accountability. These 
were the solutions highlighted throughout Chapter 4 which came from 
the four weaknesses of CRAs discussed, which were high concentration, 
over reliance, poor rating mechanisms for sovereign debt, and conflicts 
of interest. 
 
This section endeavoured to further narrow these issues and as such they 
were put under the heading of regulation as the best way to tackle the 
risks and shortcomings posed by CRAs. What should be noted is that 
whilst regulation has been introduced, the reason why it has not been 
successful is due to the fact that regulation is still yet to provide a solution 
and remedy to several problems including accountability, conflict of 
interest and competition; this is a fact and academically agreed with.1159 
 
                                               





Whilst highlighting those weaknesses it was further explored as to 
whether there had been any policy changes or suggestions put forward 
to combat the inadequacies listed, whether it be hard or soft law. Unlike 
the previous section on capital ratios there has been little by way of policy 
and change in the law. For that reason and for conformity with the section 
on capital ratios, recommendations were given on those risks and 
shortcomings that are still very much prevalent. 
 
In the end, the four recommendations stipulated by the author were the 
IOSCO code being further developed, more involvement from the Basel 
Committee through the Basel regulations, the creation of a public credit 
rating agency, and solidarity and uniformity on the issue of whether CRAs 
give an opinion or advice. It was concluded that the four aforementioned 
points can improve CRAs to strengthen this fragile area of banking 
regulation. If the four recommendations are considered and put into 
practice i.e. the IOSCO code implemented through EU law, the Basel 
Committee taking a stronger approach through the channel of the Basel 
regulations, creation of a public credit rating agency, and solidarity and 
uniformity on the issue of CRAs offering advice not an opinion, then 
positive steps can be taken and regulation of CRAs will be in a much 











The third risk and shortcoming is VaR. A complex risk measuring tool that 
has many faults yet still widely used. At the beginning of Chapter 5 the 
main issues in relation to VaR were analysed, it was also specified as to 
what improvements were needed for VaR to become more effective. The 
issues considered were the inability to cope with volatile markets, VaR 
struggles with complex products, over reliance, VaR applied incorrectly, 
and the three commonly used approaches to calculating risk i.e. 
Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach, Historical Simulation 
Approach, Monte Carlo Simulation Approach. All of these points will be 
examined as to how they can be improved. Some of these points will 
overlap and will be merged to form a more concise approach in tackling 
VaR and how best to improve those inadequacies. Ergo, the main talking 
points and suggested solutions will form under two headings. First, the 
use of several models and approaches which will encompass inability to 
cope with volatile markets, computing complex models, over reliance, 
and the three conventional approaches. Second, regulation which will 
encompass VaR being applied incorrectly. 
 
By acknowledging the VaR issues identified, recommendations will be put 
forward covering the main issues and how tackling this area could 







Value-at-Risk - A brief recap 
 
It is wise to start with the following statement that encapsulates what 
risk measuring tools should do (emphasis on should), Crouhy et al. state, 
’The many dimensions of risk require a range of complimentary risk 
metrics, and always have done‘.1160 VaR is a risk measuring tool that 
helps facilitate banks to calculate risk in their portfolio, therefore, it is a 
tool to assess a bank’s exposure to risk. VaR is promoted through the 
Basel regulations and is widely used.1161 To provide further clarity, it can 
be defined as, ’…the worst loss that might be expected from holding a 
security or portfolio over a given period of time…given a specific level of 
probability…‘.1162 With this in mind, the creation of VaR will be briefly 
considered. 
 
Prior to VaR one of the main approaches to calculating and measuring 
risk was the Nominal Amount Approach. A simple formula that would 
assess the quantity of market risk in relation to a bank’s trading desk. 
The problem with this approach was that it did not account for assets 
having different price volatilities and it did not differentiate between short 
and long term positions. As well as the Nominal Amount Approach there 
has been other risk measuring tools such as the Modern Portfolio Theory 
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and the regulatory measures put in place by SEC in the 1980s. None of 
these have come close to the prominence of VaR. 
 
The rise of VaR began in 1994 and can be linked with J. P. Morgan 
Investment Bank where the department of RiskMetrics produced a daily 
report detailing the bank’s risk. The finer details have been explained in 
Chapter 4, needless to say that the birth of VaR was at this point in time, 
even though it was in some form in other risk measuring tools prior to 
1994. 
 
To cement its position as the leading risk measuring tool, the Basel 
Committee inserted VaR into the Basel regulations during the late 1990s 
through the Market Risk Amendment and it was used as the standard 
practice tool in measuring and reporting market risk; it has evolved over 
time to also include credit risk. The Market Risk Amendment was created 
to assist banks with foreign exchange and trade debt securities, and VaR 
was incorporated to help banks assess their market risk capital 
requirements. This would be the starting point for complete domination. 
 
Despite the flaws of VaR it is still widely used as the key performance 
indicator for measuring risk. One of the main reasons is that it has been 
around for many years and has evolved since the inclusion in the Basel 
regulations. It is due to theoretical properties, ease of back testing and 





it is easy to comprehend why VaR is the most prominent risk tool. After 
all, it has been stated to underpin most risk models.1163 
 
VaR has become so popular because it is an extremely useful tool in 
measuring risk during normal market conditions. It can be used to 
calculate the overall market risk for a bank and it does this whilst 
capturing key moments such as volatility, curve and basis risk. The 
problem arises with stressed non-stationary events which VaR struggles 
to calculate.  
 
It has been explained that the foundation of VaR is based on stationary 
events i.e. any volatilities are stationary. The Basel Committee tried to 
rectify this problem in Basel II.5 with SVaR, although it did little to 
circumvent this problem due to several factors such as it being a large 
computational task, structural challenges with products introduced after 
a stressed period whereby no historical data was available, some 
commentators arguing that by adding SVaR in addition to VaR double 
counted risk, and that it did not encourage banks to develop their own 
VaR models. 
 
Furthermore, there are some inherent problems that have plagued VaR 
for many years and include issues such as that volatility may not be 
                                               






constant,1164 and it assumes the economic world progresses in small 
steps. 1165  The first inherent problem is volatility. VaR assumes that 
volatility is constant over time, therefore past variations are given the 
same weighting and importance to present times and potential variations. 
The problem is that past events do not truly reflect nor do they predict 
the events that may take place in the future. If a bank continues to 
operate on such protocol then the repercussions can be huge. 
Additionally, evidence has indicated that during the financial crisis during 
high periods of volatility, complex approaches to calculating VaR resulted 
in higher capital requirements, yet after the period of volatility the capital 
requirement decreased rapidly compared with an increase in simpler 
models.1166 This created two different forms of behaviour and results 
have shown that the methods for calculating are somewhat inefficient. 
The second problem is how VaR assumes the economic world progresses 
at a slow pace with small movements in prices and structural changes. A 
problem remains dormant until a situation arises when seismic events 
happen at which point VaR becomes almost useless. Events such as the 
terrorist attack on the United States twin towers, or the recent financial 
crisis reflect this assertion.  
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Whilst on the whole VaR is a good mechanism for predicting market risk, 
it does not do so well when a financial crisis develops. This is because 
VaR assumes the market in which the economy trades in is stationary 
and when this becomes unstable, so does VaR.1167 The next subsection 
will consider the two focal points highlighted at the beginning of this 
section in order to improve VaR - the use of several models and 
approaches and regulation. 
 
Value-at-Risk - The use of several models and approaches and regulation 
 
What became apparent from the material discussed about VaR in Chapter 
4 was that there were several risks and shortcomings. Interestingly, there 
were two points ascertained from these findings in how VaR could be 
improved. The author suggested the implementation of using several 
models and approaches that encompass several areas of risk, and 
regulation which also encompasses several areas of risk. What will be 
discussed now is what changes have taken place and what has been 
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The use of several models and approaches - What changes are taking 
place and have been suggested? 
 
Currently there are several models and approaches used under the 
auspice of VaR when calculating risk. In terms of risk models there are 
many, some of the main ones include internal rating based models seen 
in a bank’s banking book, VaR and SVaR in a banks trading book, CVA 
VaR which covers counterparty risk, or OpVaR which covers operational 
risk. In terms of approaches to calculating risk the primary and 
conventional ones include the Analytical Variance/Covariance Approach, 
Historical Simulation Approach, and Monte Carlo Simulation Approach. 
There are other approaches but the research has focused on the 
conventional ones used due to them being widely utilised.  
 
The solution of using several models and approaches was put forward in 
Chapter 4 and should help with issues such as inability of VaR to cope 
with volatile markets, computing complex products, over reliance, and 
the weaknesses of the three conventional approaches. The main solution 
to rectify these problems is straightforward and one which can be 
achieved with the use of several models and approaches rather than using 
one of each. This way a weakness in one model or approach could be 
alleviated with the use of another. This is the overwhelming conclusion 
that the author of the research has procured. Therefore, this subsection 
will consider what changes have taken or are taking place, as well as 





approaches stated and support for simultaneous use. The following items 
will be considered: SVaR, CVA VaR, and what the Basel Committee have 
implemented or proposed. All three have resulted from the financial crisis 
and are some of the key elements that have been put in place to 
strengthen VaR. There are other proposals and protocol but the author 
has chosen a selection of the most important ones.  
 
SVaR was developed during Basel II.5 and has maintained its place as a 
key model for calculating risk. It is similar to VaR in many ways, but the 
striking difference is that it calculates periods of extreme stress, 
something that VaR struggles to compute. Whilst VaR is traditionally 
based on a 99 percent confidence level over a ten day horizon that is then 
observed over a twelve month period, SVaR will apply similar formulaic 
calculations but the period of time will be both static and of extreme 
stress.1168 The reasoning for this is to reflect the volatility of the twelve 
month period that a bank is testing. 
 
The catalyst that ignited SVaR came from the financial crisis and that 
losses in a bank’s trading book were much higher (and predicted to be) 
than the minimum capital requirements for Pillar 1.1169 The goal of SVaR 
is that it must reflect a period of stress that is relevant to the bank 
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conducting the test. Whilst this is a large computational task, the results 
will be more accurate and it would make sense for a bank to calculate in 
this manner as it will be tailored to them.1170 
 
It is envisaged that by adding VaR and SVaR together for regulatory 
capital purposes the doubling of capital will act has a large capital buffer 
for stressed conditions and will counteract the pro-cyclical tendencies that 
VaR exudes. Wong explains that the notion of creating SVaR is considered 
to be a first buffer against pro-cyclicality,1171 or first line of defence. 
Furthermore and to reiterate, SVaR looks at increasing the overall level 
of capital for assisting trading book activities and to avoid pro-
cyclicality.1172 There are criticisms of this model that will be discussed 
shortly. Needless to say, SVaR is a welcomed addition to risk measuring 
and one which the author believes will prove to be very positive. 
 
Similar to SVaR, CVA VaR is a model created as a reaction to the financial 
crisis. It considers, ’…the fair price of counterparty risk for a derivatives 
transaction‘.1173 The reason why this model was created was that just 
                                               
1170 R Barfield, ‘Trading Book and Securitisation’ in I Vry, A Practitioners Guide to Basel III 
and Beyond (Thomson Reuters, 2011) 105-106. 
1171 M C Y Wong, Bubble Value at Risk: A Countercyclical Risk Management Approach 
(Revised Edition, John Wiley & Sons Singapore Pte. Ltd 2013) 209. 
1172 F Cannata and M Quagliariello ‘A New Framework for the Trading Book’ in F 
Cabanas, Basel III and Beyond: A Guide to Banking Regulation after the Crisis (Risk 
Books 2011) 126. 
1173 M Choudhry, ‘A Review of Value-at-Risk’ in M Wong, Introduction to Value-at-Risk 






over 60 percent of losses from counterparty risks came from CVA 
pricing.1174  
 
Prior to CVA VaR, Credit Value Adjustment1175 (CVA) was included in 
Basel II which covered the risk of counterparty default. The problem with 
Basel II was that the standards did not account for the risk of variations 
of CVA. Hence when the Basel Committee observed the losses incurred 
during the financial crisis it was ascertained that two thirds came from 
CVA pricing and not actual default, so the Basel Committee created CVA 
VaR to act as a capital buffer1176 and this would be modelled as CVA VaR 
which comes from those changes in credit spreads.1177 
 
Essentially there are two stages of simulation, one calculates the average 
of simulated market values across maturities, and one will simulate the 
different shocks which gives the distribution. The Basel regulations uses 
a simplified version of this CVA formula1178 compared with the complex 
and developing nature of this model. CVA VaR has been described as: 
  
 ’…the difference between the value of a derivative assuming the  
 counterparty is default risk-free and the value of a derivative  
 reflecting the default risk of the counterparty. The flip side of the 
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 CVA, the debt value adjustment (“DVA”), reflects the debit side of 
 the transaction, i.e., the difference between the value of the  
 derivative, assuming the bank itself is default-risk-free, and the  
 value of a derivative reflecting the default risk of the bank‘1179 
 
Some banks go further and include a funding valuation adjustment which 
collates the impact of funding and liquidity in relation to cost of a trade 
whereby it is uncollateralised.1180 This is to ensure that the cost of posting 
collateral to assist in any hedge, in any inter dealer market, is properly 
accounted for. 
 
There are issues with this model such as it not accounting for wrong-way 
risk, default risk of the counterparty, and the differences in how it has 
been adopted in the United States and the EU which could lead to 
arbitrage, but these will be discussed in the weaknesses subsection 
shortly. Due to its infancy, CVA VaR will naturally progress over time and 
should stifle these inconsistencies.  
 
Further to SVaR and CVA VaR, it should be considered as to what the 
Basel Committee have implemented to improve VaR, bearing in mind that 
the Basel Committee have been involved in both SVaR and CVA VaR. 
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The Basel Committee issued a consultative document in 2012 titled 
”Fundamental Review of the Trading Book“.1181 The document considered 
the development of market risk models as well as the regulatory 
framework. Specifically and in reference to models, the Basel Committee 
suggested several areas of improvement. Firstly, the replacement of VaR 
with expected shortfall1182 (ES). This will mean that any gap risk that is 
overlooked by VaR will be counted for by ES. It should be noted that ES 
has many benefits in that it will be a coherent measure and whilst 
allowing for gap risk it will also capture tail risk.1183 In addition, it is also 
less likely for manipulation.1184 Perhaps the biggest boon of ES is that 
management are likely to understand it, as Wong suggests.1185 Secondly, 
it was suggested that stressed calibration of risk models should be used, 
acknowledging that those risk models which calculate recent data cannot 
account for events when a crisis occurs however accurate the data may 
be. Thirdly, an acceptance and incorporation of the risk of market 
illiquidity. A suggestion put forward is the idea that banks should have a 
capital add-on for the instruments that may produce an increase in times 
of stress. Another suggestion is to use the Incremental Risk Charge model 
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(IRC) to allow for differing liquidity horizons.1186 A year later, the Basel 
Committee submitted a second consultative document in 2013,1187 the 
finer details and proposal put forward have not become final other than 
a further consultative document published late 2014 of the outstanding 
issues.1188 
 
Whilst improvement has been achieved and progress made, there are 
some weaknesses of the proposals put forward by the Basel Committee 
as will be discussed shortly. Nevertheless, VaR is moving in the right 
direction because there is consultation and solutions are being put 
forward. 
 
What can be observed is that the concept of calculating risk using VaR 
ultimately failed leading to the financial crisis. Since that time an array of 
reactive rather than proactive measures have come into play with new 
models such as SVaR and CVA VaR, and the Basel Committee proposing 
several types of improvements in the form of consultative documents. 
 
Before moving onto regulation, attention should be given to the three 
conventional approaches used when calculating VaR. Due to widespread 
use, the impact these approaches can have are varied and vast. It was 
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considered in Chapter 4 what some of those issues have been such as 
calculating fat tails, sample size to small, and the inability to calculate 
parameter of distribution. The main suggestion put forward by the author 
is to use more than one approach so that a weakness in one can be 
strengthened by the other, hence it coming under this subsection. 
Unfortunately, it appears that there has been very little by way of 
enhancing the three approaches. Equally, there has been no attempt to 
discuss the possibility of using several approaches at once to 
accommodate inadequacies found in all three. This will be discussed in 
the weaknesses subsection shortly. 
 
Regulation - What changes are taking place and have been suggested? 
 
The main talking point here is the issue of wrong application of VaR, 
whether incorrectly or due to manipulation. The primary solution put 
forward in Chapter 4 was regulation which would not only help with the 
inability to calculate VaR, but also the inclusion of better training for staff, 
hence it being headed under regulation which is arguably the best form 
of response to counter this problem. The question arises as to what has 
taken or is taking place, and what has been suggested to improve VaR 
being implemented incorrectly. 
 
There are two interesting suggestions put forward to improve this area 





and sanctions has been put forward by the author of the research.1189 In 
all three suggestions, regulation could be the driving force to spearhead 
these proposals and combat the issue at hand. 
 
Firstly, the idea of investment into research so that models can be 
improved and the development of statistical tools that are far superior 
than currently used.1190 This would seem an easy fix to implement as 
funding could either be put forward by the bank, or it could be an external 
source such as a company that specialises in mathematical calculation 
tools, equally it could be outsourced to universities and relevant facilities 
within those universities. A superior course of action would be to 
incorporate into regulation that banks need to allocate a specified amount 
of funds to find better ways of calculating VaR, although this method may 
prove more cumbersome and time intensive and it would also depend on 
the country. Whilst it is not mentioned in this proposal, investment could 
be put towards training for staff to improve employees whom work in this 
area. It could be argued that by investing in research this could improve 
statistical tools that would also aid staff. Resulting from this, training 
would need to be given on those improved statistical tools.  
 
                                               
1189 It should be noted that the Basel Committee will not be discussed here as it was 
examined under the first heading. 
1190 M Crouhy, D Galai and R Mark, The Essentials of Risk Management (2nd edn, 






Secondly, independent vetting teams could be created to assess how 
models are used by bank’s. 1191  This could be implemented through 
regulation whether at domestic level or through the Basel regulations, 
and could either be externally checked by a third party or internally 
checked if the model used is externally made.1192  
 
The process by which banks are vetted in terms of how they select and 
construct their risk measuring tools could prove beneficial in that if a bank 
is wrongly calculating risk then it may be that a simpler model could be 
used instead. On this point, Crouhy et al. state, ’…it provides assurance 
that the model offers a reasonable representation of how the market itself 
values the instrument, and that the model has been implemented 
correctly‘. 1193  Note the comment regarding it being implemented 
correctly, which is a key concern here. 
 
Crouhy et al. further argue that there should be six stages in order for 
independent vetting to be successful. First, the vetting team should 
request that full documentation is given on the model that is being used 
by the bank. Second, the soundness of the model should be vetted to 
verify that the model being used is reasonable in relation to the product 
being valued. Third, the vetting team should have access to financial 
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_Model_Validation_Principles.pdf page 6 accessed 13 July 2018. 
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rates i.e. the office has independent access to an unconnected financial 
rates database. Fourth, the vetting team should develop a benchmark 
model to compare with the current model being used and then calculate 
those results to see if they are accurate. Fifth, the vetting team should 
ensure that the models being used possess the basic properties that a 
stress test model should have such as non-arbitrage conditions. Finally, 
one should integrate model risk into the overall risk management of the 
bank and evaluate on a regular basis.1194 This is a detailed response put 
forward to combat VaR through vetting teams and highlights the poor 
state that the utilisation of VaR is in and the changes that need to occur. 
 
The aforementioned suggestions could improve the way a bank calculates 
risk. Equally, it could help reduce incorrect calculations, especially the 
independent vetting team proposal. Better training for staff could also 
benefit and stem from the first suggestion i.e. investment into research, 
as new statistical tools would need to be explained and staff would need 
to be trained through seminars and lectures on how to use them. 
However, neither of the two suggestions would stop manipulation.  
 
The former two suggestions are in line with wrong application, what about 
manipulation of VaR? This is an important weakness and it is unnerving 
how easily it can be done.1195 This is because, ’…it is only a quantile on 
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the distribution of profit or loss, a financial institution will often find it 
easy to move the quantile around and hence manipulate VaR‘.1196 The big 
problem here is that risk can be reduced, for this reason the author 
believes a much stronger stance should be taken in the form of penalties 
and sanctions.  
 
Thirdly, penalties and sanctions would be the third suggestion put forward 
by the author of the research to combat incorrect application or 
manipulation, specifically the latter. This is because it would act as a 
deterrent to stop, or make banks think twice about manipulating results 
extracted from a VaR calculation. The Basel Committee has considered 
this and they have provided a procedure to sanction those who 
underestimate risk.1197 This is definitely a step in the right direction and 
should be pursued further. Unfortunately, this area has not been 
thoroughly explored or endorsed. This may be due to that giving penalties 
and sanctions to large banks could be both time consuming and money 
intensive. As a result, it has not been pursued to any great length and 
will be discussed in the weaknesses and recommendations subsections. 
It should be noted that the reason why it may not have been explored is 
due to banks wanting their employees to calculate risk correctly, as it 
would be detrimental and could cause repercussions1198 as Choudhry 
indicates, this could be reputation negativity for example. Furthermore, 
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those involved would be committing fraud which is both a sackable 
offence and could result in imprisonment.1199  
 
Nevertheless, manipulation does exist and can be used in meeting capital 
requirements1200 and when VaR becomes a target as opposed to a risk 
measure, then incentives are created.1201 This is what happened leading 
to the financial crisis, managers were not only given incentives to create 
big profits but to gain profits that had low risk.1202 This brazen attitude is 
deeply concerning and action needs to be taken as the consequences 
were massive, but this was not taken into account because the likelihood 




It is inevitable that faults will always be found in regulation and policy 
and even recommendations. It is wise to reflect on the weaknesses found 
from the changes and suggestions put forward from the issues that have 
just been contemplated. Leading from this, recommendations will be 
given. 
                                               
1199 Ibid. 
1200 Bogdan Izmaylov, ‘Value-at-Risk: Strengths, Caveats and Considerations for Risk 
Managers and Regulators’ http://pure.au.dk/portal-asb-
student/files/71175799/Master_Thesis_Bogdan_Izmaylov.pdf page 16 accessed 31 March 
2017. 
1201 Ibid page 35. 
1202 Joe Nocera, ‘Risk Management’ 
https://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html accessed 29 June 2018. 
1203 See Christopher Whittall, ‘Value-at-Risk Model Masked JP Morgan $2 bln Loss’ 
https://www.reuters.com/article/jpmorgan-var/value-at-risk-model-masked-jp-morgan-2-





Two areas have been considered under VaR which are the use of several 
models and approaches, and regulation. The former highlighted SVaR, 
CVA VaR, the Basel Committee consultation papers and a final thought 
concerning the three conventional approaches to calculating risk. The 
latter highlighted research, independent vetting teams, and penalties and 
sanctions when calculating risk. With this in mind some of the weaknesses 
from these key movements will now be considered. 
 
Firstly, the use of several models and approaches. The suggestions put 
forward and areas highlighted were SVaR, CVA VaR, Basel Committee 
consultation papers, and the combination of the three conventional 
approaches. The weaknesses of these are the following. 
 
SVaR has one major weakness - double counting. What this means is that 
the figure calculated by SVaR will be added to that of VaR, thus double 
counting risk. Whilst this could be construed as positive and that a higher 
capital buffer results from this, it is an expensive form of safeguarding 
against risk in that more capital will need to be put to one side. Equally, 
the market cannot be both normal and stressed at the same time.1204 
This problem is concurred with by many and it is easy to contemplate 
why. The overlapping nature between VaR and SVaR is uncanny and the 
results from both can be similar thus double counting is inevitable,1205 as 
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1205 R Barfield, ‘Trading Book and Securitisation’ in I Vry, A Practitioners Guide to Basel III 





Vry notes. People within the banking industry have purported this issue 
and that by adding SVaR to VaR into capital requirements double counts 
risk. It has been argued that a measure to dampen cyclicality is needed 
and a weighted average of VaR and SVaR would be more efficient.1206  
 
Furthermore, there is no incentive to improve VaR as SVaR would become 
the leading market risk measuring tool and would essentially penalise a 
bank with an already capable and prudent model. This issue was rectified 
somewhat in July 2009 when the Basel Committee stated that back 
testing should also apply to SVaR and as such promoted banks to have a 
prudent model in place. 
 
This weakness highlights that there is still much work to do for SVaR to 
become more robust and efficient. Whilst the author of the research 
would argue that an increased buffer (double counting) is viewed 
negatively, the author believes that the more capital put to one side the 
better, as long as a bank has sufficient amounts of liquid assets (see 
Capital Ratios). 
 
Similar to SVaR, CVA VaR is not without fault and has several weaknesses 
that need to be acknowledged. The issue is that it does not calculate 
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wrong way risk, default risk of a counterparty or bilateral CVA.1207 In 
addition there is the issue around adoption of CVA VaR, specifically how 
it has been incorporated into law from a United States and an EU 
perspective.1208 
 
Essentially, CVA VaR has been simplified in what is a very intricate and 
less developed model, hence it omits certain criteria and has many issues. 
Whilst there are several weaknesses of CVA VaR, it should be 
acknowledged that this area of risk model is in its infancy and will develop 
over time. CVA VaR will be discussed in the recommendations subsection 
as it is an area that can be greatly improved. 
 
The next issue is the Basel Committee and the consultative paper in 2012, 
2013 and outstanding issues in 2014 respectively. The papers focused on 
ES and that this model would make up for inadequacies shown in VaR 
such as gap risk and tail risk. This is one of the major weaknesses of the 
paper and that ES requires a bank to look at the entire distribution of 
assets and over a long period of time. As Barrailler and Dufour note, in 
some cases sampling may be too short.1209 Additionally, back testing can 
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cause an issue under ES in that one needs a long duration period to back 
test, twenty years in fact to be confident that an accurate figure can be 
reached. It is possible to back test over a smaller period of time but 
inefficient results will surface.1210 The Basel Committee have discussed 
the issue of back testing in the second consultative paper and as such 
the development of ES will need to be monitored over the coming years. 
At present, outstanding issues was the last paper released in 2014. 
 
Finally, the combination of the three conventional approaches or lack of 
discussion about the positives of doing so. The issue is that the idea of 
combining several approaches has not been considered, although it 
should be appreciated that the use of several approaches may not have 
a huge impact as the end result Choudhry stipulates is still a rough 
estimate on the risk being valued.1211 Choudhry makes a valid point and 
essentially it is the result that needs to be scrutinised to assess the true 
impact of the risk being considered. However, the author would still 
disagree and put forward that a mix of the three approaches may yield 
beneficial results. The three approaches will be discussed in the 
recommendation subsection shortly.  
 
Now that the use of several models and approaches has been discussed, 
attention turns to the second and final suggestion for improving VaR - 
regulation. Under this heading some of the suggestions put forward were 
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research into better models which could filter to better training for staff, 
independent vetting teams and penalties and sanctions. 
 
Research into better models was highlighted in respect of regulation and 
combating the problem of those that incorrectly apply VaR calculations. 
Investment in the area of research could help suppress this issue and 
could be achieved by banks or by outsourcing to specialist companies or 
universities. The benefits of better statistical models would also benefit 
those who use them and would need to be explained and taught to staff, 
thus providing better training for staff. In order for it to become 
mainstream it is arguable that regulatory bodies would have to be 
involved, whether this be at domestic level or promoted through the Basel 
regulations. The potential weakness here is time and cost. On this basis 
it may be efficient to promote research through the Basel regulations. 
 
Independent vetting teams was the second proposal suggested to assist 
VaR being implemented correctly. It would surely provide assistance for 
those applying VaR incorrectly, for instance if the wrong approach is being 
taken then the vetting team can instruct on a better form of action. Like 
the research suggestion, perhaps the weakness here is the process of 
putting such a system in place. Regulatory bodies or the Basel Committee 
could provide great assistance in driving this forward and promote 
independent vetting teams to assess banks as to whether the correct 






The aforementioned weaknesses can be rectified as proposals are in 
circulation, however they only refer to a bank incorrectly applying VaR. 
The issue still stands in relation to penalties and sanctions in order to 
reduce manipulation. This is an area which the author of the research 
would argue is the remedy. Penalties and sanctions should be introduced 
not as a way to increase revenue for government or regulatory bodies, 
rather the impetus on deterrence. If banks are susceptible to penalties 
and sanctions then there would be a reduction in manipulation of VaR and 
other risk measuring tools. Whilst it has been debated as to how effective 
penalties and sanctions would be due to bank’s not wanting to damage 
their reputation, and that employees would be sacked and may 
potentially face imprisonment,1212 the author would still promote this 
course of action for deterrent purposes.  
 
In summary, the following key points that are deemed most crucial will 
now be discussed in the recommendations subsection on what the author 
deems to be the most crucial in order to improve VaR and limit those 
risks and shortcomings examined. Not all will be mentioned but rather 
the items that will best support VaR; these are CVA VaR, the three 
conventional approaches, and penalties and sanctions in relation to 
manipulation of VaR. 
 
 
                                               







Several areas and material were considered during this section on VaR 
and these continued from the main risks and shortcomings detailed in 
Chapter 4. Those risks were narrowed further which contained old and 
new challenges for Basel III and the banking sector.  
 
Rather than discussing all risks and shortcomings mentioned and the 
weaknesses that still exist from current policy and regulation in place and 
suggestions put forward, there are three areas that the author believes 
to be the most important that will provide the greatest benefit if 
supported. This is on the basis that some of the weaknesses mentioned 
are already being consulted on and have been commented on as to how 
they can be improved. The three areas that will be focused on are 
relatively untouched in terms of Basel III changes, policy or regulatory 
body changes and proposals, or academic discussion. These are CVA VaR, 
the three conventional approaches, and manipulation of VaR leading to 
incorrect results. 
 
Firstly, is CVA VaR. A model created after the financial crisis and 
concerned with counterparty risk for a derivative transaction. It was 
explained earlier in this section that over 60 percent of losses for banks 
came from counterparty risks relating to CVA pricing, hence the formation 
of CVA VaR. There are issues with this model such as wrong-way risk and 





CVA VaR has been put in the recommendations section (only partly). The 
principal reason for choosing CVA VaR is that it is still in its infancy. Over 
time the issues surrounding wrong way risk and default risk of a 
counterparty will be rectified as will the other aforementioned issues. In 
fact, the Basel Committee has already revised the guidelines for wrong-
way risk by using Effective Expected Positive Exposure under stressed 
market conditions. This will combat wrong way risk and must be 
calculated using a three year period which includes one year stressed 
conditions. If the stressed period used includes several years in the past 
then Effective Expected Positive Exposure should be compared with 
EAD;1213 a step in the right direction. 
 
Current recommendations include but are not limited to, the use of a 
benchmark system that relies on the internal risk management of a firm 
when measuring CVA (not a regulatory CVA) and that supervisors should 
review the possibility of any double counting and make sure that the risk 
is not capitalised twice. 1214  What the author of the research would 
recommend is strong support and investment (monetary and research) 
for this risk measuring tool as it will greatly enhance VaR. The reason is 
simple, two-thirds of losses for banks came from CVA pricing and 
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counterparty risk, only one-third came from actual default;1215 a very 
high figure which needs to be reduced. For that reason, by developing 
CVA VaR, VaR can benefit and the banking sector can become more 
robust. Incentivisation of more complex VaR models such as CVA VaR 
should also be encouraged as they paint a truer picture of the economic 
world.1216  
 
Whilst the author of the research recommends investment and research 
to improve CVA VaR there is one final element that needs to be 
considered - a bank. For CVA VaR to develop and become more robust, 
banks need to put in place the systems that are needed to use this risk 
measuring model. Fundamentally, Mars and Pontiki say that banks need 
to, ’…transform themselves operationally by upgrading their data, 
systems and know-how‘.1217 This draws on the previous points made in 
that investment and research is needed, by doing so CVA VaR can become 
an effective risk measuring tool. Mars and Ponitiki are correct and banks 
need to upgrade many areas from data and systems to know-how. As a 
result, investment and research will develop and support this relatively 
new area of risk measuring. By doing this and with the support of banks, 
CVA VaR can strengthen counterparty risk and support VaR in general. It 
should be acknowledged that some have said, ’…once one deals entirely 
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via the centralized clearing counterparty (CCP) then counterparty risk is 
eliminated so CVA VaR becomes irrelevant‘. 1218  Choudhry raises an 
interesting point, however CVA VaR is not disappearing anytime soon, 
and investment and research is very much the way forward because a 
centralised clearing counterparty will not be the sole way in which deals 
are only cleared, not yet at least in the author’s opinion. Furthermore, 
there are some concerns of a centralised clearing counterparty which 
raises the issue of systemic risk as higher proportions of trading is 
completed this way institutions will become concentrated to this area.1219 
 
Secondly, the three conventional approaches discussed previously and 
are the most used when it comes to calculating VaR, yet they are not 
normally used together. The author of the research would recommend 
using not one approach at any given time but using two or even three. 
The weaknesses of the aforesaid have been illustrated and the suggestion 
mentioned in Chapter 4 was that by using more than one approach could 
help allow a weakness in one to be circumvented by the other. However, 
there has been no exploration of using more than one approach and the 
feasibility of such.  
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There is the suggestion that there would be no great improvement by 
using more than one approach because essentially the end result is still 
an estimate1220 and that what needs to be considered and scrutinised is 
the figure after the calculation and what it means. In essence, it is a 
rough guide and estimation. Once the figure is derived then a multiple 
should be applied,1221 it could be double or even triple to safeguard the 
risk. Whilst the author of the research would agree with this notion, the 
author would still argue that there are benefits of using more than one 
approach. Other than the weaknesses already put forward, another 
benefit could be that if a bank uses two approaches and the two end 
results differ greatly, then there may be an issue with the risk being 
valued. What this would indicate is that the figure should be carefully 
scrutinised and capital for that risk should be increased further to what is 
currently being calculated. Another benefit and leading from the previous 
point is that an average could be achieved if, for example, the Historical 
Simulation Approach was calculating a low risk figure and the Monte Carlo 
Simulation Approach was calculating a high risk figure. Primarily, the end 
result should be prudently considered and assessed. The author would 
state that at the end a more robust VaR calculation will be achieved and 
this is a belief expressed by many.1222 
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The third and final recommendation is tackling manipulation of VaR. The 
inability to calculate correctly was investigated in the subsection 
regulation in which it was signified that one of the main weaknesses of 
VaR was the inability of persons to calculate VaR correctly and effectively. 
This resulted from the inability to calculate correctly either by persons 
under qualified to conduct such a task, or persons were purposely 
manipulating the results. The former problem is in the process of being 
improved with proposals of research teams to find better models to use 
and vetting teams to assess whether banks are calculating VaR correctly, 
therefore this area will not be looked at further. Whilst these proposals 
potentially solve the issue of incorrectly applying VaR, they will not fix 
the latter issue of manipulation and it is this that the author believes 
should be pursued.  
 
The recommendation would be to introduce penalties and sanctions 
across the board in the mindset that prevention is the best form of 
defence and this would act as a deterrent for banks to not abuse the 
system. This could be achieved one of two ways, the Basel regulations or 
regulatory bodies. The former would be the preferred choice in that the 
Basel regulations are incorporated around the world. However, the issue 
here would be that it could portray the Basel Committee as being too 
opinionated. Therefore, the second way might be a more suitable 
mechanism. The only problem with this is two fold, gaining a wide 






On this basis the author would recommend a passage to be inserted in 
the Basel regulations stating that in respect of manipulation of VaR 
calculations it is at the discretion of the country in which the manipulation 
is taking place as to whether that country and regulatory body wishes to 
penalise or sanction the bank involved. By doing it this way it would solve 
both issues previously mentioned i.e. the Basel Committee seen as 
wanting to enforce penalties and sanctions, and the time intensive nature 
it would take to accumulate many countries in creating laws that allowed 
penalties and sanctions for manipulation of VaR. The end result would be 
the global reach that the Basel Committee has, thus eliminating the time 
issue and the discretionary nature it would give to countries around the 
world. It is arguable that many countries would want to incorporate such 
law into domestic law as the manipulation of VaR can have serious 
implications for the economy in which it is taking place. After all, a 
country will want to protect their economy. 
 
Some have argued that penalties and sanctions would have no real 
effect.1223 Choudhry gives an example albeit in a different capacity of how 
a large bank was penalised for many of their ATM’s going out of service 
over a busy weekend. The argument here is that the bank did not want 
their ATM’s to go out of service thus impacting on their customer 
relationships. A large financial penalty was imposed and Choudhry states 
that this had little impact as the event had already occurred. Whilst this 
                                               





example can be appreciated, although not fully transferrable, the author 
of the research would still argue that there is a place for penalties and 
sanctions for reputation purposes, deterrent purposes, and that banks 
will want to employ the highest calibre candidate. Therefore, penalties 
and sanctions do have a place in the banking world when it comes to 
manipulation of VaR calculations. Additionally, the example explained by 
Choudhry does not directly link to manipulation of VaR and is used in a 




The main focus points for VaR has been on several models and 
approaches, and regulation. These encompass several issues which 
included the inability to cope with volatile markets, complex models, over 
reliance, VaR applied incorrectly, and the three conventional approaches. 
Some of these issues overlapped and were amalgamated so that a more 
concise response could be given in tackling VaR. 
 
The issues explored in Chapter 5 were originally discussed during Chapter 
4. They were continued in this chapter so that they could be investigated 
further and to whether there had been any developments to improve the 
risks and shortcomings explained taking into account policy changes, 
changes in domestic law, and the Basel regulation amendments and 
consultative documents. The chapter then moved forward by looking at 





had taken place or suggestions put forward. For conformity and clarity 
with the two previous sections the chapter then moved onto 
recommendations and how best to tackle the problems highlighted. A 
recommendation for all weaknesses was not given due to current and 
potential changes already happening that made the notion of a 
recommendation redundant as mechanisms are (were) already in place 
and moving forward. Additionally, there were issues that stood out which 
needed urgent attention. On this basis these were CVA VaR, the three 
conventional approaches, and manipulation of VaR. 
 
CVA VaR was created after the financial crisis, it is concerned with 
counterparty risk for a derivative transaction. The huge problem in this 
area is that over 60 percent of losses for banks came from counterparty 
risks in relation to CVA pricing leading to and during the financial crisis. 
To alleviate this problem CVA VaR was created. The recommendation put 
forward by the author of the research was to invest monies in this area 
and to promote research to develop and strengthen this model. The ideal 
result would be to reduce the aforesaid figure of losses to a much lower 
percent. 
 
The three conventional approaches to calculating risk was the second 
recommendation. There are weaknesses of all three and on this basis the 
recommendation would be to use not one approach when calculating risk 
but to use two or even three approaches. This was on the basis that 





This has not been thoroughly explored and was suggested not only on 
the basis of strengthening the approaches taken to calculate risk but also 
that the three approaches are the most conventional and most used. 
Therefore, improving this area would produce significant and widespread 
positive results. 
 
The third and final recommendation looked at manipulation of VaR which 
results in misleading and incorrect figures. The proposal put forward here 
was to introduce penalties and sanctions. This could be done by one of 
two ways. Firstly, through the Basel regulations, or secondly with 
domestic regulatory bodies. The latter was deemed more appropriate 
from the perspective that if the former was incorporated into the Basel 
regulations then it could be perceived that the Basel Committee were in 
favour of penalising. However, ideally the former would be the solution 
as it would have a better chance of adoption due to the Basel regulations 
being implemented by many countries around the world, resulting in far 
wider reach and impact. 
 
If the three recommendations put forward by the author of the research 
come to fruition it will strengthen VaR. Alongside the proposals and 
discussions in place in respect of the other weaknesses of VaR then a 
more robust and responsive risk calculating tool can be achieved.  
 
In terms of VaR going forward and how it will look in the future, it should 





on estimate.1224 It is a guide and one should proceed with caution. To a 
certain degree VaR has been made a scapegoat for the financial crisis. It 
has been criticised as one of the main perpetrators for the catalyst that 
brought the banking world to its knees. Whilst some are convinced that 
VaR cannot be improved and that it only applies to smaller banks where 
the portfolio does not partake in exotic transactions,1225 it is proposed 
that there is still a place for VaR for the recommendations already 
mentioned. Until a better risk measuring tool comes along then VaR will 
and should be used. Burchi rightly puts forward that abandonment of VaR 
is not an option1226 and advanced models may provide more accurate 
results if used.1227 The author would concur with this and would also 
postulate that it is a rough guide to calculating risk and one should 
proceed with caution when analysing the end computation.  
 
In addition, the results derived from VaR should be carefully examined 
and in some instances doubled or even tripled to account for risk. VaR 
still has a huge role to play and is still the lead risk measuring tool, the 
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RESEARCH CONCLUSION AND FINAL THOUGHTS  
 
Basel I was created to establish a safer environment because the Basel 
Committee recognised that banks could fail due to operational losses and 
this encouraged the creation of Basel II (emphasis on operational risk) 
and Basel II.5 as a result of the financial crisis;1228 and Basel III followed 
shortly thereafter. Whilst the author would agree that the Basel 
Committee have been reactive over the last three decades and the 
research focuses on the risks and shortcomings of Basel III, it should be 
stressed that there are strengths contained in all three Basel Accords and 
this was included at the appropriate stages of the research. 
 
A timeline was illustrated for two reasons, to enlighten those that may 
not be familiar or have little knowledge about Basel I, II and III, and for 
those that are more informed then an appreciation of the progression 
made, the milestones achieved, and the issues encountered alongside 
recommendations to improve Basel III could be acknowledged. 
 
Chapter 1 explained the layout that the research would follow, theory and 
method were included and a brief overview of Basel I including strengths 
and weaknesses. 
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Chapter 2 focused on Basel II and the improvements and restructuring 
that was made, as well as a brief discussion about Basel II.5 in the 
aftermath of the financial crisis. It also further developed the theme of 
the good and bad aspects of Basel II and II.5, some of which continued 
from Basel I.  
 
Chapter 3 progressed with the critical analysis of Basel III together with 
its strengths and weaknesses.  
 
Chapter 4 developed Basel III further with analysis and centred on the 
three main risks and shortcomings believed to pose most risk to the 
current regulations - Capital Ratios, CRAs and VaR. This was to refine the 
weaknesses portrayed throughout the research and to illuminate the 
three key problems with Basel III according to the author. It also 
analysed their weaknesses and also the impact they have had on the 
Basel regulations together with consideration as to how they can be 
improved.  
 
Chapter 5 began with a brief overview of the content explored, in depth 
use of material and commentary was given on the three risks alongside 
recommendations. A brief discussion was directed toward the Basel III 
additional work and the recent December 2017 papers, as well as the 
inclusion of recent commentary in regard to the changes to the Basel 






What can be deduced from the research is that the Basel regulations have 
progressed since 1988 and developed immensely in Basel III. 
Weaknesses have persisted, some have been created, and some have 
been eradicated. Whilst the Basel regulations have been in operation for 
over three decades and adopted by many countries around the world, it 
is clear that a lot of work still needs to take place and the recent events 
of the financial crisis reinforces this point. It is intended that the research 
highlights this and that with effort and perseverance Basel III can become 
stronger. On this point, it is worth noting the recent developments of 
Basel III. 
 
Basel III reforms or Basel IV? 
 
Basel III is still in the process of being fully implemented. Additionally, 
some implementation dates have been missed over the years since Basel 
III began 1229  and it may take far longer to satisfy the percentages 
featured during the research. It is indisputable that banks still have work 
to do in implementing Basel III,1230 for example in 2017 a proposal to 
extend the implementation for minimum capital requirements for market 
                                               
1229 Financial Stability Board, ‘Basel III - Implementation’ http://www.fsb.org/what-we-
do/implementation-monitoring/monitoring-of-priority-areas/basel-iii/ accessed 25 April 
2018. 
1230 Deloitte, ‘Finalization of the Basel III Post-Crisis Reforms’ 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/risk/lu-rna-finalization-






risk was endorsed and extended to 1 January 2022.1231 Implementation 
still, therefore, poses a problem.   
 
Even though Basel III is still relatively new and capital requirements 
(among other requirements set) have not been adhered to in their 
entirety, it has not stopped the whisperings of a new Basel iteration - 
Basel IV.1232 The fourth iteration of the Basel regulations is believed to 
have already been agreed on,1233 although the Basel Committee are still 
referring to this as Basel III.1234 In reality the reforms that have been 
made which are published as ’High-level summary of Basel III 
reforms‘ 1235  and ’Basel III: Finalising post-crisis reforms‘ 1236  are 
supplements and finalisations of Basel III – not Basel IV. 
 
The measures seek to complement the existing Basel III framework and 
restore credibility in RWA and comparability of bank capital ratios.1237 A 
speech from William Coen, the Secretary General of the Basel Committee 
prior to this point, suggested that the Basel framework was being 
                                               
1231 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Governors and Heads of Supervision Finalise 
Basel III Reforms’ https://www.bis.org/press/p171207.htm accessed 24 April 2018. 
1232 As will be alluded to over the coming pages, it is more of an ‘add-on’ rather than Basel 
IV. 
1233 Bank for International Settlements, ‘High-Level Summary of Basel III Reforms’ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf accessed 25 April 2018. 
1234 Justin Pugsley, ‘Basel IV’s Done - Now Comes the Hard Part’ 
http://www.thebanker.com/Banking-Regulation-Risk/Reg-Rage/Basel-IV-s-done-now-
comes-the-hard-part?ct=true accessed 24 April 2018. 
1235 Bank for International Settlements, ‘High-Level Summary of Basel III Reforms’ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf accessed 09 April 2019. 
1236 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel III: Finalising Post-Crisis Reforms’ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424.pdf accessed 9 April 2019. 
1237 Bank for International Settlements, ‘High-Level Summary of Basel III Reforms’ 






finalised and progress had been made in several areas such as NSFR, 
financial support for off balance sheet entities and capital-out-put 
floors.1238 Thus indicating the meetings and discussions conducted that 
have now come to fruition.1239 
 
The finalisation of such measures would appear complete and most of the 
implementation dates are set at 2022. These include revisions to the 
standardised approach for credit risk, a revised market risk framework, 
and leverage ratio to name but three.1240 It is only the output floor which 
has a longer implementation period and is a staggered process starting 
from 50 percent beginning 2022 rising to 72.5 percent by 2027.  
 
Even though the reforms published in December 2017 are finalised, the 
author would disagree. As Deloitte commented, ’A lot still has to happen 
before these standards are finalised and implemented…‘. 1241  For 
example, the fundamental review of the trading book has already been 
delayed from 2019 to 2022 and this shows that elements of the ’finalised‘ 
reforms are still subject to change. 
 
                                               
1238 Bank for International Settlements, ‘The State of Global Financial Regulation’ 
https://www.bis.org/speeches/sp171013a.pdf accessed 24 April 2018. 
1239 In document form at least.  
1240 Bank for International Settlements, ‘High-Level Summary of Basel III Reforms’ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf page 12 accessed 25 April 2018. 
1241 Deloitte, ‘Finalization of the Basel III Post-Crisis Reforms’ 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/risk/lu-rna-finalization-






It is important to note that Basel III primarily focused on the numerator 
in regard to the minimum required regulatory capital. In contrast, the 
reforms to the Basel III framework focuses on the denominator i.e. the 
calculation of risk exposure relating to credit, market and operational 
risk. 1242  The reforms 1243  are a clear sign that tougher regulation is 
inbound.  
 
It would be permissible to assume that the reforms made would not 
necessarily mean higher capital requirements for banks, after all, sizeable 
percentage increases have already taken place from Basel II to Basel III. 
However, as will be discussed over the remaining section this is to the 
contrary. Points that will be raised consist of some of the material from 
the December 2017 papers and commentary of where the Basel 
regulations are going. 
 
There are some key points (and challenges) to note from the changes 
made following the December 2017 papers and projections voiced since 
2015. This is to illuminate the direction that the Basel regulations are 
going and how the recent additional work seeks to make Basel III more 
robust. These include but are not limited to capital requirements (which 
includes rising costs, capital shortfall, CET1) which appear to affect 
                                               
1242 KPMG, ‘The World Awaits: Basel 4 Nears Completion’ 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/12/world-awaits-basel-4-nears-
completion.pdf page 3 accessed 25 April 2018. 
1243 European Parliament, ‘Upgrading the Basel standards: From Basel III to Basel IV?’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/587361/IPOL_BRI(2016)5873





European banks predominately, a fundamental review of the trading 
book, RWA, and finally other challenges such as implementation costs 
that come from creating new internal models, timely and accurate data 
to make calculations, and establishing internal management information 
which is used for external reporting. There are other revisions that have 
been made, these are but some of those revisions that will challenge 
banks going forward. 
 
Firstly, the Basel Committee has identified four banks that will be affected 
by rising capital requirements that fall into the category of global 
systemically important banks1244 (GSIBs).1245 The potential problem this 
may cause is that if four of the current 30 GSIBs1246 are going to be 
affected by the rising capital requirements then this can impact the 
banking sector due to the wide reaching capabilities of GSIBs. In addition, 
the Basel Committee has suggested that there will be a capital shortfall 
for large banks, and this will be most noticeable for European banks 
whereby minimum capital required is set to increase by 12.9 percent in 
order for those banks to remain compliant.1247   
 
                                               
1244 Banks that are too big to fail and if they did then a financial crisis would be all but 
confirmed.  
1245 Justin Pugsley, ‘Basel IV’s Done - Now Comes the Hard Part’ 
http://www.thebanker.com/Banking-Regulation-Risk/Reg-Rage/Basel-IV-s-done-now-
comes-the-hard-part?ct=true accessed 24 April 2018. 
1246 Financial Stability Board, ‘FSB Publishes 2017 G-SIB List’ 
http://www.fsb.org/2017/11/fsb-publishes-2017-g-sib-list/ accessed 1 May 2018. 
1247 European Banking Authority, ‘EBA Publishes Full Impact Assessment of Basel 
Reforms on EU Banks’ https://www.eba.europa.eu/-/eba-publishes-full-impact-






Secondly, a fundamental review of the trading book1248 will take place. 
This is changing in three areas: definition of the trading book, a new 
standardised approach for all market risk areas, and a review of the 
internal model approach.1249 The problem this may cause, for example, 
is that in respect of total RWAs this could have a negative impact for 
banks and capital market activities.1250 If capital market activities are 
reduced then this may impact on domestic economies, lending protocol, 
business relationships and new business ventures. 
 
Thirdly, CET1 will change and in respect of European banking, CET1 
capital requirements will be severely affected with an expected shortfall 
of about €120 billion.1251 What can be deduced from these revisions is 
that banks are being squeezed further, and more money is required in 
order for banks to align with the refined Basel regulations. Especially for 
European banks. 
 
                                               
1248 European Parliament, ‘Upgrading the Basel Standards: From Basel III to Basel IV?’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/587361/IPOL_BRI(2016)5873
61_EN.pdf page 9-11 accessed 24 April 2018. 
1249 M Niesen and S Roth, ‘Fundamental Review of the Trading Book: New Framework for 
Market Risks' in M Ohliger, M Schulte-Mattler and D Stemmer, Basel IV the Next 
Generation of Risk Weighted Assets (Wiley-VCH Verlag & Co. 2017) 147. 
1250 European Parliament, ‘Upgrading the Basel standards: From Basel III to Basel IV?’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2016/587361/IPOL_BRI(2016)5873
61_EN.pdf page 10 accessed 01 May 2018. 
1251 McKinsey&Company, ‘Basel “IV”: What’s Next for Banks?’ 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/risk/our%20insights/
basel%20iv%20whats%20next%20for%20european%20banks/basel-iv-whats-next-for-






Fourthly, another revision will be RWA and internal ratings (which 
includes capital floors previously spoke of).1252 For example, the Basel 
Committee have stated that calculation of RWA using internal models 
should be above 72.5 percent when using standardised models, thus it 
should not drop below this figure. 1253  RWA will have a five year 
implementation date which will begin 2022.1254 This could further impede 
European banks who would prefer a 70 percent figure, the United States 
in comparison have been pushing for 75 percent1255 as they are already 
in a position to satisfy such. Additionally, the increases suggested could 
affect European banks by 40 to 60 percent which equates to about €7 
trillion in aggregated RWA.1256 For instance, there will be a sharp increase 
in credit risk RWA due to quantity of credit in a bank’s portfolio combined 
with the strictness of the new credit risk rules,1257 as Wackerbeck et al. 
purport.  
 
Other challenges that may arise for banks include implementation 
costs 1258  which diverge into other avenues such as developing new 
                                               
1252 Ibid page 5. 
1253 Dixit Joshi and Steve Morris, ‘What is Basel IV?’ 
https://www.db.com/newsroom_news/2018/what-is-basel-iv-en-11456.htm accessed 24 
April 2018. 
1254 Ibid. 
1255 Huw Jones, ‘Regulators to delay meeting in bid to reach bank capital deal’ 
https://perma.cc/5ZCM-FN99 accessed 24 April 2018. 
1256 Philip Wackerbeck and others, ‘Fourth Time Around? European Banks Confront 
“Basel IV”’ https://www.strategyand.pwc.com/reports/fourth-time-around accessed 25 April 
2018. 
1257 Ibid. 
1258 KPMG, ‘The World Awaits: Basel 4 Nears Completion’ 
https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/xx/pdf/2016/12/world-awaits-basel-4-nears-






internal models, ensuring data is timely and accurate, and establishing 
internal management information which is used for external reporting. 
What can be ascertained is that the regulatory reforms made will have a 
substantial impact for banks and it may still pose much uncertainty and 
complexity for banks.1259  
 
What do the 2017 papers mean for Basel III and the future of banks? 
 
In light of some of the main revisions (and challenges) noted in the 
previous section, it is prudent to illustrate what the Basel Committee want 
to achieve by introducing the Basel III reforms.  
 
As was stated earlier1260 the finalised material published by the Basel 
Committee aims to restore credibility in relation to calculating RWA as 
well as improve comparability of banks capital ratios. With this in mind, 
the reforms put in place seek to: 
 
• Improve standardised approaches 
• Limit internal models 
• Improve operation risk  
• Introduce a new buffer for leverage ratio  
                                               
1259 Deloitte, ‘Finalization of the Basel III Post-Crisis Reforms’ 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/lu/Documents/risk/lu-rna-finalization-
basel-iii-post-crisis-regulatory-reform-08122017.pdf page 2 accessed 25 April 2018. 






• Introduce a different output floor1261 
 
First, the reforms aim to improve standardised approaches by making 
them not only more robust but also to allow for more risk sensitivity.1262 
Some examples include a better approach to residential mortgages which 
will now depend on the loan to value ratio of that particular mortgage, 
compared with the previous approach of a flat risk weight.1263 This does, 
therefore, offer a more tailored approach rather than a blanket across all 
residential mortgages. Another example is that the improved 
standardised approaches will now apply specific risk weights to small and 
medium enterprises and their exposures. Again, this improvement has 
made Basel III more accurate and tailored toward specific risks.  
 
Second, the finalised reforms seek to limit the use of internal models.1264 
For example, exposure to medium and large enterprises will now be 
calculated by fixed values compared with the previous approach of 
estimating with LGD and EAD.1265 
                                               
1261 European Parliament, ‘Finalisation of Basel III Post-Crisis Reforms’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614486/IPOL_ATA(2017)61
4486_EN.pdf accessed 9 April 2019. 
 
1262 Bank for International Settlements, ‘High-Level Summary of Basel III Reforms’ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf page 2 accessed 9 April 2019. 
1263 European Parliament, ‘Finalisation of Basel III Post-Crisis Reforms’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614486/IPOL_ATA(2017)614
486_EN.pdf accessed 9 April 2019. 
1264 The Basel Committee intend on achieving this by placing limits on certain inputs when 
calculating capital requirements while using the IRB approach for credit risk and this will 
be accomplished by not allowing the use of internal approaches for CVA risk and 
operation risk. 
1265 European Parliament, ‘Finalisation of Basel III Post-Crisis Reforms’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614486/IPOL_ATA(2017)614





Third, improvements have been made to the operational risk framework. 
Issues such as accounting for losses from misconduct or inferior controls 
were not adequately accounted for. Importantly here,  
 
’The new standardised approach determines a bank’s operational 
risk capital requirements based on two assumptions, namely that 
operational risk increases at an increasing rate with a bank’s 
income, and that operational risk losses seen in the past go along 
with a higher likelihood of operational risk losses in the future‘1266  
 
Fourth, there is a new leverage ratio buffer for GSIBs. This is in addition 
to the leverage ratio discussed in Chapter 3, and can be seen to further 
assist (limit) the leverage of GSIBs.1267 It is required that GSIBs must 
use Tier 1 capital and 50 percent of the GSIBs risk weighted 
requirements.1268 This improvement is a positive move, for example it 
addresses the too big to fail problem, and adds an additional line of 
protection for GSIBs and the world economy. 
 
Fifth, the change to output floor that was not updated since Basel I. The 
reform in this area now supports a level playing field by setting a limit on 
                                               
1266 Ibid 
1267 Bank for International Settlements, ‘High-Level Summary of Basel III Reforms’ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d424_hlsummary.pdf page 1 accessed 9 April 2019. 
1268 European Parliament, ‘Finalisation of Basel III Post-Crisis Reforms’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/ATAG/2017/614486/IPOL_ATA(2017)614






regulatory capital benefits for a bank using internal models in relation to 
standardised approaches.1269  
 
From an EU stance, the European Banking Authority has welcomed the 
reforms introduced by the Basel Committee.1270 Amendments will be 
required in order to implement these changes into EU law through the 
CRR.1271 Consultation will be required with other EU institutions as well 
as member states.1272 At present it is not expected that the EU will look 
to require implementation of the Basel reforms until 2023 or 2024 with 
proposals coming forward around 2020.1273  In respect of the United 
Kingdom, this will be, no doubt, the first time that the EU will proceed 
without participation of the United Kingdom due to the imminent 
departure, although it has been stated by HM Treasury that the United 
Kingdom is committed to implementing the Basel III reforms in a timely 
manner.1274 
                                               
1269 Ibid. 
1270 European Banking Authority, ‘EBA Welcomes the Revised Basel Framework and 
Provides an Overview of its Impact in the EU’ https://eba.europa.eu/-/eba-welcomes-the-
revised-basel-framework-and-provides-an-overview-of-its-impact-in-the-eu accessed 9 
April 2019. 
1271 European Commission, ‘Banking Regulation: Commission Welcomes Basel 
Committee’s Agreement on Post-Crisis Reforms’ http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-
17-5171_en.htm accessed 9 April 2019. 
1272 See European Parliament, ‘Amending Capital Requirements: The ‘CRD V Package’’ 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2017/599385/EPRS_BRI%282017
%29599385_EN.pdf accessed 9 April 2019 for recent developments.  
1273 Deloitte, ‘Basel III: The Bank Capital marathon’ 
https://blogs.deloitte.co.uk/financialservices/2018/03/basel-iii-the-bank-capital-
marathon.html accessed 9 April 2019. 
1274 Gov.uk, ‘Commission Consultation on Basel III Implementation – HM Treasury 
Response’ https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/commission-consultation-on-







In conclusion, it should not be forgotten what the Basel regulations are 
trying to accomplish and that is to limit financial crises through creating 
financial stability. Basel III has focused heavily on raising more capital 
and better quality capital.1275 However, Pugsley argues that it would be 
brave to say that banking crises will be a thing of the past,1276 and rightly 
so. Additionally, Pugsley questions that with a steady increase of 
regulatory bodies since the 1970s, will these revisions make any real 
difference? A valid point given that there have been several financial 
crises since the 1970s and regulation has not curtailed any of them. 
Examples include Black Monday 1987,1277 the Asian crisis 1997,1278 the 
Dotcom bubble 2000,1279 or the recent financial crisis of 20081280 that has 
been the worst in modern banking history since the Great Depression of 
the 1930s. Regulation did not stop any of these financial crises and the 
author would stipulate and concur in part with Pugsley in that why will 
regulation stop future financial crises? The author would, however, form 
a different opinion and that regulation, including Basel III, is capable of 
                                               
1275 McKinsey&Company, ‘Basel “IV”: What’s Next for Banks?’ 
https://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/business%20functions/risk/our%20insights/
basel%20iv%20whats%20next%20for%20european%20banks/basel-iv-whats-next-for-
banks.ashx page 6 accessed 24 April 2018. 
1276 Justin Pugsley, ‘Basel IV’s Done - Now Comes the Hard Part’ 
http://www.thebanker.com/Banking-Regulation-Risk/Reg-Rage/Basel-IV-s-done-now-
comes-the-hard-part?ct=true accessed 24 April 2018. 
1277 Simon Goodley, ‘How Black Monday Sowed the Seeds for the Current Financial 
Crisis’ The Guardian (London, 14 October 2012) 
https://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/oct/14/black-monday-sowed-seeds-financial-
crisis accessed 24 April 2018. 
1278 The Economist, ‘Ten Years On’ https://www.economist.com/node/9432495 accessed 
24 April 2018. 
1279 Jorn Madslien, ‘Dotcom Bubble Burst: 10 Years On’ 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/8558257.stm accessed 24 April 2018. 
1280 Joel Havemann, ‘The Financial Crisis of 2008’ 






limiting future financial crises, the important point is the substance of the 
regulation. This is forever changing and being enhanced, for this reason 
the author would suggest that regulation can be a key defender against 
financial crises and it needs to consist of the right material. A hard task 
and one which has been evolving for many decades. 
 
Whilst Pugsley is right to a certain degree and that regulation has not 
stopped financial crises in the past and that it will be the same for the 
future, the author would state that the Basel regulations can only do so 
much; it primarily covers banks as has been the context of the research. 
That being said, other areas of banking need to be considered in which 
regulation is key. For instance shadow banking,1281 an area that shows 
signs of weakness where full scrutiny of shadow firms is somewhat small 
compared to large banks. Pugsley comments, ’The problem with so 
strongly regulating one part of the financial system is that risks will 
naturally gravitate to where the rules are more lax or simply different‘.1282  
This could be where the next financial crisis lingers and is currently laying 
dormant. If shadow banking does prove problematic, as could be the case 
in China,1283 then it is only a matter of time before it surfaces and at 
                                               
1281 Shadow banking can be generally described as the leveraged non-bank investment 
channels that some banks use to place complex securitised loans off their balance sheet. 
See A Sheng and N C Soon, Shadow Banking in China (John Wiley & Sons Ltd 2016) 18-
20 for brief discussion on what shadow banking is. 
1282 Justin Pugsley, ‘Basel IV’s Done - Now Comes the Hard Part’ 
http://www.thebanker.com/Banking-Regulation-Risk/Reg-Rage/Basel-IV-s-done-now-
comes-the-hard-part?ct=true accessed 24 April 2018. 
1283 Andrew Collier, ‘China’s Shadow Finance Time-Bomb Could Trigger Crisis’ Financial 
Times (London, 26 June 2017) https://www.ft.com/content/a6086a9a-5059-11e7-bfb8-






present, as Wandhofer notes,  regulators do not have the tools to 
protect1284 and considering that a recent report suggested that shadow 
banking now accounts for 13 percent of total global financial assets,1285 
there is deep cause for concern. This example highlights that regulation 
is still very much required and the author would suggest that regulation 
needs to regularly evolve and improve. In turn it can be a preventive 
mechanism against financial crises. The Basel reforms are the next logical 
step for the Basel Committee. The author would not coin the new reforms 
made in the December 2017 papers as Basel IV as they are reforms to 
the Basel framework, at most Basel III.5. To reinforce this notion, Haynes 
states:  
 
’Basel IV is arguably not a separate set of rules but the application 
of parts of Basel III. It seems to have arisen as a term by 
management consultants and lawyers seeking to create more 
interest in their services…‘1286 
 
What has happened over the last thirty years and in recent times has 
given the impression that regulation is needed more than it has ever been 
needed before. Whilst there is a vast amount of regulation that has been 
in place over the last few years since the financial crisis and since Basel 
                                               
1284 R Wandhofer, Transaction Banking and the Impact of Regulatory Change: Basel III 
and Other Challenges for the Global Economy (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 272. 
1285 Caroline Binham, ‘Shadow Banking Grows to More Than $45tn Assets Globally’ 
Financial Times (London, 5 March 2018) https://www.ft.com/content/c45bf332-1e48-11e8-
956a-43db76e69936 accessed 29 June 2018. 






I, it is obvious that regulation endeavours to stop financial crises. 
Wandhofer ponders as to whether will it be able to prevent the next 
financial crash, the answer being no;1287 but the author would suggest 
that if the hard work continues then one day the Basel regulations and 





Basel III is an excellent framework for international standards on 
regulation, supervision and risk management of banks.1288 What is clear 
since Basel I and the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, is that whilst 
there are still risks and shortcomings of Basel III and that policy and law 
from countries around the world come and go, the Basel regulations are 
here to stay and aim to make banking regulation stronger in order to 
fortify the international banking system. On this note, it is fitting to draw 
a close to the research with a quote given at the beginning of the 
research1289 albeit slightly updated in part, however the mandate itself is 
the same: 
 
                                               
1287 R Wandhofer, Transaction Banking and the Impact of Regulatory Change: Basel III 
and Other Challenges for the Global Economy (Palgrave Macmillan 2014) 262. 
1288 Supported by the Basel Core Principles. See, Bank for International Settlements, 
‘Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision’ https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf 
accessed 28 March 2019.   






 ’The BCBS is the primary global standard setter for the prudential 
 regulation of banks and provides a forum for cooperation on  
 banking supervisory matters. Its mandate is to strengthen the  
 regulation, supervision and practices of banks worldwide with the 
 purpose of enhancing financial stability‘1290 
 
So with the Basel Committee overseeing the implementation of the Basel 
regulations they will continue to strive for a better tomorrow. Ultimately 
it should not be forgotten that risk cannot be eliminated, it can only be 
minimised because if the elimination of risk was possible there would be 
no need for regulation.1291 Keeping this in focus, it is poignant to end with 
the following quote by King:  
 
 ’After almost a decade of reforms and new regulations, and  
 protestations by central bankers and regulators that the banking  
 system is now incomparably safer than before the crisis, it is  
 troubling that the Italian banking system has again come under  
 scrutiny and is clearly in need of recapitalisation, that Deutsche  
 Bank has been so fragile with European bank share prices falling  
 in 2016, and that such well-respected economists as former US  
 Treasury Secretary Larry Summers have concluded that financial 
                                               
1290 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel Committee Charter’ 
https://www.bis.org/bcbs/charter.htm accessed 29 June 2018. 
1291 M Ojo, ‘Risk Management by the Basel Committee: Evaluating Progress made from 






 markets regard the banking sector today as no safer than before 
 the crisis‘1292 
 
                                               
1292 M King, The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking and the Future of the Global Economy 
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